


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The Princeton theological
review



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THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

No. 4—October, 1905.

I.

TERTULLIAN AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

FIRST ARTICLE.

IT is exceedingly impressive to see Christian Latin literature Athena-like spring at once into being fully armed in the person of an eminently representative man, in whom seem summed up the promise and potency of all that it was yet to be. This is what occurred in Tertullian, whose advent and career provide a remarkable illustration of the providential provision of the right man for the right place. Seldom has one been called to a great work who was better fitted for it by disposition and talents as well as by long and strenuous preparation. Ardent in temperament, endowed with an intelligence as subtle and original as it was aggressive and audacious, he added to his natural gifts a profound erudition, which far from impeding only gave weight to the movements of his alert and robust mind. A jurist of note, he had joined to the study of law not only that of letters, but also that of medicine; born and brought up in the camp he had imbibed from infancy no little knowledge of the military art; and his insatiable curiosity had carried him into the depths of every form of learning accessible to his time and circumstances, not even excepting the occult literature of the day. When he gave himself in his mature manhood to the service of Christianity, he brought in his hands all the spoils of antique culture, smelted into a molten mass by an almost incredible passion.

The moment when he appeared on the scene was one well calcu-

lated to call out all his powers. It was shortly after the beginning of the last decade of the second century. Commodus had died and left a trail of civil war behind him, in the midst of which persecution had broken out afresh in Africa. Harassed from without, the African Church was also torn from within by an accumulation of evils; apostasies, heresies, schisms abounded. Up through the confusion were thrust Tertullian's mighty shoulders, casting off the enemies of the Gospel upon every side. He was not formed for defensive warfare. Even against the persecuting heathenism he took the offensive. Not content with repelling its calumnies and ridiculing the popular hatred of Christianity, he undertook to demonstrate, as a jurist, the illegality of the persecuting edicts, and, as a moralist, the absurdity of the heathen superstitions. He broke out a short and easy way for the refutation of heretics, by which he put them out of court at the start, and then followed them remorselessly into every corner of their reasoning. Within the Church itself he pursued with mordant irony the crowding abuses which had grown up in the Christian life. Of course he had the defects of his qualities. This terrible adversary of others was a terrible adversary also of his own peace. The extremity of his temper made him a prey to the fanatical claims of the Montanists and ultimately drove him beyond even them. He died the head of a new sect of his own.

Meanwhile he had rendered a service to the Church which it is no exaggeration to call inestimable. There is certainly discoverable in the writings of his immediate successors little open recognition of the immensity of the debt which Christianity owed to him. Throughout the whole of the remainder of the third century—a period of some eighty years—his name is not once mentioned. In the Greek Church, indeed, no one but the historian Eusebius seems ever to have heard of him. Even in his own West, Lactantius (305–6) is the first to allude to him, and he does so with obvious depreciation. Jerome, it is true, gives free vent to his admiration for the learning and acuteness, the vehemence and elegance of this “torrent of eloquence,” and not only places him formally among the “illustrious men” of the Church, but calls him fondly “our Tertullian.” With Hilary and Augustine, however, he has already taken his place definitely in the catalogue of heretics, and thenceforward he found hardly any who were prepared to do him reverence.* All this appearance of neglect passing into reprobation, however, is appear-

*The generous but qualified praise of Vincent, *Common.*, xviii [46], stands almost alone by the side of Jerome's.

ance only. Men might carefully avoid speaking of Tertullian; they could not escape his influence. Cyprian, for example, never breathes his name; yet the works of Cyprian are filled with the silent witnesses of the diligence with which he studied his brilliant predecessor; and his secretary told Jerome he never passed a day without reading him, and was accustomed to ask for him in the significant formula, "Hand me the Master." This is not far from a typical instance. "The man was too great a scholar, thinker, writer," remarks Harnack,* "and he had done the Western Church too distinguished service during a long series of years for his memory to become effaced."

In modern times the vigor of Tertullian's mind and the brilliancy of his literary gifts have perhaps generally been fully recognized. It is questionable, however, whether the greatness of his initiative in the development of Christian doctrine is even yet estimated at its true value. That many of the streams of doctrinal thought that have flowed down through the Western Church take their rise in him is indeed universally understood. But perhaps it comes to us with a little surprise when Harnack claims for him, for example, that it was he who broke out the road for the formulation of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. "When the Nicene formulary is praised," says Harnack,† "it is always of Athanasius that we think; when the Chalcedonian decree is cited, it is the name of Leo the Great that is magnified. But that Tertullian is in reality the father of the orthodox doctrines of the Trinity and of the Person of Christ, and that in the whole patristic literature there is no treatise that can be compared in importance and influence with his tract *Against Praxeas*, it has necessarily been left to the investigations of our own day to exhibit." If such a statement as this can be substantiated it is enough to mark Tertullian out not merely as a man of exceptional gifts and worthy performance, but as one of the greatest forces which have wrought in history.

It is proposed to subject this statement to such testing as is involved in going to the tract *Against Praxeas* and seeking to form a judgment of its value and of the place in the development of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity which it vindicates for its author.

The tract *Against Praxeas*, it must be borne in mind from the

* *Sitzungsberichte d. k. p. Akad. d. Wissenschaften*, 1895, June, p. 546: "Tertullian in der Litteratur der alten Kirche."

† *Loc. cit.*

outset, is not an extended treatise. It is a brief document filling but some fifty pages. Nor is it a calm constructive work in which the author sets himself to develop in its completeness a doctrinal elaboration. It is a vigorous and lively polemic designed to meet an immediate crisis. In other words, it is distinctly an occasional writing, devoted to the refutation of a heresy which was at the moment troubling the churches. Any doctrinal construction which may be found in it is accordingly purely incidental, and rather betrays the underlying conceptions of the writer's mind than forms the calculated burden of the document. If this constructive element, thus emerging, is nevertheless epoch-making for the history of thought, it will redound with peculiar force to the honor of the author. That it so emerges, however, renders it necessary that, for the proper estimate of the tract, we should begin by obtaining a somewhat exact understanding of the circumstances which gave birth to it.

We must not be misled by its title or by the reversion of the discourse now and then to the form of direct address into supposing the tract a personal assault upon Praxeas himself. It is quite clear that Praxeas was a figure resurrected by Tertullian from a comparatively remote past, and given prominence in the discussion, perhaps, as a sort of controversial device. Tertullian, apparently, would represent the teachings he is opposing as a mere recrudescence of an exploded notion, discredited in its vacillating and weak proponent a generation ago.* Of Praxeas himself we know nothing except what Tertullian tells us: there is no independent mention of his name in the entirety of Christian literature. He is represented as an Asian confessor who was the first to import into Rome the type of doctrine which Tertullian calls Monarchianism or Patripassianism.† Evidently he had made himself felt for a time in

* Even were this motive not operative, it would not follow from the use of Praxeas' name that he and the book were contemporaneous. Josephus controverted Apion and Origen Celsus only after a considerable interval of years. The same seems to be true of the use of Fronto's name in the *Octavius* of Minucius Felix. (See HARNACK, *Chronologie*, II, 326, and note; and compare what is said by HAGEMANN, *Röm. Kirche*, pp. 235-6.)

† HAGEMANN's attempt (*Röm. Kirche*, 234 and sq.) to identify Praxeas with Callistus is only a part of his general attempt so to manipulate the facts as to make Callistus the real protagonist for fundamental Christian truth and Tertullian the real errorist. In the prosecution of this endeavor he gives to Callistus all that belongs rightfully to Tertullian (and more). He speaks of him as setting forth "the doctrine of the unity of nature of the Father and Son and the doctrine of the hypostatic union of the two natures in Christ, with a completeness of formal development such as they received later through the instrumentality of the General Councils only after long and bitter controversies," and as thus more than

Rome, and among other things had succeeded in reversing the favorable policy of the Roman bishops with respect to the Montanists. By this achievement he naturally earned from Tertullian a twofold scorn. Tertullian biting remarks that thus Praxeas had doubly done the devil's business in Rome,—“he had expelled prophecy and brought in heresy, had exiled the Paraclete and crucified the Father.”* His heresy passed over into Africa,—while the people, says Tertullian, slept in doctrinal simplicity. But God raised up a defender of the truth: and the heresy was exposed and seemingly destroyed; Praxeas himself submitted to correction, and returned to the old faith. Apparently this was the end of it all: *exinde silentium*, says Tertullian, with terse significance. But it is the curse of noxious growths that they are apt to leave seeds behind them. So it happened in this case also. The tares had been rooted up and burned. But lo, after so long a time, the new crop appeared, and the last state was unspeakably worse than the first. The tares had everywhere, says Tertullian, shaken out their seed, and now, after having lain hid so long, their vitality had become only too manifest. It is not then an individual that Tertullian is facing; it is a widespread condition. This tract is not an attempt to silence a heretic menacing the peace of the Church; it is an effort to correct a rampant evil already widely spread in the community, by which the very existence of the truth is endangered.

The tones in which Tertullian speaks of the rise of the heresy in the person of Praxeas and of its prevalence at the time of his writing are noticeably different. Then it was an exotic vagary seeking footing in the West and finding none: now it is a native growth, springing up everywhere. The tares had cast their seed, he says, “everywhere” (*ubique*). Nor can he look with comfort on the task of rooting them up. Though he is not the man to lose courage, and reminds himself of the past success, he yet finds his deepest consolation in the assurance that all tares shall be burnt up at the last day. When a man looks forward to the Judgment Day for the vindication of his cause, he is not far from despairing of success here and now. It looks very much as if Tertullian felt himself in a hopeless minority in his defense of what he calls the pristine faith

a hundred years in advance of the Church at large refuting Arianism and establishing for Rome a “triumphal creed” (see especially pp. 101 and 128). On the other hand, he represents Tertullian as, under the influence of Hippolytus, so misunderstanding Callistus that, under the nick-name of Praxeas, he treats his epoch-making orthodox definitions as if they were Monarchian.

* *Adv. Prax.*, i, Ita duo negotia diaboli Praxeas Romæ procuravit, prophetiam expulit et hæresim intulit, paracletum fugavit et patrem crucifixit.

(*pristinum*). He does not conceal the difficulty he experienced in obtaining even a fair hearing for his doctrine. Christians at large were impatient of everything that seemed to their uninstructed minds to imperil their hard-won monotheism. The majority of believers he tells us are ever of the simple, not to say the unwise and untaught (*simplices, ne dixerim imprudentes et idiotæ*); and they were nothing less than terrified (*expavescunt*) by the mention of an "economy" within the being of God by virtue of which the one only God may be supposed to present distinctions within His unity. They continuously cast in the teeth of those who inculcated such doctrines the charge of preaching two or three gods, while they arrogated to themselves alone the worship of the one only true God.

If we are to take this literally, it will mean that Christians at large in Tertullian's day—that is, at the time when he wrote this tract—were suspicious of the doctrine of the Trinity and looked upon it almost as a refined polytheism; that they were inclined rather strongly to some form of Monarchianism as alone comporting with a real monotheism. There are not lacking other indications that something like this may have been the case. Hippolytus, in approaching in the course of his great work *On Heresies* the treatment of the Monarchianism of his day, betrays an even more poignant sense of isolation than Tertullian. He speaks of the promoters of the Monarchian views as bringing great confusion upon believers throughout the whole world.* In Rome at least, he tells us, they met with wide consent;† and he represents himself as almost single-handed in his opposition to their heresy. In effect it seems to be quite true that through no less than four episcopates—those of Eleutherus, Victor, Zephyrinus and Callistus—the modalistic theology was dominant and occupied the place indeed of the official faith at Rome. We may neglect here hints in Origen‡ that something of the same state of affairs may have obtained in the Eastern churches also. Enough that it is clear that at the time when Tertullian's tract was written—say during the second decade of the third century§—the common sentiment of the West was not untouched by modalistic tendencies.

It must not be supposed that the mass of the Christian

* *Philosophumena*, IX, 1: μέγιστον ταραχον κατὰ πάντα τὸν κόσμον ἐν πάσιν τοῖς πιστοῖς ἐμβάλλονσιν.

† Do., IX, 6.

‡ See HARNACK, *Hist. of Dogma*, III, 53, note 2; DORNER, *Person of Christ*, I, ii, 3.

§ HARNACK (*Chronologie*, II, 285–6, 296) sets the date of the book at c. 213–218.

population, in the West at least—for it is with the West that we have particularly to do—held to a modalistic theory, as a definitely conceived theological formula. What is rather to be said is that the Modalistic formula when warily presented roused in the minds of most men of the time no very keen sense of opposition, while the Trinitarian formula was apt to offend their monotheistic consciousness. This is by no means surprising; and it is partially paralleled by the situation in the East after the promulgation of the Nicene creed. The difficulty in obtaining assent to that symbol did not turn on the prevalence of definitely Arian sentiments so much as upon the indefiniteness of the conceptions current among the people at large and the consequent difficulty experienced by so definite a formula in making its way among them. Men were startled by these sharp definitions and felt more or less unprepared to make them the expression of their simple and somewhat undefined faith. So here, a century before the Nicene decision, the people in the West found similar difficulty with the Trinitarian distinctions. The naïve faith of the average Christian crystallized around the two foci of the unity of God and the deity of Christ: and the modalistic formulas might easily be made to appear to the untrained mind to provide simply and easily for both items of belief, and so to strike out a safe middle pathway between the Dynamistic Monarchianism of the Theodotuses and Artemodites, on the one hand, and the subtle constructions of Hippolytus and Tertullian on the other. The one extreme was unacceptable because it did not allow for the true deity of the Redeemer: the other seemed suspicious as endangering the true unity of God.

It is not at all strange, therefore, that the unsophisticated Christian should tremble on the verge of accepting Modalistic Monarchianism, especially when presented, in a guarded form, as a simple and safe solution of a vexing problem. It was thus that it was quick to commend itself; and it was on this ground that it was in its most prudent formulation exploited at Rome as the official faith. When it was brought to Rome, we must remember, it was set over against, not developed Trinitarianism, but rather, on the one side, the crude humanitarianism of the dynamistic school of Monarchianism which was at the moment troubling the Church there, and on the other, the almost equally crude emanationism of the Logos speculation, which had held the minds of thinking men for a generation. It was therefore naturally treated as a deliverance from opposite heresies, along whose safe middle way men might walk in the light of the twin truths of the deity of Christ

and the unity of God. When Hippolytus assailed it, therefore, he obtained no hearing and was treated as merely another disturber of the Church's peace. His assault did not, indeed, fail of all effect: he rendered it impossible for Modalism to be adopted in its crudest form, and forced modifications in it by which it was given the appearance of more nearly covering the main facts of the revelation of God in the Gospel. But he could by no means turn the thoughts of men into a different channel; neither, indeed, was he capable of digging a channel into which their thoughts might justly flow. The outcome, therefore, was only that Callistus excommunicated both Sabellius and Hippolytus and set forth as the Christian faith a new doctrine which was intended to declare the central truths of the Gospel as understood by men of moderation and balanced judgment. Hippolytus looked on this new doctrine as itself essentially Modalism, with a tendency downward. And Hippolytus was right. But it commended itself powerfully to the age, and that not merely in Rome, but in Africa. It is this refined Modalism of the Roman compromise, which seemed to be threatening to become the Christianity of the West, that Tertullian attacks in his tract against Praxeas.

It is not necessary for our present purpose to trace the gradual modifications which the Monarchian teaching underwent from its earliest form as taught at Rome by Noëtus and possibly by Praxeas to its fullest development and most advanced adjustment in the hands of Callistus to the fundamental Church doctrines of God and Christ. Suffice it to say that the modifications by which Callistus sought to "catholicize" Monarchian modalism, proceeded by according some sort of recognition to the Logos doctrine on the one hand, and on the other by softening the crass assertion that it was the Father who suffered on the cross. Of course no personal distinction between Father and Son, or God and Logos, was admitted. But a nominal distinction was accorded, and this distinction was given quasi-validity by a further distinction of times. "Callistus says," explains Hippolytus,* "that the same Logos is at once Son and Father, distinguished in name, but really one individual Spirit, . . . and that the Spirit incarnated in the virgin is not different from the Father but one and the same. . . . For that which is seen, which is of course the man,—it is that which is the Son; but the Spirit which is contained in the Son is the Father, since there are not two Gods, Father and Son, but one. Now, the Father being in him,"—*i.e.*, the Son, which is the "man" or the "flesh,"—"seeing that he had

* *Phil.*, IX, 7.

assumed the flesh, deified it by uniting it with Himself, and made it one, so that the Father and Son are called one God, while this person being one cannot be two, and so the Father suffered along with the Son." Hippolytus adds that Callistus worked out this form of statement because he did not "wish to say the Father suffered." The point here, therefore, is that the Son differs from the Father not as the incarnate differs from the unincarnate God, but rather as the incarnating man differs from the incarnated Spirit. As then the flesh is properly designated by the "Son" and it is the flesh that suffers, the Father, who is properly the Spirit incarnated in the "Son," may more exactly be said to have suffered along with the flesh, *i.e.*, the "Son," than Himself to have endured the suffering. The suffering was, in other words, in the "flesh": the informing "Spirit" only partook in the suffering of the "flesh" because joined in personal union with it. The artificiality of this construction is manifest on the face of it; as also is its instability. Hippolytus himself pointed out its evident tendency to fall back into the lower dynamistic Monarchianism; since in proportion as the Father as the Spirit and the Son as the flesh were separated in thought, the reality of the incarnation was likely to give way in favor of a more or less clearly conceived inhabitation. Thus Jesus would become again only a man in whom God dwelt. The formula of "the Father suffering with the Son" was really, therefore, a mediation toward humanitarianism rather than toward full recognition of the deity of the Son; and it is interesting to observe in the later Arians the reëmergence of the mode of expression thus struck out by Callistus. With them of course it was not a question of the Father but of that "Middle Being" which they called the Son of God; but what they affirm of it is that having taken "man" from the Virgin Mary, it "shared in" the sufferings of this "man" on the cross.* The obvious meaning of the Arians will throw light back upon the idea which Callistus meant to convey. This was clearly that the incarnation of the Spirit which was God in the man which was Christ, brought that Spirit into definite relations to the sufferings endured by this man properly in his flesh.

What it concerns us to note here particularly, however, is that it is just this Callistan formula which underlies the Monarchianism

* At the Synod of Sirmium, 357. See HAHN ³, § 161. The idea is that the "man" alone "suffers" (*patitur*): the Logos incarnate in the "man" only co-suffers (*compatitur*) with it. The Spirit, say the Arians at Sardica, 343, "did not suffer, but the man (*ἄνθρωπος*) which it put on suffered"; because, as it is immediately explained, this is "capable of suffering." Cf. HAHN ³, p. 189.

which Tertullian is opposing in his tract.* The evidence of this is pervasive. It will doubtless be enough to adduce the manifest agreement of his opponents with the Callistan formula in the two chief points to which we have adverted. Tertullian's opponents, it appears, while allowing to the Word a sort of existence, would not admit Him to be a really *substantiva res*, "so that He could be regarded as a *res et persona*" and, being constituted as a second to God the Father, make with the Father "two, Father and Son, God and the Word."† They "sought to interpret the distinction between Father and Son conformably to their own notion, so as to distinguish between them within a single person, saying that the Son is the flesh, that is, the man, that is Jesus, but the Father the Spirit, that is God, that is Christ."‡ Similarly Tertullian's opponents seeking to avoid the charge that they blasphemed the Father by making him suffer, granted that the Father and Son were so far two that it was the Son that suffered while the Father only suffered with Him.§

The special interest of this for us at the moment lies in a corollary which flows from it. Tertullian was not breaking out a new path in his controversy with the Monarchians. He was entering at the eleventh hour into an old controversy, which had dragged along for a generation, and was now only become more acute and more charged with danger to the Church. This, to be sure, is already implied in his reference to an earlier refutation of Praxeas, and in his representation of the error at present occupying him as merely a repristination of that old heretic's teaching. Accordingly, not only is the controversy old, but it is old to Tertullian. The general fact is evident on every page of his tract. It is quite clear that Tertullian is not here forging new weapons to meet novel attacks. On both sides much acuteness had already been expended in assault and defense,|| and the lines of reasoning had already long been laid down and even the proofs *pro* and *con* repeatedly urged. The very exegetical arguments bear on them the stamp of long use and betray the existence on both sides of a kind of exegetical tradition already formed. The emergence of this fact throws us into doubt as to how much even of what seems new and original in the tract may not likewise be part of the hereditary property of the controversy.

* Cf. ROLFFS in the *Texte und Untersuch.*, XII, iv, 94 sq.

† *Adv. Prax.*, C. vii.

‡ C. xxvii.

§ C. xxix. Filius patitur, pater vero compatitur. Compassus est pater filio.

|| We are here drawing upon LIPSUS' admirable article, "On Tertullian's Tract Against Praxeas," published in the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, XIII (1868), pp. 701-724. For the present matter see especially p. 710.

Even the technical terms which Tertullian employs with such predilection and which are often thought of as contributions of his own to the discussion, such as *οἰζοβομία*, *trinitas*,* for example, need not be new, but may owe it only to accident that they come here for the first time strikingly before us. Indeed, Tertullian does not use them as if they were novelties. On the contrary he introduces them as well-known terms, which he could freely employ as such. He speaks† of “that dispensation which we call the *οἰζοβομία*,” that is to say, apparently, “which is commonly so called.” And in the same connection he joins the “distribution of the Unity into a Trinity”‡ with the *οἰζοβομία* in such a manner as inevitably to suggest to the reader that this mode of explaining the *οἰζοβομία* belonged to its tradition. Assuredly no reader would derive from the tract the impression that such terms were new coinages struck out to meet the occasion.

Additional point is given to this impression by the circumstance that Tertullian not only puts forward no claim to originality, but actually asserts that his teaching is the traditional teaching of the Church. As over against the novel character of the new-fangled teaching of Praxeas, which falls as such under the prescription which Tertullian was wont to bring against all heresies as innovations and therefore no part of the original deposit of the faith, he sets his doctrine as a doctrine which had always been believed and now much more, under the better instruction of the Paraclete. “We, however, as always, so now especially, since better instructed by the Paraclete, who is the leader into all truth, believe that there is one God indeed, but yet under the following dispensation, which we call the *οἰζοβομία*.”§ An attempt has been made, it is true, to read in this statement a hint that the doctrine of the Trinity was a peculiarity of the Montanists;|| and to make out that Tertullian

* LIPSIVS, as above, p. 721, instances these two terms as “expressions which meet us here for the first time.” Both terms appear in Hippolytus’ *Cont. Noët.*, and if that tract antedates Tertullian’s this would be an earlier appearance; and each appears once in earlier literature.

† Chap. ii.

‡ Chap. ii. Cf. Chap. iii.

§ Chap. ii.

|| That Tertullian owed his Trinitarianism to Montanism was already suggested by the younger CHRISTOPHER SAND in the seventeenth century—whose *Nucleus Historiæ Ecclesiasticæ* was one of the works which BULL’S *Defensio* was intended to meet. See BULL, II, vii, 7 (E. T., p. 203). It was revived vigorously by the Tübingen School (BAUR, *Dreieinigkeitslehre*, 177, and especially SCHWEGLER, e.g., *Nachapost. Zeitalter*, II, 341). LIPSIVS, as quoted, p. 719, opposes the notion, but argues that nevertheless in Africa, at least, there was a connection between Montanism and Trinitarianism. Besides his own paper in the *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftl. Theologie*, 1866, p. 194, LIPSIVS refers for information to RITSCHL, *Alt-kathol. Kirche*, Ed. 2, p. 487f, and VOLCKMAR, *Hippolyt.*, p. 115. STIER argues the

means to say only that "we Montanists" have always so believed. The language, however, will not lend itself to this interpretation. Tertullian does say that since he became a Montanist his belief has been strengthened, and elsewhere (chap. xiii) he intimates that the Montanists were especially clear as to the "economy," as he calls the distinction within the unity of the Godhead. Perhaps he means that special prophetic deliverances expounding the Trinity in unity had among the Montanists been added to the traditionary faith. Perhaps he means only that the emphasis laid by the Montanistic movement, in distinction from the Father and Son, on the activity and personality of the Paraclete as the introducer of a new dispensation, had conduced to clearer views of the distinctions included in the unity of the Godhead. But the very adduction of this clearer or fuller view as consequent upon his defection to Montanism, only throws into prominence the fact that the doctrine itself belonged to his pre-Montanistic period also. "We as always, so now especially," contrasts two periods and can only mean that this doctrine dated in his consciousness from a day earlier than his Montanism. We must understand Tertullian then as affirming that the doctrine of the Trinity in unity which he is teaching belongs to the traditionary lore of the Church. His testimony, in this case, is express that what he teaches in this tract is nothing new, but only a part of his original faith.

This testimony is supported by the occurrence in earlier treatises by Tertullian—notably in his great *Apology**—of passages in which essential elements of his doctrine are given expression in his characteristic forms. And it is still further supported by the preservation of such a treatise by the hand of another, as Hippolytus' fragment against Noëtus,† in which something similar to the same doctrine is enunciated. It has been contended indeed that Tertullian borrowed from Hippolytus, or that Hippolytus borrowed from Tertullian. And there may be little decisive to urge against either hypothesis if otherwise commended. But in the absence of such further commendation it seems much more probable that the two treatises independently embody a point of view already traditional in the Church.‡ In any case Hippolytus must be believed to be stating in essence no other doctrine than that which

question in his *Gottes- und Logos-lehre Tertullians*, p. 93, note; cf. DORNER, *Person of Christ*, I, ii, 20, and esp. 448.

* Chap. 21. It seems to have been written about the end of 197.

† *Contra Noëtum*. Cf. *Philos.*, IX.

‡ On Tertullian's relations to the anti-Modalistic writings of Hippolytus, see HARNACK in the *Zeitschr. für d. hist. Theologie*, 1874, 203 sq.

he had striven for a generation to impress upon the Roman Church; and he makes the same impression that Tertullian does of handling well-worn weapons. Indeed we need bear in mind nothing more than the most obvious New Testament data culminating in the baptismal formula, the ritual use of which kept its contents clearly before the mind of every Christian, and the prevalence attained throughout the Christian world by the Logos speculation of the Apologists, to be assured *à priori* that it was not left either to Hippolytus or to Tertullian to work out the essential elements of the doctrine of the Trinity in unity. But this compels us to recognize that something more entered into the naïve faith of the average Christian man as essential constituents of his Christian confession than the two doctrines of the unity of God and the deity of the Redeemer. Even the simple Christian could not avoid forming some conception of the relation of his divine Redeemer to the Father, and in doing so could not content himself with an absolute identification of the two. Nor could he help extending his speculation to embrace some doctrine of the Spirit whom he was bound to recognize as God, and yet as in some way neither the Father nor the Son, along with whom He was named in the formula of baptism. In proportion as the believer was aware of the course of the debate that had gone on in the Church, and was affected by the movements which had agitated it from the beginning—all of which touched more or less directly on these points—he would have been driven along a pathway which, in attempting to avoid the heresies that were tearing the Church, could emerge in nothing else than some doctrine of Trinity in unity. The presence of a Trinitarian tradition in the Church is thus so far from surprising that its absence would be inexplicable. There is no reason, therefore, why we should discredit Tertullian's testimony that Christians had always believed in essence what he teaches in his tract against Praxeas.

If it is very easy to exaggerate the originality of Tertullian's doctrine as set forth in this tract, however, it is equally easy to underestimate it. Let us allow that Trinitarianism is inherent in the elements of the Gospel, and that, under the influence of the Logos Christology and in opposition to Gnostic emanationism, a certain crude Trinitarianism must have formed a part of the common faith of naïve Christendom. It remains none the less true that men were very slow in explicating this inherent doctrine of Christianity, at least with any clearness or concinnity; and meanwhile they were a prey to numerous more or less attractive substitutes for it, among which the Logos Christology long held the field, and its contra-

dictory, Modalistic Monarchianism, as we have seen, at one time bade fair to establish itself as the common doctrine of the Churches. And it remains true, moreover, that no one earlier than Tertullian and few besides Tertullian, prior to the outbreak of the Arian controversy, seem to have succeeded in giving anything like a tenable expression to this potential Trinitarianism. If Tertullian may not be accredited with the invention of the doctrine of the Trinity, it may yet be that it was through him that the elements of this doctrine first obtained something like a scientific adjustment, and that he may not unfairly, therefore, be accounted its originator, in a sense somewhat similar to that in which Augustine may be accounted the originator of the doctrines of original sin and sovereign grace, Anselm of the doctrine of satisfaction and Luther of that of justification by faith. Whether he may be so accounted, and how far, can be determined only by a careful examination of what he has actually set down in his writings.

When now we come to scrutinize with the requisite closeness the doctrine which underlies Tertullian's enunciations in his tract against Praxeas we perceive that it is, in point of fact, fundamentally little else than the simple Biblical teaching as to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit elaborated under the categories of the Logos Christology.

This Logos Christology had been simply taken over by Tertullian from the Apologists, who had wrought it fully out and made it dominant in the Christian thought of the time. Its roots were planted alike in Jewish religion and in Gentile speculation. Its point of origin lay in a conception of the transcendence of God which rendered it necessary to mediate his activity *ad extra* by the assumption of the interposition of intermediate beings. In their highest form, the speculations thus induced gave birth to the idea of the Logos. Under the influence of passages like the eighth chapter of Proverbs and the first chapter of John, the historical Jesus was identified with this Logos, and thus the Logos Christology was, in principle, completed. It will be observed that the Logos Christology was in its very essence cosmological in intention: its reason for existence was to render it possible to conceive the divine works of creation and government consistently with the divine transcendence: it was therefore bound up necessarily with the course of temporal development and involved a process in God. The Logos was in principle God conceived in relation to things of time and space: God, therefore, not as absolute but as relative. In its very essence, therefore, the

Logos conception likewise involved the strongest subordinationism. Its very reason for existence was to provide a divine being who does the will of God in the regions of time and space, into which it were inconceivable that the Invisible God should be able to intrude in His own person. The Logos was therefore necessarily conceived as reduced divinity—divinity, so to speak, at the periphery rather than at the centre of its conception. This means, further, that the Logos was inevitably conceived as a protrusion of God, or to speak more explicitly, under the category of emanation. The affinity of the Logos speculation with the emanation theories of the Gnostics is, therefore, close. The distinction between the two does not lie, however, merely in the number of emanations presumed to have proceeded from the fountain-deity, nor merely in the functions ascribed to these emanations, bizarre as the developments of Gnosticism were in this matter. The distinction lies much more in the fundamental conception entertained of the nature of the fountain-deity itself, and more directly in the conception developed of the nature of the emanation process and the relation of the resulting emanations to the primal deity. The Gnostic systems tended ever to look upon the source-deity as a featureless abyss of being, to conceive the process of emanation from it as a blind and necessary evolution, and to attribute to the emanations resulting from this process a high degree of independence of the primal deity. In direct contradiction to the Gnostic construction, the Logos speculation conceived God as personal, the procession of the Logos as a voluntary act on the part of God, and the Logos itself as, so to say, a function of the eternal God Himself, never escaping from the control of His will, or, as it might be more just to say, from participation in His fullness. The effect of the Gnostic speculation was to create a hierarchy of lesser divinities, stretching from the primal abyss of being downward in ever-widening circles and diminishing potencies to the verge of the material world itself. The value of the Logos speculation to the first age of Christianity was that it enabled Christian thinkers to preserve the unity of God while yet guarding His transcendence; and to look upon the historical Jesus, identified with the Logos, as very God, the Creator and Governor of the world, while yet recognizing His subordination to the will of God and His engagement with the course of development of things in time and space. It is probable that it was only by the help of the Logos speculation that Christianity was able to preserve its fundamental confession in the sharp conflict through which it was called to pass in the second century. By the aid of that speculation, at all events, it emerged from

this conflict with a firm and clear hold upon both of the fundamental principles of the unity of the indivisible God and the deity of the historical Jesus, who was, as John had taught in words, the Logos of God; that is to say, as the leaders of the day interpreted the significance of the term, the pretemporal protrusion of the deity for the purpose of creating the world of time and space and the mediating instrument of the deity in all His dealings with the world of time and space.

Tertullian, now, was the heir of this whole Logos construction, and he took it over from the Apologists in its entirety, with his accustomed clearness and even intensity of perception.* There was no element in it which he did not grasp with the most penetrating intuition of its significance and of the possibilities of its development at the call of fresh doctrinal needs. The demand for a new application of it came to him in the rise of the Monarchian controversy, and he opposed the Logos doctrine to the new construction with a confidence and a skill in adaptation which are nothing less than astonishing. This seems the precise account to give of the scope of the tract against Praxeas. It is in essence an attempt to adapt the old Logos speculation, which Tertullian had taken over in its entirety from the Apologists, to the new conditions induced by the rise and remarkable success of the Monarchian movement. Whatever contributions, then, to the development of the doctrine of the Trinity Tertullian was able to make, were made because of the emergence of need for such new adjustments of the old Logos speculation, and because he met this need with talents of the first order.

We must not underestimate the significance of the rise and rapid spread of the Monarchian Christology; or imagine that it could have filled the place in the history of the late second and early third centuries which it did, if it had found no justification for itself in the condition of Christian thought at the time, or had brought no contribution for the Christian thought of the future. The truth is, the Logos speculation left much to be desired in the formulation of the Christian doctrines of God and the Mediator between God and man; and the Monarchian speculation came bearing these very desiderata in its hands. The Logos Christology put itself forward as the guardian alike of the unity of God and of

* The general dependence of Tertullian on the Apologists is very marked. Loofs says justly: "Tertullian's general conception of Christianity is determined by the apologetical tradition" (*Herzog*.³, XII, 264, 46); and again: "Novatian and Tertullian were much more strongly influenced than Irenæus by the Apologists: their general conception of Christianity received its color from this influence" (*Sitzungsberichte der k. p. Akad. d. Wissenschaften*, 1902, I, 781).

the deity of Jesus. But the unity it ascribed to God was, after all, apt to be but a broken unity, and the deity it ascribed to Jesus was at best but a derived deity. According to it, Jesus was not the God over all that Paul called Him, but the Logos; and the Logos was not one with the Father, as John taught, and indeed as Jesus (who was the Logos) asserted, but an efflux from the Father—by so much lower than the Father as the possibility of entrance into and commerce with the world of space and time implied. Men might very well ask if this construction did justice either to the unity of God or to the deity of Jesus which it essayed to protect; whether every attempt to do justice on its basis to the unity of God would not mean disparagement of the perfect deity of Jesus, and every attempt to do justice to the deity of Jesus would not mean the erection of the Logos, with whom Jesus was identified rather than with God, to a place alongside of God, which would involve the confession of two Gods. By the rise of Monarchianism, in other words, the traditional Logos-construction was put sharply on its trial. It was demanded of it that it show itself capable of doing justice to the deity of Jesus, while yet retaining in integrity the unity of God, or else give place to a better scheme which by identifying Jesus directly with the One God, certainly provided fully for these two focal conceptions.

The difficulty of the situation into which the assault of Monarchianism brought the Logos Christology by its insistence that Jesus should be recognized as all that God is, becomes manifest when we reflect that every attempt to elevate the deity that was in Jesus to absolute equality with the God over all seemed to involve in one way or another the abandonment of the entire Logos speculation. The simple identification of Jesus with God would be, of course, the formal abolishment of the Logos speculation altogether. But the attempt to retain the distinction between God and the Logos, while Jesus as the Logos was made all that God is, seemed only a roundabout way to the same goal. Since the postulation of a Logos turned precisely on the assumption that God in Himself is too transcendent to enter into commerce with the world of space and time, the obliteration of the difference between the Logos and God appeared to reduce the whole Logos hypothesis to an absurdity. Either the primal deity would need no Logos, or the Logos Himself would require another Logos. The task Tertullian found facing him when he undertook the defense of the Logos Christology over against the Monarchian assault was thus one of no little delicacy and difficulty. It was a task of great

delicacy. For the Monarchians did not come forward as innovators in doctrine, but as protestants in the interest of the fundamental Christian doctrines of the divine unity and of the Godhead of the Redeemer against destructive speculations which were endangering the purity of the Christian confession. They embodied the protest of the simple believer against philosophic evaporations of the faith. Above all they were giving at last, so they said, his just due to Christ. It means everything when we hear Hippolytus quoting Noëtus as exclaiming: "How can I be doing wrong in glorifying Christ" *—a cry, we may be sure, which found an echo in every Christian heart. And it was a task of great difficulty. For what Tertullian had to do was to establish the true and complete deity of Jesus, and at the same time the reality of His distinctness as the Logos from the fountal deity, without creating two Gods. This is, on the face of it, precisely the problem of the Trinity. And so far as Tertullian succeeded in it, he must be recognized as the father of the Church doctrine of the Trinity.

Of course Tertullian was not completely successful in so great a task. On his postulates, indeed, complete success was difficult to the verge of impossibility. The Logos Christology was, to speak shortly, in its fundamental assumptions incompatible with a developed doctrine of immanent Trinity. Its primary object was to provide a mediating being through which the essentially "invisible" God could become "visible"—the absolute God enter into relations—the transcendent God come into connection with a world of time and space. To it Jesus must by the very necessity of its fundamental postulates be something less than the God over all. So soon as He was allowed to be Himself all that God is, the very reason for existence of the Logos speculation was removed. Nor was it easy on the assumptions of the Logos Christology to allow a real distinctness of person for the Logos. On its postulates the Logos must be itself God—God prolate—God in reduction—God, as we have said, on the periphery of His Being: but God Himself nevertheless. On every attempt to sharpen the distinction by conceiving it as truly personal rather than gradual, the whole speculation begins to evaporate. The distinction inherent in the Logos speculation may be a distinction of transcendent and immanent, of absolute and relative, of more or less: a distinction between person and person is outside the demands of its purpose. How can a distinct person be the absolute God become relative? And these difficulties reach their climax when we suppose this distinction to be eternal. What

* τὸ οὐκ κακὸν ποιεῖν, δοξάζων τὸν Χριστόν;

function can be conceived for a relative God in the depths of eternity, when nothing existed except God Himself? A meaningless God is just no God at all. Tertullian, in a word, as a convinced adherent of the Logos Christology, was committed to conceptions which were not capable of holding a doctrine of immanent Trinity. The most that could be expected from him would be that he should approach as closely to a doctrine of Trinity as was possible on his presuppositions,—that he should fill the conceptions of the Logos Christology, the highest as yet developed in the Church, so full that they should be nigh to bursting. We shall see that he did more than this. But in proportion as he did more than this has he transcended what could legitimately have been expected of him; and we shall be forced to allow that, in his effort to do justice to elements of faith brought into prominence in this controversy, he filled the conceptions of the Logos speculation so full that they actually burst in his hands. The Logos Christology, in other words, was stretched by him beyond its tether and was already passing upward in his construction to something better.

A great deal has been said of Tertullian's failure in perfect consistency: a great deal of his indebtedness to the Monarchians themselves for many of his ideas: a great deal of elements of compromise with his opponents discoverable in his construction. These things are not, however, proofs of weakness, but indications of strength in him. They mean that with all his clearness of grasp upon the Logos Christology, and with all his acuteness in adapting it to meet the problem he was facing, he yet saw the truth of some things for which, for all his acumen, it could not be made to provide—and stretched it to make it cover them also. They mean that he was not misled into the denial of positive elements of truth, always confessed by the Church, by zeal against the body of errorists that had taken them under their especial charge. For it is not quite exact to speak of these elements of truth as accepted by Tertullian at the hands of the Monarchians. They were rather elements of truth embodied in the general Christian confession, hitherto more or less neglected by the theologians, but now thrown into prominence by the presently raging controversy. It is the nemesis of incomplete theories that neglected elements of truth rise up after awhile to vex them. So it happened with the Logos Christology. But Tertullian sought to stretch the Logos Christology to cover these truths, not because they were urged with so much insistence by his opponents—he was not quite the man to meet insistence by yielding: but because they were parts of the Rule of Faith and were

universally accepted by Christians as imposed on their belief by the Divine Oracles, and he, for his part, was determined to be loyal to the Rule of Faith and to the teaching of Scripture.

There was one thing, in other words, which was more fundamental to Tertullian's thinking than even the Logos Christology. That was the Rule of Faith—the immemorial belief of Christians, grounded in the teaching of the Word of God.* The insistence on certain truths by his opponent may have been the occasion of Tertullian's notice of them: his attempt to incorporate them into his construction was grounded in recognition of them as elements in the universal Christian faith. This Rule of Faith had come down to him from "the beginning of the Gospel," as he phrased it;† and he recognized it as his first duty to preserve it whole and entire. The Logos Christology had not been able to take up all the items of belief which Christians held essential to their good profession: perhaps it was due to the Monarchian controversy that Christians were enabled to see that clearly. It is to the credit of Tertullian, that seeing it, he sought rather to stretch his inherited Christology to include the facts thus brought sharply to his notice, than to deny the facts in the interest of what must have seemed to him the solidly worked out philosophy of revealed truth. By his sympathetic recognition of these elements of truth he built a wider foundation, on which a greater structure could afterward be raised. To his own consciousness the principle of his doctrine remained ever the data of Scripture embodied in the Rule of Faith and

* This is, briefly, what appears to be meaning of the Rule of Faith, or the Rule of Truth, in the writings of Tertullian as of the other early Fathers. There has been much discussion among scholars as to the exact relation of the conception to Scripture, on the one hand, and to the Baptismal Creed—what we know as "The Apostles' Creed"—on the other. KUNZE, in his *Glaubensregel, Heilige-Schrift und Taufbekenntnis*, seems greatly to have advanced the matter. It seems clear that the Rule of Faith means the common fundamental faith of the Church, as derived from Scripture and expressed especially in the Baptismal Creed. That is to say, it is (1) the authoritative teaching of Scripture as a whole; (2) but this teaching conceived as the common faith of the whole Church; (3) most commodiously set out in brief in the Apostles' Creed. This may be sharply expressed by saying that the Rule of Faith was supposed to be the Scriptures, and the Creed was supposed to be the Rule of Faith. In the East the consciousness that the Rule of Faith was merely the teaching of the Scriptures as drawn from them and confessed by the Church, in the West the consciousness that the Apostles' Creed was a summary setting forth of the Rule of Faith, tended to rule the usage of the term. Accordingly the tendency was in the East to see most pointedly the Scriptures *through* the Rule of Faith, or, if you will, the Rule of Faith *in* the Scriptures; in the West to see the Apostolicum *in* the Rule of Faith, or, if you will, the Rule of Faith *through* the Apostolicum. On Tertullian's conception of the relation of the Rule of Faith to Scripture see especially KUNZE, p. 178.

† He carries back the Rule of Faith to the teaching of Christ (*De Prescript.*, ix, xiii. Cf. xx, xxi, xxvii, etc.).

interpreted under the categories of the Logos Christology. Beyond the Logos Christology he did not purposely advance. It remained for him to the end the great instrument for the understanding of Scripture. But it happened to him, as it has happened to many besides him, that the process of pouring so much new wine into old bottles had an unhappy effect upon the bottles. This great adherent of the Logos speculation became the prime instrument of its destruction.

What is true in this matter of Tertullian is true also in his own measure of Hippolytus. Both stood firmly on the Rule of Faith* and the instrument for its interpretation used by each alike was the Logos Christology, which both had adopted in its entirety from the Apologists. This accounts for the similarity of their teachings. The difference of their teachings is due very largely to the unequal ability of the two men.† Tertullian was much the abler man and succeeded much better in making room in his construction for the elements of truth embedded in the Rule of Faith which the Logos Christology found difficulty in assimilating. Callistus was not without some color of justification in excommunicating Hippolytus as well as Sabellius, as alike with him defective in his teaching. Only, Callistus was incapable of perceiving that it was the Logos Christology, and not the facile methods of Monarchian modalism, which was seriously seeking to embrace and explain all the facts; that in it alone, therefore, was to be found the promise of the better construction yet to come, toward which it was reaching out honest and eager hands. His own shallow opportunism prevented him from apprehending that what was needed was not denial of all real distinction between God and Logos, Father and Son, and therewith the confounding of the entire process of redemption; but the rescue of this distinction from its entanglement with cosmological speculation, and the elevation of it from a mere matter of degrees of divinity to the sphere of personal individualization, while yet it should be jealously guarded from the virtual division of the Godhead into a plurality of deities. Callistus, the politic ruler of a distracted diocese, intent above all on calming dangerous excitement and discouraging schism, ready to purchase peace at any cost, was not capable of such a feat of sound thinking. Hippolytus was too little independent of his inheritance to be capable of it.

* In Hippolytus the term and its synonyms are of very infrequent occurrence (see KUNZE, p. 129), and except in the *Little Labyrinth* the form "Rule of Truth" is the one he employs.

† A similar judgment is expressed by Mr. BETHUNE-BAKER, *The Meaning of Homoeousios, etc.*, pp. 73-4, note.

Even Tertullian was not capable of carrying through such a task to its end: though he was able to advance it a little stage toward its accomplishment. All the circumstances considered, this was a great achievement, and it could not have been accomplished had not Tertullian united to his zeal in controversy and his acumen in theological construction an essential broad-mindedness, an incorruptible honesty of heart and a sure hold on the essentials of the faith.

That the account thus suggested correctly represents the facts will appear upon a somewhat more detailed investigation of the exact attitude of Tertullian both to the Logos Christology and to the Rule of Faith. To such an investigation we shall now address ourselves.

Even in his earliest writings there occur passages in which full and convinced expression is given to the speculations of the Logos Christology, from which it appears that from the beginning of his activity as a Christian writer these speculations supplied the moulds in which Tertullian's thought ran. When, for example, in the twenty-first chapter of his *Apology*, which was written about 197, he undertakes to expound to his heathen readers the deity of Christ,* he identifies Him out of hand with the Logos of Zeno and Cleanthes,† because, as he says, "we have been taught" (*didicimus*) as follows—whereupon he proceeds to set forth the Logos doctrine, thus declared to be to him the traditionary doctrine of the Church.‡ "We have been taught," says he, that the Logos "was produced (*prolatum*) from God (*ex Deo*) and in [this] production generated, and therefore is called the Son of God and God, because of (*ex*) the unity of the substance, since God also is Spirit. Just as when a ray is put forth (*porrigitur*) from the sun, it is a portion of the whole (*portio ex summa*), but the sun will be in the ray, because it is a ray of the sun, and is not separated from the substance, but stretched out (*non separatur substantia sed extenditur*); so Spirit [is extended]

* Necessesse est igitur pauca de Christo ut deo.

† "Your philosophers Zeno Cleanthes and we too (et nos autem). . . ."

‡ KUNZE, p. 197, has some excellent remarks on the relative places taken by philosophy and Scripture in the thinking of such men as Irenæus and Tertullian. They wished to be purely Biblical; and the influence of philosophy "was exerted only through the medium of their understanding of the Bible, through the filter of Bible interpretation." "This was true, for example," he adds, "of their Logos theory. As certain as it is that in this matter extra-Christian influences are recognizable, it is equally certain that for Tertullian, and especially for Irenæus, the Logos idea and its corollaries would have formed no part of the regula had they not found word and thing alike in the Scriptures."

from Spirit and God from God, as light is kindled from light. The *matrix materiv* (source of the material) remains entire and undiminished (*integra et indefecta*) although you draw out from it many branches of its kind (*trahes qualitatibus*): thus also what is derived (*profectum*) from God is God and the Son of God, and the two are one. In this manner, then, He who is Spirit from Spirit and God from God made another individual in mode [of existence], in grade, not in state (*modulo alterum numerum, gradu non statu fecit*), and did not separate from but stretched out from the source (*et a matrice non recessit sed excessit*). This ray of God, then, descended into a certain virgin, as it had always been predicted in times past”*

What we read in the tract against Praxeas embodies the same ideas in the same terms. We must, however, note in more detail how far Tertullian here commits himself to the forms of the Logos speculation. We observe, then, in the first place, that Tertullian with complete conviction shares the fundamental conception out of which the Logos doctrine grows,—the conception of the transcendence of God above all possibility of direct relation with a world of time and space. So axiomatic did it seem to him that God in Himself is exalted above direct concernment with the world-process, that when discussing the temporal activities of our Lord, he permits himself to say that such things, hard to believe of the Son and only to be credited concerning Him on the authority of Scripture, could scarcely have been believed of the Father, even if Scripture had explicitly affirmed them of Him.† That is to say, the doctrine of the transcendence of God, or as Tertullian phrases it, in Scriptural language which had become traditional in this school, of the “invisibility” of God “in the fulness of His majesty,”‡ stood, as a fixed datum, at the root of Tertullian’s whole thought of God. In the second place, we observe that Tertullian shared with equal heartiness the current conception of the Logos as, so to speak, the world-form of God. It was, indeed, only in connection with the world, and as its condition, both with respect to origin and government, that he was accustomed to think of a Logos at all. The prolation of the Logos took place, in his view, only for and with the world, as a necessary mediator, to perform a work which God as absolute could not perform. It was “then,” says Tertullian with pointed emphasis,§ that the Word assumed “His own form,” when God said, “Let there be light!” It was

* Cf. the parallel statements in *De Præscript.*, 13.

† *Adv. Prax.*, c. xvi: Fortasse non credenda de patre, licet scripta.

‡ Chap. xiv.

§ *Loc. cit.*, chap. vii: Tunc igitur etiam ipse sermo speciem et ornatum suum sumit, sonem et vocem, cum dixit deus: fiat lux.

only when God was pleased to draw out (*edere*) into "their own substances and forms" (*in substantias et species suas*) the things He had planned within Himself, that He put forth (*protulit*) the Word, in order that all things might be made through Him.* We observe, 3 in the third place, that Tertullian, with equal heartiness, shared the consequent view that the Logos is not God in His entirety, but only a "portion" of God—a "portion," that is, as in the ray there is not the whole but only a "portion" of the sun. The difference seems to be not one of mode only, but of measure. "The Father," he says, "is the entire substance, but the Son is a derivation and portion of the whole."† He speaks "of that portion of the whole which was about to retire into the designation of the Son."‡ To Tertullian this idea was self-evident inasmuch as the Logos was to him necessarily produced, or, rather, reduced Divinity—Divinity brought to a level on which it could become creator and principle 4 of the world of time and space.§ We observe, in the fourth place, that Tertullian also accorded with the current conception in thinking of the prolation of the Logos as a voluntary act of God rather than a necessary movement within the Divine essence. As there was a time before which the Son was not,|| so He came into being by the will of God,¶ and remains in being to fulfill the will of God, and at last when He has fulfilled the will of God retires once more into the divine unity.** All this, of course, applies only to the

* C. vi: *Nam ut primum deus voluit ea quæ cum sophiæ ratione et sermone disposeuerat intra se in substantias et species suas edere, ipsum primum protulit sermonem, habentem in se individuas suas, rationem et sophiam, etc.* So also chap. xiii, "The first statement of Scripture is made, indeed, when the Son had not yet appeared: 'And God said, "Let there be light," and there was light.' Immediately there appears the Word, 'that true light. . . . From that moment God willed creation to be effected in the Word, Christ.' . . ."

† Chap. ix.

‡ Chap. xxvi.

§ The real meaning of this phrasology will be discussed further on in this article.

|| Chap. v: God was alone "up to the generation of the Son." Cf. vi and xiii. Cf. *Against Hermog.*, iii: *Fuit autem tempus cum Filius non fuit . . .* and see BULL's long discussion of this passage in his *Defensio Fidei Nic.*, iii, x (E. T., p. 509 sq.). The real meaning of this too will be discussed later.

¶ Chap. xvi: "The Scripture informs us that He who was made less (than the angels) was so affected by another and not Himself by Himself." Cf. Chaps. iv, xxiii. The insistence of the Apologists on the origination of the Logos in an act of the will of God was their protest against the blind evolutionism of the Gnostics, and often was but their way of saying that creation was not a necessary process but a voluntary act on God's part; that is to say, it hangs together with their cosmological conception of the Logos. Cf. HAGEMANN, *Rom. Kirche*, p. 194. On the whole subject compare DORNER, *Person of Christ*, I, ii, 460, and BETHUNE-BAKER, *Early Christian Doctrine*, 159, note 2, and 194-5.

** Chap. iv. Cf. Chap. xxii, xxiii.

prolate Logos.* This whole development of the prolate Logos, therefore, is not only a temporal but a temporary expedient, by means of which God, acting voluntarily, accomplishes a work. When this work is accomplished the arrangements for it naturally cease. The Logos mode of existence thus emerges as an incident in the life of God which need not, perhaps, find a necessary rooting in His nature, but only a contingent rooting in His purposes. In the very nature of the case, therefore, the prolate Logos is dependent on the divine will.† It is hardly necessary to make a separate fifth observation, therefore, that Tertullian thoroughly shared the subordinationism inherent in the Logos Christology.‡ To him the Son, as prolated Logos, was self-evidently less (*minor*) than the Father, seeing that His prolation occurred by the Father's will, and in order to do His will. He remains subject to His will,§ and when that will is accomplished returns into the divine bosom. The invisible Father alone possesses the fullness of the divine majesty: the Son is visible *pro modulo derivationis*,—by reason of the measure of His derivation,—and stands related to the Father as a ray does to the sun.|| He is the *second*, in every sense of the term. 5

Even such a brief survey as this of the natural forms in which Tertullian's thought ran makes it exceedingly clear that the prime instrument in his hands for the interpretation of the facts of the Christian revelation was just the Logos Christology taken over in its entirety from his predecessors.

But if the Logos Christology thus supplied to Tertullian the forms of thought with which he approached the problems now brought into renewed prominence, the matter of his thinking was derived from another source, and from a source that lay even more deeply embedded in his convictions. If the Logos Christology was the instrument by means of which he sought to interpret the Rule of Faith, the Rule of Faith supplied the matter to be interpreted. The question that was always pressing upon him, therefore, was whether this matter in its entirety could be interpreted by the Logos Christology. Certainly Tertullian must be credited with a loyal effort to preserve all its data in their integrity, as even his most cursory reader will at once perceive;¶ and in making this effort,

* The as yet unprolated Logos Tertullian wishes to distinguish from the uttered Logos or Sermo, as the unuttered Logos or Ratio; cf. chap. v.

† Cf. STIER, p. 100. ‡ Cf. STIER, p. 71. § Chaps. iv, xvi, xviii. || Chap. xiv.

¶ The Rule of Faith, which originates in the teaching of Christ and comes to us in the apostolic proclamation, and which is, therefore, "absolutely one, alone, immovable and irreformable," according to *De Vel. Virg.*, 1, "prescribes the belief that there is only one God . . . who produces all things out of nothing through

largely under the influence of the Monarchian controversy, he found himself compelled to enlarge and modify the contents of the Logos speculation, in order to embrace the data of the Rule of Faith.

In the first place, the Rule of Faith imposed on Tertullian the duty of framing a doctrine of the Holy Spirit as well as of the Son of God. For this, of course, the Logos Christology did not necessarily provide. But it pointed out a road to it by way of analogy. The Apologists, accordingly, though they were absorbed in the doctrine of the Logos and did not always know what to do with the Spirit, yet did not leave the subject so entirely to one side but that they handed down to their successors the beginnings of a doctrine of the Spirit framed on the analogy of this Christology.* They had already made it a matter of traditionary doctrine, for example, that the Spirit is related to the Son much as the Son is to the Father, and makes a third alongside of the Father and Son.† Tertullian takes up these somewhat fluid elements of traditional teaching and gives them sharpness and consistency.‡ He looks upon the Spirit apparently as a prolation from the Son, as the Son is from the Father, thus preserving, so to speak, a linear development in the evolution

His own Word first of all sent forth; that this Word is called His Son . . . was made flesh and . . . having been crucified, rose again the third day, ascended into the heavens, sat at the right hand of the Father; sent instead of Himself the power of the Holy Ghost to lead such as believe on Him." Or as Tertullian sets forth the items in *Contr. Prax.*, 2, relatively to the matters in hand in that tract, this aboriginal Rule of Faith teaches that "there is one God"; that "this one only God has also a Son, His Word, who proceeded from Himself, by whom all things were made and without whom nothing was made"; and that this Son has "sent also from heaven from the Father, according to His own promise, the Holy Ghost, the Paraclete, the Sanctifier of the faith of those who believe in the Father, and in the Son and in the Holy Ghost." Tertullian obviously looks upon the Rule of Faith as originating in the baptismal formula given by our Lord, and as finding its normal succinct expression in the Baptismal Creed, commonly known as the Apostles' Creed.

* On the early opinions as to the Spirit, besides Dr. SWETE's book on this precise subject, see KAHNIS, *Lehre vom heil. Geiste*, 168 sq.; NÖSGEN *Geschichte d. Lehre v. heiligen Geiste*, chap. I; HARNACK, I, p. 197, note, and II, 209, note¹; SCOTT, *The Nicene Theology*, Lecture V.

† SCOTT, pp. 274, 284. "The doctrine of the Holy Spirit," says SCOTT, p. 285, note, "was not developed in the second century, but it was plainly present in the Church, both East and West. The theological statement of the Spirit in the second century did not use the term *hypostatic*; but all that was meant later by that term is clearly involved in the teachings of the Apologists and the anti-Gnostic writers." Tertullian "first called the Spirit 'God,' but he only uttered what the Church had ever believed."

‡ On Tertullian's doctrine of the Spirit, see KAHNIS, 255 sq.; SCOTT, p. 284; HARNACK, II, 261, note 4; STIER, p. 92, note. The most distinctive passages seem to be found in *Adv. Prax.*, ii, iii, iv, viii, ix, xi, xiii, xxvi, xxx.

of God:* but he carefully preserves the conception of the Father as *fons deitatis*, and thus frames as his exact formula the assertion that the Spirit, being the third degree in the Godhead, proceeds "from no other source than from the Father through the Son" (chap. iv). In his familiar figures, as the Father and Son are represented by the root and the stem of the tree, by the fountain and the river, by the sun and its ray, so the Spirit, being "third from God and the Son," is as the fruit of the tree, which is third from the root, or as the stream from the river, which is third from the fountain, or as the apex from the ray, which is third from the sun (chap. viii).† All flows down from the Father through colligated and conjoined grades (*per consertos et connexos gradus*, chap. viii, *ad fin.*), but the immediate connection is of the Father in the Son and the Son in the Paraclete (chap. xxv, *ad init.*), and thus it may be truly said that the Son received the Spirit from the Father and yet Himself shed Him forth,—this "Third Name in the Godhead and Third Grade in the Divine Majesty, the Declarer of the One Monarchy of God and yet, at the same time, the Interpreter of the Economy" (chap. xxx). Under the guidance of the Logos speculation Tertullian thus, in the first instance, conceives the Spirit apparently as a prolation of the Son as the Son is of the Father, and as therefore subordinate to the Son as the Son is to the Father: but nevertheless as ultimately deriving from the *fons deitatis* itself, through the Son, and through the Son subject ultimately to it.‡

The consistent extension of the Logos speculation to cover the Third divine Person confessed in the Rule of Faith was, however, only a short step toward embracing the data included in that formula under the categories of the Logos speculation. The really pressing problem concerned the relations in which the Father, Son and Holy Spirit stand to one another. In the Rule of Faith—in the Baptismal Formula—they appear as coördinate persons, to each of whom true deity is ascribed, or rather, to all three of whom the Name is attributed in common. Was the Logos speculation capable of taking up these data into itself and doing full justice to them? Tertullian must be credited with a sincere and a fruitful effort to make it do so. So far as the mere inclusion of the data under a single formula is concerned he found little difficulty. His

* This characteristic of the Apologists' construction is its most marked trait, and is therefore frequently noted. Thus HAGEMANN, p. 139, when speaking of Hippolytus, adverts to the difference between the Church's construction and his, that the one thought of the trinitarian relationships "after the analogy of a circular motion (*Kreisbewegung*) and the other as *advancing in a straight line*."

† *Tertius enim est spiritus a deo et filio, sicut tertius a radice fructus a frutice, et tertius a fonte rivus a flumine, et tertius a sole apex ex radio.*

‡ STIER, p. 92, note; HARNACK, II, 261, note.

formula is that the Father, Son and Spirit are one in substance and distinct in person. In this formula he intrenches himself and reiterates and illustrates it with inexhaustible zest. He opens the serious discussion of the tract with a clear enunciation of it drawn out in full detail,—crying out against the Monarchian assumption that the unity of the Godhead implies unity of Person, “as if One might not be All in this way also—viz., in All being of One, by unity of substance, while the mystery (*sacramentum*) of the *οἰκονομία* is still preserved, by which the unity is distributed into a Trinity, ordering (*dirigens*) the three,—Father, Son and Holy Ghost,—three, however, not in status but in grade, not in substance but in form, not in power but in aspect (*species*); yet of one substance, and of one status, and of one power, inasmuch as He is one God from whom are reckoned these grades and forms and aspects under the name of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost.” This is Tertullian’s complete formula of Trinity in Unity, which he promises to explicate more fully in the remainder of the treatise. This promise he very fairly fulfills—now repeating the entire statement more or less fully and now insisting on this or that element of it.* One of his favorite methods of indicating briefly the combined sameness and distinction is by employing distinctively the neuter and masculine forms of the words. “I and the Father are one,” says our Lord; and Tertullian lays stress not only on the plural verb—“I and the Father *are*,” not “*am*,” one,—but on the neuter form of the adjective,—“unum,” not “unus”—as implying “not singularity of number but unity of essence,” and the like (chap. xxii). “These Three,” he says again (chap. xxv), “are unum, not unus, in respect of unity of substance, not singularness of number.” So he rings the changes constantly on the unity of substance and distinction of persons.

So far, we shall easily say, so good. For so much the Logos speculation opens the way without straining. It is inherent in it that the divine prolations should be of the very essence of God, while, on the other hand, capable as prolations of acting in some sense as distinct beings. The tug comes when we ask whether this asserted unity of substance provides for the supreme deity of the prolations, so that we can say that Jesus Christ, for example, is all that God is; and whether this asserted distinctness of persons provides for a real individualization of personality, so that each so-called person stands over against the others in permanent distinctness and not in merely apparent and in its very nature temporary objectivation. Certainly the Logos speculation suggests a reduced deity for the pro-

* *E.g.*, chaps. iv, viii, ix, xi, xii, xxi, *sq.*

lations, and that in diminishing grades: and a temporal rather than an eternal—whether *a parte ante* or *a parte post*—distinction between them. Does Tertullian see glimpses beyond? In such glimpses beyond we shall discover whatever approach he has made to constructing a doctrine of a real Trinity. The hinge of the problem turns on the answers we shall be compelled to give to five questions: (1) Whether Tertullian by his distinction of “persons” intends a distinction which is really personal in the philosophical sense of that term; (2) whether Tertullian supposes this distinction of persons to have been constituted by the prolations of the Logos and Spirit which, he teaches, took place in order to the creation and government of the world, or to belong rather to the essential mode of existence of God; (3) whether he succeeds in preserving the unity of God despite the distinction of persons which he teaches; (4) whether he is able to ascribe such deity to Christ as to say of Him that He is all that God is; (5) whether he accords to the Holy Spirit also both complete deity and eternal distinctness of personality. We shall need to look at his response to these five questions in turn.

But we shall reserve this for the next number of this REVIEW.

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II.

ROYAL TITLES IN ANTIQUITY: AN ESSAY IN CRITICISM.

ARTICLE SIX.

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY.

HAVING given in the numbers of this REVIEW from April, 1904, to July, 1905, inclusive, an approximately complete induction of the titles and designations of the kings of the Persians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Egyptians, Parthians, Hebrews and other ancient nations, we are now prepared to sum up the conclusions based upon this induction in so far as they bear upon the assertions of Dr. Driver with reference to the historicity of the books of Ezra and Nehemiah.

Before proceeding to make this summary, it seems fair that we should repeat the statements of Dr. Driver against which this summary is directed. On pages 545, 546 of his *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament* we find, among others, the following arguments against the genuineness of Ezra and Nehemiah: "The books [of Ezra and Nehemiah] contain internal marks of having been compiled in an age long subsequent to that of Ezra and Nehemiah. Thus notice:—[1] (a) The phrase 'king of Persia,' Ez. i. 1, 2, 8, iii. 7, iv. 3, 5, 7, 24, vii. 1: the addition would, during the period of the Persian supremacy, be at once unnecessary and contrary to contemporary usage (see p. 546, n)."

"(c) [2] Neh. xii. 22: 'Darius the Persian' must (from the context) be Darius Codomannus, the last king of Persia, B.C. 336-332, and the title [S] 'the Persian' could only have become a distinctive one after the Persian period was past."

"Persia was absorbed and lost in the wider empire of which, by Cyrus' conquest of Babylon, the Achæmenidæ became the heirs; hence after that date their standing official title is not 'king of Persia,' but [3] 'king of Babylon'" (*Records of the Past*, first series, IX, 67; cf. second series, X, 166, and comp. Ezra v. 13), or, more commonly, [4] "the king," [5] "the great king," [6] "king of kings," [7]* "king of the lands," etc. (often in combinations).

* The numeration in brackets is inserted by the present writer for convenience of reference.

[8] ("King of Persia" is used by Cyrus only *before* his conquest of Babylon (*Records*, second series, V, 160); and of Darius only exceptionally, in the midst of other titles (*ib.*, first series, I, iii). By their subjects the Persian kings are also styled "king of Babylon" or "king of the lands" (often in combination): see the numerous contract-tablets belonging to the reigns of Cyrus, Cambyses and Darius, published in Schrader's *Keilinschr. Bibliothek*, IV, 259-311.)"

I. "KING OF PERSIA."

Taking up these statements in the order of numeration, we shall discuss first the assertion that the use of the phrase, "king of Persia," "would, during the period of the Persian supremacy, be at once unnecessary and contrary to contemporary usage." There are here two assertions: first, with regard to the necessity of the use of this phrase, and secondly, with regard to the fact of contemporary use of this phrase.

As to the first of these assertions, it may readily be admitted that it may not have been absolutely necessary to use the phrase. For the sake of clearness and distinction, however, it may well have seemed best to the writer and his contemporaries to use it. For, in the first place, there were more Cyruses than one. (1) There was Cyrus, king of Anšan, the grandfather of Cyrus, king of Persia.* (2) There was the well-known Cyrus, the younger, the hero of Xenophon's *Anabasis*. (3) According to Josephus, the preregnal name of Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, was Cyrus. He says: "After the death of Xerxes, the kingdom happened to pass to his son Cyrus, whom the Greeks call Artaxerxes" (*Antiq.*, XI, 184). In the second place, there are at least six Dariuses said to have lived in Persian times, to wit, Darius the Mede, Darius Hystaspes, Darius Nothus, Darius Codomannus, Darius the son of Xerxes, and Darius the son of Artaxerxes Mnemon. In the third place, since none but kings are known with the name Artaxerxes, it is possible, to be sure, that the phrase "king of Persia" is given to Longimanus in imitation of Cyrus and Darius; but it is probable, rather, that there were others (perhaps many others) of the name Artaxerxes as well as of the names Cyrus and Darius. This cannot be asserted, of course, but much less can it be denied, in

* The grandfather is mentioned by Cyrus, king of Persia, himself on the so-called Cyrus-cylinder, l. 21, *mâr mâri amelu Ku-ra-aš šarru rabû šar âli An-ša-an*, i.e., "son of the son of Kyros, the great king, king of the city of Anshan." Herodotus calls Cyrus, king of Persia, the son of "Mandane, Astyages' daughter, and of Cambyses, son of Cyrus," I, 111.

view of the facts lately revealed by the monuments with regard to the names of other kings. Thus, the monuments of Assyria show us that there was not merely a Hazael king of Damascus, but several others of that name (see Johns, *Ass. Deeds and Doc.*, Vol. III, p. 453); that "Nabonidus is a common name" (*id.*, p. 143); that Nergalšarušur was a name borne by many (*id.*, p. 192); that Nebuchadnezzar was borne by at least two, or more, not kings of Babylon (*id.*, p. 230); that Belshazzar was not merely the name of several private persons and of the eldest son of Nabonidus, but also of a king of Kišesim who rebelled against Sargon, 716 B.C. (*id.*, p. 177, and Strassmaier, *Ins. of Nab.*); that there were at least four of the name of Labaši-Marduk besides the son of Nergalšarušur.

As to Dr. Driver's second assertion, wherein he says that the addition of the phrase "king of Persia" would, "during the period of the Persian supremacy," be "contrary to contemporary usage," he is altogether misleading.

This is sufficiently shown by the simple fact that Cyrus, Cambyses, Darius Hystaspes, Xerxes and Artaxerxes Longimanus are all designated by the term "king of Persia" while the Persian empire was still in existence. Note the following examples: Cyrus is so called by Nabonidus in the Nabonidus-Cyrus Chronicle, second column, l. 15.* Thucydides speaks of "Cyrus, the first king of the Persians" (see *P. T. R.*, † Vol. II, 275). Cambyses is called "king of the Persians" by Herodotus, III. 21; and Darius, also, in the inscription of Tearus, *id.*, IV. 91. Darius is so called by Thucydides, I. 13, and by himself on Behistun Ins., § 1. Xerxes is so called in conjunction with other titles in the Inscriptions from the Age of Xerxes, Nos. 2 and 3, published by Evetts (see *P. T. R.*, Vol. II, 266), in one published by Oppert‡ and elsewhere.§

* In the same cylinder, second column, l. 1, he is called "Cyrus, king of Anšan"; in line 4, "Cyrus, king of the country of Anšan." In the Clay Cylinder he calls himself "Cyrus, king of the city of Anšan" (see above, Vol. II, page 267).

† In this article, *P. T. R.* means The PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

‡ *Revue d'Assyriologie et d'Archéologie orientale*, I, 484.

§ As the tablets containing the name of Xerxes are scattered in a number of publications not accessible to all, I have thought best to give in the following note the subscriptions of all that I have found:

1. "Hi-ši'-ar-ši'," alone. *Acts of 8th International Congress of Orientalists: Strassmaier's Contribution, No. 22*; and Bezold's *Achämenideninschriften*, XII. E. 3.

2. "Xerxes, the king." Bezold, XI. D. 9, 17; XIII. Ca. 3; XIV. Cb. 5; XV. F. 9; XVI. K. 4, 12; XVII. S. 5, 6; XIX. 5.

3. "Xerxes, the Persian king." (Ih(Hi)-ha-ri-šu, šarru Parsu). *Z. A.*, XI. 83(?).

4. "Xerxes, the Great King." Bezold, XIV. Cb. 14.

Darius the son of Xerxes is called "Darius, king of the Persians," by Xenophon in *Hellenica*, I. 2. Furthermore, the phrase "king of the Persians," without the name, occurs in the Behistun Ins., 72; in Herodotus, III. 102, 21 *bis*, V. 36; in Xenophon's *Cyropædia* VII. 1, VIII. 2 *bis*; in the *Anabasis*, III. 4; in the *Hellenica*, VII. 3, VI. 3, 5, VII. 1; in *Science of Sound Husbandry* four times; in *Ag.* once, I. 6.

The force of this argument is lost in part, however, unless we call attention to the fact that the phrase "king of Persia" is very seldom added to the name of the king by the Greek writers who lived after the time of Darius Codomannus, Diodorus Siculus excepted. Polybius uses the phrase "king of the Persians" once only, and then without the name, though he frequently designates kings contemporaneous with himself by name, title and country ruled (see *P. T. R.*, Vol. III, pp. 259-261). Diodorus Siculus uses the phrase with the name more frequently than any other Greek writer except perhaps Josephus: *e.g.*, of Cyrus, II. 44, IX. 31, X. 13; of Cambyses,

5. "Xerxes, king of Medo-Persia" (Ah-ši-ya-mar-šu, šar Par-su, Ma-da-a-a.) *Acts of the 8th Oriental Congress: Strassmaier's Contribution.*

6. "Xerxes, the king of the lands." Evetts' *Inscriptions of the Reigns of Evil-Merodach, Neriglissar and Labosoarchid*, Appendix 5.

7. "Xerxes, king of Babylon and of the lands." *Acts of 8th Orient. Congress*, Nos. 16 and 17.

8. "Xerxes, king of Babylon, king of the lands." *Acts of 8th Orient. Cong.*, Nos. 18 and 21, and Evetts' *Inscriptions*, Appendix 2.

9. "Xerxes, king of Persia and of the land of the Medes, king of Babylon and of the lands." *Acts of 8th Orient. Cong.*, No. 20.

10. "Xerxes, king of Persia and of the Medes, king of Babylon and of the lands." Evetts' *Insc.*, App. No. 4.

11. "Xerxes, king of the land of Persia and of the land of the Medes, king of Babylon and of the lands." Evetts, No. 3.

12. For combinations of many titles, see this REVIEW, Vol. II, pp. 262-264.

His name is spelled in Babylonian in the following ways:

(1) "Hi-ši-'ar-ši-'." *Acts of 8th Orient. Cong.*, No. 22.

(2) "Hi-si-'ar-ši." Bezold, XII. E. 3; XI. D. 9; XIX. 5.

(3) "Hi-ši-'ar-ša-'." Bezold, XIII. Ca. 3; XIV. Cb. 5, 14; XV. F. 9; XVI. K. 4, 12.

(4) "Hi-ši-ar-šu." Bezold, XVII. 5 *bis*.

(5) "H(Hi)-ha-ri-šu." *Z. A.*, XI. 83(?).

(6) "Ah-ši-ya-mar-šu." *Acts of 8th Orient. Cong.*, No. 19.

(7) "Ah-ši-ya-ar-šu." Evetts, 3, 5.

(8) "Ah-šu-mar-ši-'." *Acts of 8th Orient. Cong.*, 16.

(9) "Ak-ki-iš-ar-šu." *Id.*, 17.

(10) "Ak-ši-i-ma-ar-šu." *Id.*, 18.

(11) "Ah-ši-ar . . ." *Id.*, 21.

(12) "Ak-ši-ak-ar-šu." Evetts, 2.

(13) "Ak-ka-ši-ar-ši." Evetts, 4.

(14) "Ak-ši-ya-ar." *Acts of 8th Orient. Cong.*, No. 20.

X. 15; of Xerxes, XII. 1; of Artaxerxes, XI. 71, 74, XII. 64, XV. 2¹, 4. Josephus uses it of Cyrus, *Ant.*, X. 232, 247, *c. Ap.* I. 152; of Darius Hystaspes, *Ant.*, XI. 30; of Xerxes, *c. Ap.*, I. 172; of Artaxerxes Longimanus, *c. Ap.*, I. 40. In Cory's *Fragments*, Syncellus speaks of "Cyrus, the present king of the Persians." On the other hand, Alexander and his sons, the Seleucids and the Arsacids, who were the successors of the Persian monarchs of the Achæmenian line, seem to have dropped the title "king of Persia" as an ordinary designation; and of the late Greek writers, Diodorus Siculus alone uses it frequently in referring to the kings of Persia, though he, as well as Strabo, Polybius, and all other later writers, ordinarily speak of the kings of Persia by the names only. So that if the authors of Daniel and Ezra-Nehemiah really lived in the time of the Macedonian or Parthian supremacy, they must have used, not the titles current in their day, but those appropriate to the Persian kings during the existence of the Persian kingdom under the Achæmenidæ.*

A probability that the phrase "king of Persia" was used during the existence of the Persian kingdom would have been raised, moreover, from the almost, if not altogether, universal usage of antiquity. For example, it will be observed that the usual designation of every king of Egypt, from Mena, the first king of the first dynasty, down to Cæsarion, the son of Cleopatra and Cæsar, was "King of Upper and Lower Egypt" (see *P. T. R.*, II, 618, *seq.*; III, 55, *seq.*, and 239, *seq.*). So, also, of the sixty-eight kings of Babylonia, or parts thereof, the names of but six will be found without mention of the name of the country, city or people ruled; and this rare failure to mention the country, etc., ruled will be seen to arise most probably from the paucity of monuments of the kings whose names thus occur, and not from the avoidance of the title (see *P. T. R.*, Vol. II, pp. 465-479). The name of every one of the kings of Assyria is found accompanied with the title "king of Assyria" (see *P. T. R.*, Vol. II, pp. 479-497). Furthermore, it is the ordinary descriptive title of the kings in all the other early Semitic monuments, *e.g.*, on the Moabite stone Meša is called king of Moab and Omri king of Israel; in the Sendschirli inscription, Krl and Barsur are designated by the title "king of Yadi," Panammu as "king of Samal," and Tiglath-

* The phrase "king of the Medes" should be mentioned here as a designation of the Achæmenidæ during the existence of the Persian kingdom. We find it alone in Herod., I. 206 (Cyrus so addressed by Tomyris, queen of the Massagetæ). In VII. 136, VIII. 14, Xerxes is called "king of the Mede" by the Lacedæmonians, and in IX. 7 by the Athenians.

Pileser as "king of Assyria." In the Sabea inscriptions, the common title of the kings is "the king of Saba" or the "king of Saba and Raidan," *et al.*; in the Phenician inscriptions the kings of Gebal, Kty and of the Sidonians are usually designated by the appropriate title, *i.e.*, "king of Gebal," etc. In the Nabatean inscriptions, the kings receive the title "king of the Nabateans." So, also, in the Greek writers, which were contemporaneous with the Persian kings, the kings are frequently referred to by name, title and country (see *P. T. R.*, III, 260). The Hebrew writers who refer to contemporary kings are also in the habit of using the name followed by the title, followed by the country, city or people ruled over, *e.g.*, Isaiah employs the title as follows: Rezin, king of Aram, vii. 1; Sargon, king of Assyria, xx. 1; Sennacherib, *id.*, xxxvi. 1, xxxvii. 21, 37; Tirhakeh, king of Cush, xxxvii. 9; Merodach-Baladan, the son of Baladan, king of Babylon, xxxix. 1. Jeremiah employs it frequently, *e.g.*, Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, xxi. 2, 7, xxii. 25, xxiv. 1, xxv. 1, 9, xxvii. 8, 20, xxviii. 3, 11, 14, xxix. 3, 21, xxxii. 28, xxxv. 11, xxxvii. 1, xxxix. 1, 5, 11, xli. 2, 13, 26, xlix. 28, 30, l. 17, li. 34, lii. 4, 12; Pharaoh Necho, king of Egypt, xli. 2, and Pharaoh, king of Egypt, xxv. 19, xli. 17. Ezekiel speaks of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, xxvi. 7, xxix. 18, 19, xxx. 10; of Pharaoh, king of Egypt, xxix. 2, 3, xxx. 21, 22, xxxi. 2, xxxii. 2. Daniel speaks of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, i. 1, and of Cyrus, king of Persia, x. 1. So Ezra, in like manner, speaks of Artaxerxes, king of Persia, 7, iv. vii. 1; and Nehemiah, of "Artaxerxes, king of Babylon," xiii. 6.

II. DARIUS, THE PERSIAN.

Dr. Driver further remarks that, "the title of Persian could only have become a distinctive one after the Persian period was past," and " 'Darius, the Persian,' must (from the context) be Darius Codomannus, the last king of Persia, B.C. 336-332."

Omitting discussion of the phrase "from the context," the usage of the monuments, so far as known, is against the assumption that this title became distinctive after the Persian period was past. For the one king of all history who most parades and glories in his race and family was Darius Hystaspes. For example, he says on the Suez inscription C: "I am a Persian"; on the inscription of Nagš-i-Rustem, he is called a "Persian, the son of a Persian"; on the Behistun inscription, Darius calls himself "the Persian, king of Persia"; and he often designates the nationality of others in

the same way.* So, also, Herodotus calls him "Darius, the Persian" (II. 110, 158). Further, *no other writer*, so far as I know, *calls him by this title; nor is it ever used of any other Darius*. It is used, however, of Cyrus by Xenophon in the *Cyropædia*, I. 1; by Diodorus Siculus, II. 34, IX. 20, 31, 32, 35, and by Josephus, *c. Ap.*, I. 159; of Cambyses by Diodorus Siculus, X. 14, and by Castor (Cory, *Anc. Frag.*, p. 87).

It is especially noteworthy that elsewhere the Scriptures designate Cyrus and Darius alone by the title "Persian"; and that, with the exception of Diodorus Siculus (who lived in the first century B.C.) and Castor, no other authority calls any other king by this designation. "Cyrus, the Persian," is so called in the Scriptures in opposition to "Belshazzar, the Chaldean"; and Darius the Persian in distinction from Darius the Mede. The title, therefore, was necessary to distinguish kings of pure *Persian* race from those of other nationalities.†

It is worthy of note, also, in this connection, that the Greek writers contemporary with the existence of the Persian kingdom delight in the words "Persian" and "Mede" to denote the kings of Persia. So Herodotus calls Xerxes "a Persian man," VII. 157; or "the Persian," VII. 22, 148 *bis*, 117, 163, 166, 172, 177, 207, VIII. 108, 116, 141, IX. 1, 7; and represents him as being addressed "O Persian," VII. 12. So Thucydides uses "the Mede" of the king of Persia, I. 69, 74; and Xenophon "the Persian" in *Hellenica*, V. 2.

Finally, it was customary in ancient times to designate men by means of their nationality as well as their office, as may be seen in a good number of examples in the contract-tablets of Nabonidus, Cambyses, *et al.* (See Strassmaier, *in loc.*)

**E.g.*, "There was a Magian, Gumatu by name, who rebelled," l. 15; "there was neither a Persian, nor a Median, nor any one of our family who would take away the government from the Gunatu the Magian," l. 20; "a Babylonian, Nadintabel by name, rebelled in Babylon," l. 31; "a Median, Parumartiš by name, rebelled in Media," l. 47; "Umidarna, a Persian, my servant, I appointed the governor," l. 44; "Dadaršu, an Armenian, my servant, sent I to Armenia," l. 48; "Umisi, my servant, a Persian, sent I to Armenia," l. 53. So, in like manner, he refers to "Tukhmaspada, the Median," l. 62; "Dadaršu, the Persian," l. 69; "Artamarzia, the Persian," l. 73; "Uimimana, the Persian," l. 79; "Arahu, an Armenian," l. 85; "Vindaфра, a Mede," l. 86; "Martia, a Persian," l. 92. At the end of the inscription is the following: "These are — men who were with me until I slew — Magian: Vindaфра we all called Persian g. t. 109–112."

† Smerdis, or Gomates, is frequently called the Magian in the Behistun inscription, *i.e.*, "Gumatu Magashu," §§ 18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 90, 109. Is it astonishing that the successful king should vaunt his "Persian" extraction as over against the usurping Magian?

III. "KING OF BABYLON."

After the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus, continues Dr. Driver, the "standing official title" of the kings in question "was not 'king of Persia' but 'king of Babylon.'"

That the title "king of Babylon" was not the standing official title of any king of Persia will be evident from the following facts, which are supported by the evidence of the monuments and documents cited in the previous articles:

1. In the Medo-Persian monuments the king of Persia is never called the "king of Babylon" (*P. T. R.*, II, 265-266).

2. Among the numerous Egyptian titles of the kings of Persia, this one never occurs (*P. T. R.*, II, 270-272).

3. Neither Greek inscription, nor letter, nor historian of any age mentions the kings of Persia by this title—not even Josephus (*P. T. R.*, II, 272-281).

4. In the Scriptures the title is used but once, to wit, in Ezra v. 13,* where Cyrus is spoken of as king of Babylon (*P. T. R.*, II, 281).

5. Even in Babylonia the title alone is found in but a few, comparatively, of the tablets;† and it is never found on the tablets from the reigns of Smerdis, Xerxes(?), Artaxerxes I, Darius II, and Artaxerxes II.‡ It is never found, either alone or in combi-

* This phrase is worthy of special consideration, because of the fine linguistic discrimination and the exact accuracy of the writer. The twelfth verse reads: "But after that our fathers had provoked the God of heaven unto wrath, he gave them into the hand of Nebuchadnezzar, the king of Babylon (נְבֻכַדְנֶצַּר), the Chaldean, who destroyed this house and carried the people away into Babylon." The thirteenth reads: "But in the first year of Cyrus king of Babylon (בְּרִשְׁתִּי) King Cyrus (בְּרִשְׁתִּי) made a decree to build this house of God." The English version fails to bring out the distinction between Cyrus and Nebuchadnezzar as kings of Babylon. The Aramaic original shows clearly by the use of *di* that a distinction is made by the writer between the first year of Cyrus as king of Babylon and the first year of Cyrus as king of Persia. The idea is that Cyrus, king of Persia, restored the vessels of the house of Jehovah,‡ the first year that he reigned over Babylon. The phrase would be literally rendered: "in the first year of Cyrus the king, that is of Babylon."

† To wit, in but nine to eleven Cyrus tablets out of 375, and once in the Cyrus Cylinder; in from twenty-two to thirty Cambyses tablets out of 445; out of the eleven Smerdis tablets, not at all (see *Z. A.*, IX, Strassmaier, "Notes du VIII-tième Congrès internationale, No. 22); in but nine to fourteen out of 600 Darius tablets; out of fourteen Xerxes tablets, in at most one; in no one of the 126 Artaxerxes' tablets; and in no one of the eighty-eight(?) Darius Nothus tablets. Or, out of 1569 tablets from the Persian period, only forty to fifty-six have the name of the king plus the title king of Babylon alone in the subscription.

‡ In fairness, it must be added here that the phrase "king of Babylon" does occur besides on the Babylonian tablets in the following combination, to wit: the name of the king plus the combination "king of Babylon and of the lands," in the tablets of Cyrus twenty-four to twenty-five times; of Cambyses, fifty to

nations, upon the tablets from the times of Artaxerxes I, Darius II, or Artaxerxes III.

No argument, then, is needed to show that Dr. Driver is absolutely wrong when he states that after the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus, the standing official title of the Achæmenidæ was not "king of Persia," but "king of Babylon." Especially, is he wrong in supposing that Ezra and Nehemiah, living as they did in the reign of Artaxerxes I, would use this title of that king; inasmuch as neither alone nor in combination has this title been found as yet upon any inscription from his reign.

IV. "THE KING."

After "king of Babylon" this title is the one first mentioned by Dr. Driver as the common title of the kings of Persia. But notice:

First, this title never occurs alone on any monument of the Persian kings except once, and that in an indefinite address to an imaginary king. This is found in verse 105 of the Behistun inscription, which reads: "King Darius says: Whosoever thou art, O king, who mayest rule after me, etc."

Secondly, nor has it been found on any Babylonian tablet as a designation of any particular king, but only in such general phrases as "son(?) of the king," "storehouse of the king," etc.

Thirdly, it is, however, the usual title in the contemporary Greek historians, Ctesias, Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon, and also in the Hebrew Scriptures.

It will be seen, then, that Dr. Driver's statement is true of the Greek and Hebrew writings, but not of the original native and Babylonian sources to which he is ostensibly referring.

How, then, are we to account for the difference in usage between the Greek and Hebrew on the one hand, and the monuments of Persia and Babylonia on the other? The answer is:—easily, when we remember that the kind of literature preserved to us on the monuments is entirely different from that contained in the Greek and Hebrew records. It is at this point that the critics have made the most astonishing *non sequiturs*. It will be seen in the long lists of royal titles which have been collected and published in

fifty-three times; of Smerdis, twice; of Darius, 150 to 154 times; of Xerxes, once; of Artaxerxes, no time. The phrase followed by the combination "king of Babylon, king of the lands," occurs in the tablets of Cyrus 266 to 273 times; of Cambyses, 301 to 306 times; of Smerdis, thirteen times; of Darius, 369 times; of Xerxes, three times; of Artaxerxes, no time. The phrase "king of Babylon" occurs also nine other times in various combinations, see in § I, pages 269, 270, Vol. II.

the preceding articles, that royal titles and designations were used with all the discrimination and taste which would be employed to-day; and that differences in the kind of literature in which the title was used, or in the relation of the person speaking to the monarch spoken of, were the cause of the difference in the manner of address or reference to the monarch mentioned. Let any one look, for example, over the letters of Tel-el-Amarna or the Greek letters, and he will see that the manner of address is peculiar to that kind of literature. So, also, in the legal documents of Babylonia and Egypt, one should notice that the superscription of the Egyptian and the subscription of the Babylonian contain accurate dates and distinctive titles, but no flourishing of titles of honor needless for the purpose of business. Again, in the Greek historians, where the name alone or the title alone is sufficient for definiteness, it alone is used; but the distinctive titles are employed when needed. So, also, in the Scriptures, Ezra and Nehemiah use the very manner of address and give in every case the particular title and designation which are proper to them and to the document which they use. In speaking to the monarch personally they use the term "king," as their position and close relation to him entitle them to do. In official documents they give the appropriate titles. In letters they give the proper address. There is not one title or designation in the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah that is not suitable to the time of Artaxerxes Longimanus, and to the character of the particular writing in which it occurs.

V. "THE GREAT KING."

Dr. Driver asserts that this was a standing official title; and implies that Ezra and Nehemiah should, if they wrote the books bearing their names, have employed this title to designate the kings of Persia.

But it will be noted that no Persian or Babylonian inscription, nor, in fact, any contemporary writer of any nation, uses this title alone to designate the Persian king, except Xenophon in the *Anabasis*, and he even but a few times, *e.g.*, I. 3, 7 *bis*, II. 3.

In combination with the name alone it is found on the seal of Darius (Bezold, II, Sgl.); on several vases of Xerxes (*id.*, XX. 2); and on a vase of Artaxerxes (see Weissbach u. Bang, *Die Altpers. Keilins.*, p. 47).

In other combinations on inscriptions, it is found in all the trilingual inscriptions published by Bezold and by Weissbach and Bang. So Cyrus calls himself on the Clay Cylinder, 20-52, and

Cambyses is called "a great king of Egypt" (Brugsch, *History*, II, 294).

It will be noted, further, with regard to this title:

First, that it is never used in the subscriptions, nor, I believe, anywhere else in the contract-tablets of Babylon.

Secondly, that it is used in Persian on a seal, on a vase, and on rock inscriptions, such as are nowhere mentioned in the Scriptures.

Thirdly, that it is not a *common* title in the Greek classics.

Fourthly, that it is not a distinctive title of kings of Persia, inasmuch as it was used both before and after the Achæmenids by the kings of Babylon, Assyria, Egypt, and by the successors of Alexander. Among the kings of Egypt it is used by Queen Hatshepsu (see *P. T. R.*, II, 638, 19), of Amenophis III (*id.*, 645, 11, 12), of Amenophis IV (*id.*, 661, 58-66), of Rameses I (*id.*, Vol. III, 55 (11)), of Seti I (*id.*, 58 (30)), of Rameses II (*id.*, 62 (46), (47), (65)), of Rameses IX (*id.*, 69 (9)). Among the kings of Babylon, the phrase "šarru dannu," *mighty king*, is used by Dingi (*P. T. R.*, II, 466), Bursin (*id.*, 467), Gamil-Sin (*id.*), Sargon (*id.*, 468), Hammurabi (*id.*), Samsu-iluna (*id.*, 469), Ammiditana (*id.*), Ammizaduga (*id.*), Karaındaš (*id.*, 470), Burnaburiaš (*id.*), Kuri-galzu (*id.*), Marduk-tabik-zerim (*id.*, 471), Nebuchadnezzar I (*id.*), Esarhaddon (*id.*, 473), Šamaššumukin (*id.*, 474), Nabopolassar (*id.*, 475), Nabonidus (*id.*, 479). The last named uses, also, the phrase "the great king" (*id.*, 479). The kings of Assyria use the title "šarru dannu," *mighty king*, from the time of Ašuruballit (*id.*, 479) down to the last king, Sinšar-iškun (*id.*, 497); and the phrase "šarru rabu," *great king*, from the time of Ramman-Nirari (*id.*, 482) down to the last king (*id.*, 497). So in the inscriptions of the Seleucids (*P. T. R.*, III, 250. 7; 251. 9) and in one inscription (*P. T. R.*, III, 427) and on many of the coins of the Arsacids, and on two coins of Bactrian kings (*P. T. R.*, III, 427, 430) the phrase "great king" is used along with the name alone or more frequently in combination with other titles, such as "the great king of kings, Arsaces," etc.

VI. "KING OF KINGS."

With respect to the assertion that after the conquest of Babylonia the official title was "king of kings" it should be remarked that:

This title is never used alone in any known record, so far as I have seen. In conjunction with the name of the king it is found nowhere, except *possibly* in the Aramaic inscription found at

Memphis (see *P. T. R.*, Vol. II, 271, 272). In conjunction with the name plus that of the father, it is found only in the inscription of Gadates (*P. T. R.*, Vol. II, 273). In all other places where it occurs it is one of many titles used on rock inscriptions, with regard to which, what seems most noteworthy in this connection is, that it was not a *specific* designation of the kings of Persia. It is, no doubt, used of many kings of Babylonia, *e.g.*, Nebuchadnezzar I is called the "prince of kings" (nasik šarrâni) (*P. T. R.*, II, 472); Merodach-Baladan, "the lord of lords" (*id.*, 473). It is used, also, of the kings of Assyria: *e.g.*, Ašurnaširabal is called "king of lords" (*id.*, 483); "king of kinglets," "lord of lords," "king of kings," (*id.*), "king of kings" (*id.*, 484); Esarhaddon, "king of the kings of Egypt" (*id.*, 492); Ašurbanipal, "king of kings" (*id.*, 495, 496), "lord of kings" (*id.* often). Among the kings of Egypt, moreover, Amenhotep III bears the title "king of kings" (*id.*, 643, 644), "prince of princes" (*id.*); Darius, "king of kings" (*id.*, III, 78). In the Aramaic inscriptions of Eshmunazar, again, the king of Persia is called "the lord of kings" (*P. T. R.*, III, 424); in the Mašub inscription, Ptolemy is so called (*id.*, 424); so, also, in the inscriptions from Larnax Lapithæa (*id.*, 425). So Abdashtoreth is called in the inscription of Larnax Lapithæa (*id.*, 425). This, also, is the usual title of the Arsacid kings (see *P. T. R.*, III, 426-428).

VII. "KING OF THE LANDS."

As to the title "king of the lands" (šar matâti), it should be remarked—

First, that it is never found alone.

Secondly, that in the Medo-Persian monuments it is never found except in combination with three or more other titles.

Thirdly, that it is never used in Greek, except, perhaps, once in Herodotus, in his translation of the Tearus stele of Darius Hystaspes (Bk. IV. 91).

Fourthly, that it is never employed in any Egyptian monument except in that of Darius Hystaspes, which was written in Babylonian and other languages, on the stele found near the Suez Canal.

Fifthly, that its use with the addition of the name alone, even on the tablets of Babylon, was not the common one in the reigns of Cyrus, Cambyses, Smerdis, Darius Hystaspes and Xerxes. In the Cyrus tablets it occurs in but twenty-three to twenty-seven out of 368; in the Cambyses tablets, in twenty-two to twenty-six out of 438; in the Darius tablets, in twenty-six to twenty-nine out

of 579; in one or two Xerxes tablets out of thirteen; and in none of the Smerdis tablets.

Sixthly, that the use of the phrase was not confined to the Persian kings, nor did it cease at the destruction of the Persian empire under Darius Codomannus. For example, it is used alone and in conjunction with the name of one or more of the Antiochi; and also in combination with other titles (see *P. T. R.*, III, 250, 251).

Seventhly, that in the reigns of Artaxerxes I, Darius II and Artaxerxes II (one tablet only) all the Babylonian tablets are of this form with the addition of the name. The title "king of Babylon" and all combinations have been dropped and we find simply "Artaxerxes, king of lands" and "Darius, king of lands."

The problem, then, with regard to this title, reduces itself to the question, Why did Ezra and Nehemiah, living as they did in the reign of Artaxerxes the First, not use this title in conjunction with his name, seeing that the Babylonian tablets of that time use it and nothing but it? To this we would answer—

First, that all the tablets from the reign of Artaxerxes, Darius and others so far found and published number about 200 in all, and these all from one small place—Nippur in Babylonia.

Secondly, in the Medo-Persian inscriptions Artaxerxes is called "Artaxerxes, the king," "Artaxerxes, the great king," and simply "Artaxerxes," but never, except in combinations on three monumental titles, is Artaxerxes called "the king of the lands."

Thirdly, his Egyptian cartouch reads simply "Artaxerxes, Pharaoh the Great," and in another place he is called "the king of Upper and Lower Egypt, the sovereign Artaxerxes."

Fourthly, the Greeks who were his contemporaries call him usually "King," "Artaxerxes, the king," "Artaxerxes," "King Artaxerxes" "Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes," and "King Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes," but they never call him "king of lands."

Fifthly, Ezra and Nehemiah use the titles "King," "Artaxerxes," "Artaxerxes, the king," or "the King Artaxerxes," and once Ezra says "Artaxerxes, king of kings," and three times "Artaxerxes, king of Persia."

If now we ask why Ezra and Nehemiah use these titles and not "king of lands" we reply:

First, we have shown that this title, so far as found, was used, except in a few combinations, only in Babylonia. Ezra and Nehemiah were not residents of Babylonia but of Persia. They lived at the court and capital of the Persian empire. There is no

evidence that the title "king of lands" was employed in Persia proper as a title in conjunction with the name alone, nor anywhere except in monumental combinations; nor is there evidence that it was used anywhere but in Babylon. Why, then, should Ezra and Nehemiah have used it?

Secondly, even if it could be shown that this title was in general use throughout the empire of the Persians, it might not have been mentioned in a mere fragment of literature such as we have in Ezra-Nehemiah.

Thirdly, it will be seen by referring to the group in Article I (*P. T. R.*, Vol. II, pp. 260, 267), that the title "king of lands" has never been found except in *contract-tablets* from Babylonia, and in several combinations of *monumental* titles from Persia (*P. T. R.*, II, 262, 268). No proof is forthcoming that it was ever used in any other kind of literature; such as letters, decrees, personal address, history, or in actual court ceremonial speech.

CONCLUSION.

Before closing this article I cannot refrain from calling attention to two remarks suggested by the titles collected.

First, in view of the immense variety of these titles; in view of the facts that different kinds of titles prevail in different kinds of literature, and that different authors exercise their individual preferences in their designations of particular kings; and in view, finally, of the fact that the titles most commonly used in the Hebrew Scriptures have prevailed in all ages of the world and among all peoples in similar kinds of literature, and were used in similar relations of the writers and speakers to their particular king—we deem it preposterous to prescribe what titles any given author must have used, or to suppose that the omission or insertion of any such titles, as those mentioned by Dr. Driver, can supply an indication of the age of the document in which they occur.*

* Even the title "Pharaoh" to designate the king of Egypt does not imply a late date for the Pentateuch, as the collection of titles of the Egyptian kings given above in Articles III and IV demonstrate. For, first, it will be noted that the title "Pharaoh" was used especially of the kings of Egypt of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth dynasties, and, secondly, that such Egyptian writings as concern the monarch only indirectly (such as the tales of Sancha and of Khamuas, "the most notable of the numerous progeny of the great king Rameses II") (see Griffith's *Stories of the High Priest of Memphis*, Oxford, 1900) contain the title Pharaoh as the preferable designation of the monarch of Egypt. This is worthy of more extended investigation. At present we can only say, that a title which was probably used as early as the first dynasty (see *P. T. R.*, Vol. II, p. 619), and in the fifth and twelfth dynasties (*id.*, 623 and 627), and

Secondly, a caveat should be entered against hasty generalizations and unsupported assertions which tend to undermine faith in the historicity of the Old Testament Scriptures. If the statements of Dr. Driver* with regard to the titles of the kings found in Ezra-Nehemiah, supported by an array of evidence, have been shown by a fuller induction of facts to be without foundation, and the statements of the Scriptures stand approved—what credit can be given to assertions of radical critics, for which no evidence whatever has been nor can be produced? In short, if when, as in the case of these titles of the kings, much evidence can be gathered from outside sources, and this evidence when gathered is found to be against the radical critics and overwhelmingly and convincingly in favor of the Biblical statements and usage, is not the presumption justified that, where no evidence is forthcoming, the Bible is right and the critics who attack its statements wrong?

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more commonly in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth dynasties, might very well have been employed by Moses in designating the king of Egypt. It was not so much the individual king as the power hostile to the Hebrews and their God that the writer of the Pentateuch wishes to designate.

* In this and the preceding articles on the titles of the Persian kings in Ezra-Nehemiah, I have singled out Dr. Driver's statements rather than those of some other writer on Introduction; because he has given the fullest, clearest, and fairest argument possible in support of the assertion, first made apparently by Ewald, that the use of the title "king of Persia" demanded a date for Ezra-Nehemiah subsequent to the downfall of the Persian kingdom. If, therefore, it has been shown that Dr. Driver's contention is insufficiently supported by the facts, or rather is contrary to the facts, much more will it have been shown that the mere assertions of others are without justification.

III.

ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER'S PREPARATION FOR HIS PROFESSORSHIP.*

DURING his tour to the Hebrides, Samuel Johnson visited the little island on the west coast of Scotland where Columba and his companions lived; and from which they moved on their missionary journeys to the neighboring islands and to the mainland. Standing on the bleak hill which crowns it, his mind traveled back to the period when, to quote his words, "it was the luminary of the Caledonian regions." The association of the place with the saintly life and labors of the Irish apostle of Scotland called from him an eloquent expression of contemptuous pity for those whom such associations do not interest and benefit,—for those "whose patriotism is not deepened on the plain of Marathon, and whose piety does not grow warmer on the island of Iona." In every case in which association of this kind exerts a beneficent influence, the benefit takes its departure not from the mere physical element, but from the human element associated with it. There is much to charm the senses in the towers, the halls, the pictures, the libraries, the peaceful rivers, the gardens and the noble trees of Oxford and Cambridge. But what are these delights of sense in their power to uplift, to inspire, to awaken the high resolve "to scorn delights and live laborious days," when compared with the human memories which the university cities of England awaken or deepen? I do not know whether Mr. Matthew Arnold was right when he said that Oxford is the university of great movements and Cambridge the university of great men; but one cannot walk in either Oxford or Cambridge without crowding thoughts of the great and good whose lives have made them places of pilgrimage for all time.

Called to deliver the first address of the session, it has seemed to me that I could not do better than ask you to surrender yourselves for the hour to some of the great associations which constitute no small part of the wealth of the place in which you are to begin or continue your theological studies. For young as the town of

* An address to the students of Princeton Theological Seminary.

Princeton is when compared with the seats of the great schools of learning on the continent or in Great Britain, it needs only a little study to discover that we too are rich in great memories of the kind which should inspire high resolve.

The University of Princeton, standing on one of the first foothills of the Appalachian Mountains and in a town whose trees and lawns have given it a continental fame, whose oldest hall is one of the best examples of pre-revolutionary architecture, with its monumental buildings increased in number nearly every year, and with its noble towers and library and memorial theatre, produces a profound impression on the visitor. But what are these to its human associations? It is the great names on the gravestones in the cemetery, the marble stone that marks the place where Mercer fell, the homes of two signers of the great Declaration; it is the memorable fact, that here Madison and Paterson, in the Whig and Cliosophic Societies, began their discussions of the great problems of constitutional government which they debated in maturer years in the Constitutional Convention; that here Ellsworth began to learn the lessons in jurisprudence which made him the great Chief Justice; that here the elder Edwards planned to write his *History of Redemption*, and Davies delivered his eloquent discourses; that here Witherspoon impressed permanently his strong personality on the life of a great institution, and on the individual lives of his students; that here the elder Maclean lectured from the first chair of Chemistry in the United States, and Henry conducted the experiments which issued in the great discoveries which made possible the invention of the electric telegraph—it is names and facts like these which make the town a benediction to all who will yield themselves to its memories.

Younger by three-fourths of a century than the University is the Theological Seminary of which you are students. Though the eldest of the divinity schools of the Presbyterian Church, it is less than a century old. The years which have passed will one day be looked on as a brief period in the life of this institution of learning. If we choose to think of Princeton's age comparatively, and to call to mind the fact that they still deliver theological lectures at Paris where Thomas Aquinas taught in the thirteenth, and at Oxford where John Wycliffe taught in the fourteenth century, our Seminary is in its infancy. Even among American institutions it is not the oldest. The Dutch Reformed Church Seminary, now at New Brunswick, was founded in 1795; the Associate Reformed Seminary in 1804; and Andover in 1809. Thus three American divinity schools antedate Princeton Seminary, as three American

colleges antedate Princeton University. But young as it is, Princeton Seminary has not only done a large work for the Church and the world, but is rich in inspiring associations.

Of these none are more precious than the careers and characters of the founders and the early professors. It is one of these that I shall bring before you this morning. I shall tell the story of Archibald Alexander, our first professor; the story, not of his career in Princeton, but of those preceding and preparatory years which explain his Princeton life and justify the veneration with which we always speak of him. It is origins and beginnings with which history is most closely concerned, and in which the reader of history is most deeply interested. Limited in time as this opening address must be, I am compelled in selecting a special subject to choose between his earlier and his later life. And without hesitation I choose the earlier, not only because less known, but because it is the earlier and for you, therefore, the more important to know. I am not without hope that I shall be able so deeply to interest you in the man as to lead you to the charming biography written by his son.* If I shall do no more than this I shall be content; for in that case I shall have helped to bring you into vital communion with one of the loftiest, purest and simplest characters, with one of the largest and best-disciplined intellects the American Church has produced.

We shall do no wrong to their associates if we say that the Presbyterian Church owes this Seminary above all to the anxiety, the prayer, the correspondence and the separate and united labors of three notable men: Ashbel Green, Samuel Miller and Archibald Alexander.

If ever a man inherited the right and the duty to promote the interests of higher learning, in particular to take part in laying the foundations of a theological institution, it was Ashbel Green, sometime President of Princeton College. His father, the Rev. Jacob Green of Hanover, New Jersey, a graduate of Harvard College, had educated not a few ministers in his house, and had acted during a vacancy as President of Princeton. His maternal grandfather, the Rev. John Pierson of Woodbridge, graduated at Yale in 1711, was one of the founders and first trustees of Princeton College. His great-grandfather, the Rev. Abraham Pierson, graduated at Harvard, was one of the founders and the first President or Rector of Yale College. And his great-great-grandfather,

* *The Life of Archibald Alexander, D.D., First Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton, New Jersey.* By James W. Alexander, D.D. New York: Charles Scribner, 1854.

Abraham Pierson, was graduated at Cambridge in England, and was deeply interested in the life of Harvard at new Cambridge in Massachusetts. With such an ancestry, Ashbel Green was only continuing the work of his family when he sent to the General Assembly of 1805 an overture, in which he set forth the Church's and the country's need of learned and devoted ministers, and prayed the Assembly to see to it that the Presbyteries of the Church take regular steps to secure suitable candidates and to proceed to their education. This overture and its favorable reception were the first public action toward the planting of this institution. Dr. Green was at that date the pastor of the Second Church of Philadelphia. Among his intimate friends and correspondents was the Rev. Samuel Miller, D.D., one of the collegiate pastors of the Presbyterian Church of New York. Samuel Miller's memory is one of the highly honored memories in the possession of our Church. We are too apt to think of him chiefly as a saintly man, who was eminently a gentleman. He was a saint; and he brought to his Seminary professorship that fine urbanity which was the fruit of good blood, lifelong association with men of influence, native gifts for society, a profound Christian experience and a successful career as the pastor of a great city church. But Samuel Miller, this Seminary should be the last to forget, was also a man of exceptional ability, of wide reading, of real scholarship and of diversified intellectual sympathies. Whatever he studied was submitted to the reflection of a strong and judicial mind. I hope to do later, what the time allotted to this opening lecture will not permit me to do now, namely, so to set before you the life and character and work of this great founder and benefactor of the Seminary, as will leave on you the impression I have received of his high intellectual life. That he lived far above the intellectual level on which many of his conspicuous contemporaries lived, no one who knows his life and work can doubt. Samuel Miller, as I have said, was one of Ashbel Green's most valued friends and correspondents. Whether Dr. Green awakened or only deepened Dr. Miller's interest in the plan of a regular system of ministerial education it is now impossible to tell. Certain it is, that not long after the overture of 1805 the two men were in correspondence on this subject in connection with the kindred subject of the projected seminary at Andover, on which Mr. Miller's New England blood and friendships led him to look with favor. But before Andover Seminary was established in 1809 Dr. Miller had become convinced that the Presbyterian Church must undertake the education of its own ministry. . Mean-

while, in 1808, Archibald Alexander, then the pastor of the Third Church of Philadelphia, preached as the retiring Moderator a sermon before the General Assembly, from the text, "Seek ye to excel, to the edifying of the Church." "The first thing which deserves our attention," said he, "is the introduction of suitable men into the ministry. If you would have a well-disciplined army, you must begin by appointing good officers. There is no subject which more deserves the attention of our Church when met in General Assembly than this. The deficiency of preachers is great. Our vacancies are numerous and churches often continue for years unsupplied, by which means they are broken up and destroyed." He expressed the opinion that the Church would not have a supply of ministers adequate to its needs until every Presbytery, certainly until every Synod had under its direction a seminary established for the single purpose of educating youth for the ministry, and in which the course of education from its commencement would be directed toward this object.

It is not improbable that this sermon was the result of consultation and correspondence with Dr. Green and Dr. Miller. Certainly it gave the needed impetus and the right direction to the movement to provide the Church with a theologically educated ministry. For the next year an overture came to the General Assembly from the Presbytery of Philadelphia, distinctly proposing the establishment of a theological school. The Assembly appointed a committee, and referred the subject to the Presbyteries. The answer of the Presbyteries led to the organization of the Seminary "Plan." A Board of Directors was elected, of which Ashbel Green became the President, and of which Samuel Miller and Archibald Alexander were members. In 1811 Archibald Alexander was elected the professor of the Theological Seminary, and in 1812 Samuel Miller was elected as his colleague. During the latter year the Seminary was opened with three students in attendance. With the name of Archibald Alexander, therefore, begins the list of the instructors of this institution, of those who defined its curriculum and have given character to its internal life.

One of the richest valleys in the eastern half of the Appalachian Mountains lies between two ranges, which, while somewhat broken into peaks in the northeast, can be traced in Massachusetts and Connecticut. As you move south the ranges become more regular and less broken, until they sink into the alluvium of the States that border on the Gulf. The Hudson has cut its way across the valley at Newburgh, the Delaware at Easton, the Schuylkill at Reading,

the Susquehanna at Harrisburg, and the Potomac at Williamsport. South of the Potomac, speaking roughly, the valley widens until at places it is quite thirty miles in breadth. It was rich in timber at almost all points when the whites entered it; and wherever the land was cleared and tilled it amply rewarded by rich and diversified harvests the labors of the settlers. The mountains were always in sight to give the element of sublimity to a landscape which even without them would have possessed elements of exceptional beauty; and they were there as reservoirs to make it a land of water-courses, a land of plenty.

Throughout almost its entire length this great valley was subdued to the use of man by what we shall not be criticised in this place for describing as one of the noblest classes of the Colonial immigrants—I mean the class constituted by those who had been educated by the theology and polity of the Reformed Churches. In western Massachusetts and Connecticut prevailed that type of Congregationalism which was formed, not by the idea of Independency, but by the English Presbyterianism of Cartwright. In the valley through New York and New Jersey lived the Dutch and the Huguenots. In Pennsylvania, from the Delaware at the Irish Settlement on beyond the Schuylkill at Reading, the immigrants were largely German, and of these many came from the Reformed Churches of the Rhenish Palatinate. Even in this region some settlers from Ulster had founded homes; and they became more numerous as the valley approached the Susquehanna. Between the Susquehanna and the Potomac it would be hard to say whether the German or the Ulster immigrants were the majority. South of the Potomac the valley was called the Valley of Virginia; and what we may call the Presbyterian character of the settlements was quite as striking as it was farther north. I think we shall not be inaccurate if we call this great valley from its northeastern to its southwestern limits, the region of the country in which the theology and polity of the Reformed Churches exerted their characteristic influence more powerfully than in any other large section during the last half of the eighteenth century.

About 1736 Archibald Alexander, the son of Thomas, who was born in Scotland, migrated to America from the county of Derry in Ireland. He landed at the port of Philadelphia, and settled on the Schuylkill near what is now Norristown. Here his son William was born. Like many others he moved, about ten years later, to the southwest to new Virginia. Just what was the route he took we do not know; but it would not have been difficult for him to

have pursued his journey farther than the Potomac river through contiguous settlements of Ulster families. In Virginia he made his home in what is now Rockbridge county. His strong character was reflected in his vigorous physical frame. He was the leader of the community of settlers, the captain of the company raised to protect the settlement. "Perhaps," writes his grandson, "no man ever left behind him a higher character for uprightness and benignity than 'Old Ersebell' Alexander, as he was called by the Scotch people." His son William, a merchant and farmer and an elder of the Church, who could justify his right to bear rule by repeating from memory the whole of the Larger Westminster Catechism, married, in his own community, Ann Reid. Of these Scottish or, as we inaccurately say, "Scotch-Irish" parents Archibald Alexander was born on the seventeenth of April, 1772, just three years before the farmers of Massachusetts at Concord "fired the shot heard round the world." So heartily in sympathy was the farming community into which he was born with their Massachusetts brethren, that when soon afterward they organized a new county seat, they called it Lexington after the little town of Massachusetts; and the classical academy they founded and supported they called Liberty Hall, which still flourishes—*semper sit in flore*—as Washington and Lee University.

Archibald was the third of a family of nine. When he was three years old the family removed about five or six miles from his birth-place, and very near to what became the county seat. The period of his childhood was one of general distress throughout the country, brought on by the war. To this distress we must add the hardships which all suffer who live in a new country, even if as rich as a prairie of the Middle West or as the great Valley itself. The lack of a stable currency, the frequent and unexpected calls of the minute men to support the Continental line in the war of Independence, the want of manufactures, the difficulties of transportation and even of correspondence were common hardships; hardships which we, who live in a highly specialized society where labor is divided, can with difficulty realize. But hardships were not the most important elements of Archibald Alexander's boyhood. The community in which he lived was free in its spirit and democratic in its organization. If there were hardships, all endured them. The adventitious differences which mark our conventional life were unknown. If the rich were poor, as they were, the poor had enough and to spare of the necessities of living. And of the greatest elements of an ideal society none were wanting. For the com-

munity of which the Alexander family were members was aglow with religious feeling, and animate with intelligence and high intellectual ambition, and all on fire with the resolve to achieve civil liberty. We need not commiserate this boy. We would better congratulate him. For a society, however wanting in wealth, inventions and even fine art, which is formed by the sublime ideas of religion, intelligence and civil freedom, must be a society of fair women and brave men, of courtesy, of good deeds and large deeds, of self-sacrificing benevolence. It was quite another kind of community than that in which Archibald Alexander was born of which Wordsworth wrote, "Plain living and high thinking are no more."

He was trained religiously, of course. That prejudice or prejudgment in behalf of a religious life, which the historian Niebuhr said ought to be created in the mind of every child, was not permitted by faithful parents to be absent from the mind of young Alexander. And in his case at an exceptionally early period religious belief was given an intellectual and systematic form. Before he was seven he learned the Shorter Catechism.

He had already begun the study of Latin. And so distinct already was the promise he gave of large faculty for study, and so strong was the desire of his parents that one of their sons at least should receive a liberal education, that they sent him from home to what was thought a better school. When he was ten years old the purpose of educating him was settled, so remarkable already had his love of learning and his ability to acquire it appeared. He now became the pupil of the Rev. William Graham, whose school, called Liberty Hall, a revival of one which existed before the war, was reëstablished on land given for the purpose by young Alexander's father.

The often quoted remark of President Garfield, that in order to constitute a university it would be only necessary to secure a log, put on it Mark Hopkins as teacher and give him a pupil, would lose nothing of its truth if made of this teacher of Mr. Alexander. For William Graham, in his ideas of education, his devotion to abstract study and the search for fundamental truth, and his gift of exciting the interest and calling into healthful activity the powers of his students, was not unlike the great President of Williams College. He aimed, at Liberty Hall, "to rear a seminary on the model of Princeton College." Dr. Alexander, when seventy years of age, delivered a discourse in which he expressed his mature judgment of the gifts and character of his early teacher. "Mr. Graham," said he, "possessed a mind formed for profound and accurate investigation. He had studied the Greek and Latin clas-

sics with great care, and relished the beauties of these exquisite compositions. He had a strong leaning to the study of natural philosophy and took great pleasure in making experiments with such apparatus as he possessed. As he was an ardent patriot and thorough republican, the times in which he lived led him to bestow much attention on the science of government. The science, however, which engaged his thoughts more than all others, except Theology, was the Philosophy of the Mind." Dr. Alexander held in high esteem both the fidelity of Mr. Graham as an investigator in this department and the views he defended. He expressed the opinion that "the system of mental philosophy he organized" was a really great system. Besides Mr. Graham's, Mr. Alexander attended the classes of James Priestly, Mr. Graham's assistant. Priestly was a fine classical scholar and an enthusiastic teacher. His distinguished pupil says of him, that "the classics commonly read at school he had so completely by heart that I hardly ever saw a book in his hand when hearing classes in Ovid, Virgil, Horace or Homer. He would resort with the larger scholars to a spring, to spout the orations of Demosthenes in the original with all the fire of the Grecian orator himself."

In this academy he continued his studies for seven years. He had at the time a very humble opinion of his acquirements. He had, however, passed through, with the approbation of his principal, the whole of the course and was engaged in the review preceding the examination for Bachelor, when his studies were interrupted by his father's announcement that he had made "an engagement for him as tutor in the family of General Posey of the Wilderness, twelve miles west of Fredericksburg."

Humble as young Alexander's estimate of his attainments at this time was, it was not shared by either his father or his teacher. Already he had given evidence of the sure intellectual grasp and the eager intellectual outlook which always distinguished him. It was only his engagement as tutor that prevented his taking his degree. And his preparation for it was the mastery of a curriculum as wide as that whose completion gave it to Samuel Miller at the University of Pennsylvania, and to William Graham at Nassau Hall.

When he became tutor in General Posey's family he was only seventeen years old. This seems to me to have been the greatest change he ever made and the severest test to which his character was ever subjected. For he passed from the position of a pupil to that of a teacher, and he was thrown into the midst of a society very differently organized from that of his own community, and this

when only seventeen. I have said that the society of the Valley of Virginia was democratic in its organization and spirit. This is true, though the farms were larger there than in the valley in Pennsylvania, and though the farmers employed slaves and redemptioners who constituted a distinct and servile class. But on the lowlands of Virginia the farmers were great planters. Their shipping interests had early brought them into direct contact with the mother country. There was among them a spaciousness and ease of life which reflected the lives of county families in the old home. The planters were English in blood, and English sports and social ideas prevailed. Here Episcopalianism had been first established in America. Happily the planters did not follow their rectors in the loyalty of the latter to the mother country. The laymen of Virginia, among whom was George Washington, in rebelling against the Government of the United Kingdom, rebelled against the ministers of their own congregations; and really, if the portraits of these ministers, painted, for example, by Thackeray in the *Virginians*, are true to life, the laymen of Virginia evinced as much righteousness in abandoning their spiritual guides as they did patriotism in fighting for political independence. Partly because of the character of many of their clergy, and partly because of the spirit of the age, religious indifferentism or positive Deism was common in this part of Virginia. The warmth of religious feeling and the deep interest in religious truth which were characteristic of the Valley were at this time, speaking broadly, absent from the planting district, except as they prevailed among what were called "the lower classes." Certainly William Alexander either unwittingly put his son in a situation of great moral and spiritual peril, or had great confidence in his character, intelligence and attainments when he ushered him at seventeen into this society.

I dwell on this because it seems to me that Mr. Alexander, in the way in which he met these new conditions, showed the strength and poise of character, the fine self-command, the control by his central will of all the powers which marked him during all his manhood. Two things aided him in this critical period of his life. One was the regularity and severity of his duties as teacher; the other was the conversation of a devout Christian lady who lived in the family. The result of his year's life on the plantation was that his knowledge was increased and his character grew firm and his interest in personal religion was deepened. This interest, strengthened by his conversations with Mrs. Tyler, was informed by honest and intelligent efforts to obtain light on subjects which were dark to

him. He read John Flavel, one of the greatest of Puritan preachers, and studied Jenyns' *Internal Evidences of the Christian Religion*, a volume which he always esteemed highly.

This life at General Posey's proved a providential preparation for the deepening of his religious life. In 1789 he returned to his home in the Valley. A deep and widespread religious awakening occurred just at the time of his return, not at his home, but east and south of the Blue Ridge. I must refer you to his biography for a detailed narrative of this great revival. Among the preachers prominent during its course were John Blair Smith, Drury Lacy and William Graham. Mr. Graham took Mr. Alexander with him on his preaching tour, and it was while in company with his teacher and in the midst of the scenes characteristic of a great religious movement that he publicly confessed the Lord as his Redeemer. Both his deep and lifelong interest in revivals of religion and his opposition to not a few of the measures afterward employed by evangelists of note had their origin in his reflections on the scenes he witnessed during this tour.

In the autumn of 1789 he returned to his home in Rockbridge county, and became a communicant. Soon afterwards he fell dangerously ill. On his recovery he was compelled to face the question of his profession. He talked with his friends, and their judgment was clear that he should become a minister. "Moreover, the ministry of the Gospel was clearly his choice." But he thought himself unfit for it. To quote his own words, "I doubted my call. The only other pursuit which entered my thought was that of agriculture; and I pleased myself with the thought of retirement and escape from the awful responsibilities of the ministry." Still he went on with his studies, and began to read divinity with his old preceptor, Mr. Graham. At first with only one companion, afterward with half a dozen, he went to Mr. Graham's house once or twice a week to recite and debate. Philosophy and Systematic Theology were the chief subjects of the course. "During the time of my theological studies," he says, "I perused no great number of volumes, but some I read with great care. Among them were Edwards on the *Will*, on *Original Sin*, and on the *Affections*; Bates' *Harmony of the Divine Attributes*, and some treatises of Owen and Boston."

In the autumn of 1790 he was accepted by the Presbytery of Lexington as a candidate, and his preceptor obtained for him the right to exhort in social meetings for religious worship. This was against Mr. Alexander's wish, for he was not yet thoroughly

convinced that he had been called to the ministry. Mr. Graham, however, urged him to "exercise his gifts," and told him that he might postpone as long as he chose to do so his licensure and ordination.

He was a reserved and somewhat diffident lad, and was without the least consciousness of the gift of public speech. Mr. Graham knew him far better than he knew himself. I do not know an instance in which this gift revealed itself more suddenly. Soon after the meeting of Presbytery Mr. Graham took Alexander and John Lyle, another student, to Kerr's Creek, to the house of "old John McKee," where he told them they were to "exhort." Poor Lyle broke down utterly. "He hemmed and groaned, rolled up his pocket handkerchief into a ball, made a few convulsive gestures and sat down." Alexander went to the meeting apprehensive of disaster, for up to this time he had spoken in public nothing which he had not memorized. Once he had tried to debate, but without success. After Lyle's failure at the meeting, a prayer was offered and a hymn was sung and Alexander was asked to make some remarks. "Although," he writes in 1843, "I did not know a single word I was to utter, I began with a rapidity and fluency equal to any I have enjoyed to this day. I was astonished at myself, and as I was young and small the old people were not less astonished."

This was the beginning of Archibald Alexander's career as an extemporaneous preacher. A power which up to that time had been entirely hidden suddenly burst into the view of himself and his audience. From this time on he had no reason to decline the appeals to preach which came to him from preceptor and people. It is not too much to say that the ease, simplicity and lucidity of speech which marked all the discourses of his later years were present in his first sermons. His son James, who expresses the opinion that his father's "extemporaneous discourses were throughout his life the highest effusions of his mind," tells us that up to the last Dr. Alexander found the greatest ease and enjoyment in his freedom of extemporary speech; and was often heard to say that "if he were to stake his life on a single effort, he would, if familiar with the general subject, abandon himself entirely to the impulse of the moment."

All that I have been able to learn of his preaching from his pupils and others accustomed to listen to him, and from his sermons which have been preserved, leads me to believe that among his contemporaries he had no superior in the Church in what may be called didactic eloquence; in that oration of which the method is the orderly

unfolding of the truth, and of which the purpose is the incitement of the will to action. I have the opinion, too, that as this was the earliest of his special gifts to reveal itself, so it was one of his greatest gifts, and the one in whose exercise he had the greatest liberty and the highest enjoyment. Whether his audience was composed of his own family and family friends, or a little gathering in the house of "old John McKee," or the students of the Seminary in the lecture-room or the oratory, or the General Assembly before which he preached as the retiring Moderator, it was as the orator engaged in expository discourse, and bent not distinctively on quickening the sensibilities, but on moving the will, the free responsible spirit of man, that he was at his best. It was when engaged in this work that all his remarkable powers wrought best as a unity and made all his attainments their willing and genial servants. Whatever the subject, whether in philosophy or dogmatics or missions, this was his chosen method, and his aim was always one. Perhaps he enjoyed most, as he excelled most, when he revealed the sinful or Christian soul to itself, exploring its recesses and expounding those "inner ongoing" which, even if noticed by the subject of them, require a teacher to correlate them to divine truth.

Even before he was licensed by the Presbytery he preached often, and as soon as he had passed his examinations he was sent on a missionary and evangelistic tour into the southeast section of Virginia. Wherever he preached, he preached with extraordinary power, and he always delighted in the work. "So accustomed was he," writes his son, "to associate pleasurable sensations with pulpit work that even in later years he used to laugh at the notion of any one's being injured by preaching. And it was commonly observed, through most of his life, he always came from it in a state of exhilaration. Never was he more full or free in conversation. These were the times at which to draw from him his most elevated religious discourses, as well as his liveliest narratives, and his own household, or those in which he was a guest, remember such hours with pensive delight."

Many a minister has been seriously injured by having facility in public speech developed in early life. There is no more insidious peril to the public speaker than that arising from the ability to address an audience with ease. Had Mr. Alexander, in other respects than this particular gift, been a small man or even an average man, his experience in the house of "old John McKee," when he first found he could speak with ease and with fervor, would probably have seriously limited his influence. He would have been strongly

tempted to trust so largely to his natural eloquence as largely to neglect the discipline and cultivation of his powers.

But Mr. Alexander knew himself, and was honest with himself. Unflattered by his success as a speaker, he gave himself to theological study with great earnestness. His studies were carried on under great disadvantages. His library was what could be gathered in a new country. But no man could have had a stronger thirst for knowledge or a stronger determination to satisfy it. It was during the early years of his professional life that he formed the habit of exploring every avenue of learning which presented to him the slightest opening: a habit which at last made him a linguist, a philosopher, a theologian and a great preacher. The text-books put before him by his preceptor became the starting-points of independent investigation. He "devoured books rather than perused them." And there was no great subject which did not so deeply interest him as to possess him. Dr. James Alexander says that he has heard him recite passages from a History of the Arabians which he had not opened for sixty years. Deism had left its mark in Virginia. He undertook an answer to Paine's *Age of Reason*, and read as widely as he could on the evidences of Christianity. He was interested in Church order and the Catholic and Protestant controversy, and so read Stillingfleet's *Irenicum* and Chemnitz on the *Council of Trent*. Now as both before and afterward, he loved mathematics and was interested in physics. The Geometry of Euclid was always a delight to him. Of course he was more deeply interested in investigating abstract truth, the study to which he was introduced at Liberty Hall, and most deeply of all in Systematic Theology. But that he might know the truth thoroughly he studied its great source, the Word of God. He knew the Greek Testament, and read it with ease from an early day; and though the first Hebrew Bible owned by him was wanting in some of its leaves, what of it remained he read, and as his son says, read with avidity. "My thirst for knowledge was always great, and its pursuit was never a weariness to me," he writes of himself; and to this those who knew him, whether in early youth or when for most men age makes the grasshopper a burden, bear unanimous testimony. Thus the facile speech of Archibald Alexander was made useful by severe intellectual discipline, and enriched by wide culture, and ennobled by severe and lofty reflection from the very beginning of his life as a clergyman.

But if he was interested in preaching and in study, I gather from

his early life that he was more deeply interested in his fellow-men and in their highest welfare. No one can read the story of his missionary journey undertaken immediately after his licensure without receiving this as his most distinct impression. That religious affection for the souls of men which marks all great preachers shines conspicuous in his sermons and letters of the period, and in his reminiscences written long afterward.

Thus furnished in intellect, in character, in knowledge and above all in zeal for souls, he entered upon the stated work of his clerical life. He was licensed to preach in October, 1791, by Lexington Presbytery. Two years and a half later he was ordained as pastor of the Churches of Briery and Cub Creek, in Charlotte county. From this date onward his work became more complex in character; though through it all, while actively at work as pastor, he never relaxed his energy in the pursuit of truth and in the cultivation of his mind. He was now one of a circle of active evangelical missionary pastors; and he threw himself into the work with an earnestness excelled by that of none of his brethren. Loving to preach and preaching with power, he was not willing to confine himself to the appointments of his own pulpit; and he gladly gave his services to his brethren, at communions and in meetings designed to awaken the impenitent to a sense of their sin and of their need of a Saviour. I do not know that there is any evidence that he grew as a preacher. But he developed and informed his intellect by hard and continued study; his character was made strong by his evangelical and pastoral labors; and his social life was enriched by close friendships among his clerical brethren, and among the Christian people into contact with whom he was brought as pastor and minister.

Of his clerical friends none appears to have been closer to him than Dr. John H. Rice, whose name in Union Seminary, Virginia, is honored no less than that of Archibald Alexander is in Princeton. Next to Rice, Conrad Speece, the son of a German, stood closest to him. The relation between these three young men was an ideal Christian friendship. Blessed is the minister who has such friends. Each preserved his individuality, each stimulated the others' minds and warmed the others' hearts. After Mr. Alexander had left Virginia and had become a pastor in Philadelphia their intimacy was maintained by correspondence. It is to their city friend that these clergymen in the country write for books. "Buy for me," writes Rice, "at any price, any book you can find that it will in your opinion be important for me to have." He wants especially Horsley's new

translation of Hosea, and asks Alexander to be on the watch especially for a Syriac New Testament, for Trommius' Concordance, for Wettstein's Greek Testament and Michaelis' Hebrew Bible. This was a notable trio of clerical friends. Nor was his interest exhausted by theological and religious subjects. He was interested in public affairs, and he made the acquaintance of men of eminence. He heard and met Patrick Henry, whose career as an orator, statesman and lawyer was soon to close, and John Randolph of Roanoke, just then rising to political prominence.

While still pastor of the two Churches he was called, in 1796, when only twenty-four years of age, to the presidency of Hampden-Sidney College. It had been opened with Samuel Stanhope Smith as President in 1773, but did not obtain a charter until ten years after its planting. It was in a low condition; "but the trustees were determined to resuscitate it if possible." He hesitated long before accepting the position. He became President in the spring of 1797. He reorganized the curriculum and increased the number of students; tiding the institution over the shallows on which it had almost been wrecked. The love of thoroughness in study and exactness of knowledge which were characteristic of himself he endeavored to awaken in his students. Meanwhile, in view of his specific duties as the head of the college, he studied as perhaps he had never studied before. He was "earnestly engaged," says his son, "even beyond his strength, in accumulating and systematizing stores of knowledge, and in conscientiously endeavoring to lift up an institution which had sunk almost to its lowest point." Engrossing as his new duties were, he continued to preach not only statedly to two congregations, but in response to many special calls. It was during this period of his life that he married Miss Waddel, the daughter of the Rev. James Waddel, one of the most eloquent of Virginia preachers, the description of whose preaching at a communion service by William Wirt is widely known.

While President of Hampden-Sidney, Dr. Alexander passed through an intellectual trial which, looking at his life from the point of view we occupy, we must regard as one of the preparations for the larger work he was afterward to perform. He was beset with doubts about the position of his Church in respect to the subjects and the mode of baptism. I must refer you to his extended life for the narrative of this trial. But I cannot mention it without saying that his conduct toward himself and his investigation of the subject reveal strikingly the honesty of his intellectual life. With absolute simplicity of purpose, desiring to know only the truth,

he studied the discussions and explored the sources of the subject, until he reached a conclusion in which he could confidently rest.

If this experience of doubt helped to prepare him for his larger work, so did another experience, though in an entirely different way. This was his travel to the North, and especially his journey through New England. The people of southeastern Virginia, where he lived, were widely separated from the rest of the nation. Indeed, owing to the difficulties of communication, every community was in danger of becoming narrow and provincial. Perhaps no two sections of the country were growing wider apart in customs and social life than the South and New England. Agriculture was the characteristic occupation of the South, trade of the North. Moreover, in New England there was flourishing not only Arminianism which soon ripened into Unitarianism, but also more than one type of modified or, as they called it in New England, improved Calvinism. At the same time the Presbyterian Church and the Congregational Churches were about to form the Plan of Union which continued in operation for nearly forty years, and which, while it conferred great blessings on the country, had in it also the seeds of strife and disaster.

As it was intended that he should do his latest and greatest work in organizing a great national school of theological learning, it was important that he should know intimately the theological currents and the religious life of the country. And so he was led, when twenty-nine, to take this journey. He had been twice at Philadelphia as Commissioner to the General Assembly. I do not know where to look for a more vivid picture of that body, as it was at the close of the last and the beginning of the present century, than the sketch in Dr. Alexander's recollections.

But these recollections fall far below in interest those which detail this remarkable journey which began at Hampden-Sidney and extended to New Hampshire. His reputation as a preacher and a thinker preceded him. And this reputation and his position as President of the College secured for him a warm welcome everywhere. He saw the stately ceremonies of a Commencement at Harvard. He visited Princeton and Dartmouth Colleges. He attended the meeting of the General Association of Connecticut. The ministers met at the house of the pastor of Litchfield; and the first business transacted was "the distribution of long pipes and papers of tobacco, so that the room was soon filled with smoke." More interesting to him was his meeting with the clergy who were widely influential as pastors, like Nathan Strong of Hartford and

Eckley of the Old South Church of Boston; or as theological writers, like Hopkins of Newport and Emmons of Franklin. We easily understand the enlarging influence exerted by such a journey on a man prepared for it, as was Dr. Alexander, by his interest in men, his special theological knowledge and his active life as an eminent preacher and educator. It deepened in him that national patriotism which, in his future position, was so important to him and to this institution.

Retaining still the point of view from which his earlier life is regarded as preparatory to his life as a theological professor, one other experience would seem to have been needed; the experience of city life. And this he obtained when, in 1807, he became the pastor of the Third Church of Philadelphia. Philadelphia at that time was the central city of the nation as well as its metropolis. It stood between the North and the South, and was sympathetic with both sections. It had been the capital of the United States during the war of Independence and for several years after the consolidation of the Union under the Constitution. It was also the centre of Presbyterian influence. The first Presbytery in the United States was called popularly the Presbytery of Philadelphia. And when the Presbytery developed into a Synod the geographical name was retained. Here the Synod became the General Assembly; and the General Assembly almost invariably selected one of the Philadelphia churches as its place of meeting. No other city at this time had four Presbyterian churches. To pass from the quiet country home of Hampden-Sidney to his new residence was for Dr. Alexander to be brought into frequent and personal contact with the ministry and laity of the Church from all sections of the country. The change also brought him before the whole Church. He suffered not a little from homesickness, as indeed he did afterward at Princeton. His love and enthusiasm for Virginia never abated. But his pastorate of five years in Philadelphia made the Church know him and made him know the Church. Though he formed no friendships like those with Rice and Speece in Virginia, he was brought into contact with a larger number of ministers. He studied new types of men and saw truth from their points of view. New England was not more distant than Virginia. New York was nearer. And Philadelphia was the point from which the largest movement to the West was made. Moreover, he learned the distinctive traits of the Church life of a city, and with his quick apprehension and his zeal in applying his knowledge to immediate needs, he led a movement of Church extension. And then at the

period of his pastorate those great organizations, which employed and united the evangelical spirit of the churches in the work of Home Missions and Foreign Missions and the publication of the Word of God, were beginning to take form. He was thirty-five when he came to Philadelphia, and forty when he left it for Princeton; and when we think of the great work he had before done, we can, I am sure, conceive of no better consummation of the long period of his providential preparation for life in the Theological Seminary.

And now, in 1812, began the largest and, so far as we are able to judge, the most important part of his life. When the Church founded the Theological Seminary, and in 1811 met in General Assembly for the election of a single professor, by an "almost unanimous" vote Archibald Alexander was elected to the position. It may safely be said that no one in the Church except himself had any doubt as to his duty. What doubt he had had its origin in his profound sense of the greatness of the work. "No man," writes his biographer, "could entertain a higher estimate of the functions which awaited him; no man of eminence could think more humbly of himself." At last, after serious and deliberate consideration, he accepted the appointment, and was inducted into his new office in 1812.

There is no need to tell the well-known story of his life and work as the first professor of this Seminary. The plan of the Seminary went little further than to set forth its specific design. In its details, "the scheme was not so much to be carried out as to be created." In this work of calling into being the elements of the interior life of the institution, Dr. Alexander, though at the farthest remove from an egotist, impressed his personality upon each of these elements, so far as I can see, more deeply and more permanently than any other man I know of has done on any other theological institution. Not even John Witherspoon at the College so distinctly reappears in its subsequent life as does Archibald Alexander in the continuous life of this Seminary for more than ninety years. The largeness and variety of the work he did is appalling. For the first year he was the only professor. We need not wonder that his son says, "Without doubt these were the most anxious moments of his life." He drafted the three-years' course; he instructed all the classes; he wrote lectures; he adjusted his teachings to men from institutions of differing degrees of efficiency. Immensely as he was strengthened by Samuel Miller's accession the next year, it is simply the truth that Dr. Miller found the curriculum created and the means for maintaining the religious life of the students perfected.

The presence of an able and learned colleague gave to Dr. Alexander more time for private study. To his latest days he continued the pursuit of exact knowledge, in the languages, in theology and in history, with all the enthusiasm which was awakened in his youth by William Graham. He made himself a master not only in his knowledge of the details of the Reformed theology, but in his knowledge of its history. Beginning his work with a knowledge of the Biblical languages large for the time and the country, he extended and deepened it, teaching the Old Testament until he was able to commit its instruction to young Charles Hodge; the discernment of whose high character and large gifts while still a student and the selection of whom for the work of linguistic instruction constitute only one of Dr. Alexander's special services to the Church.

As the years passed his influence grew stronger and wider. Students, attracted largely by his reputation for large knowledge, for sincere goodness, for devotion to truth, for genius as a preacher, and by his fame as a quickening and informing teacher, came to the Seminary from New England and from the South, as well as from the Middle States. Within ten years from its planting the Seminary was as national in its patronage as the College.

Then came the fruitful period of publication: *The Canon of Scripture*, *The Evidences of Christianity*, *The History of Israel*, special studies in local history, like the volume on *The Log College*, *The History of Colonization*, biographies, reviews, theological essays and practical discourses were in succession given to a public which had learned highly to esteem every product of his pen.* Year by year both this larger public and the increasing students of the Seminary regarded him with growing love and admiration. And as he passed from middle life to old age, to the love and admiration was added reverence. At last, when in the eightieth year of his age he was called to his reward, no man in the Church was more influential, more beloved, more deeply venerated. From all lands came eulogies which expressed the gratitude, the reverence and the love of a thousand pupils and of unnumbered friends. The unity, symmetry and largeness of his mind, character and life made it difficult at the time—and it is no easier to-day—to portray him in his individuality; though his countenance, his expression, his voice, his gestures and his conversation were strongly marked by distinct

* In addition to the theological essays and reviews contributed to the *Biblical Repertory* and articles published in other periodicals, Dr. Alexander's publications—books and pamphlets—number forty-nine.

and attractive qualities. It was easy for his friends to recall his quick and sure grasp of all the subjects of his study, his interest in truth in all its forms, his tenacious memory, his ease of recollection, his lucid expression, his buoyant spirit, his zeal for God and his love of men. But after all their analysis and all their catalogues, it must have been felt at the time, as one who studies his career now must feel, that catalogues of traits which differentiate him from other men are utterly inadequate to describe the greatness of Archibald Alexander.

For the special trait of the highest type of mental and spiritual life is precisely a trait which does not differentiate. It is mental and spiritual universalism—at once receptive and out-giving at every point of contact with the universe of thought and the world of man. To this high type of greatness we must assign the greatness of this Seminary's first professor. He was a man, and nothing human was foreign to him. The largeness of his human sympathies, both intellectual and spiritual, and his wholesome relish of every phase of thought and life he touched, gave to his character as student and as man its finest quality. Of course he had special gifts, and a strong character which laid them under tribute; and both gift and character were sanctified by strong and high convictions and consecrated to the service of God and man. Of these special gifts, it seems to me the most notable was the quick and sure apprehension of which I have spoken, which in action appeared as an intuitive and lightning-like penetration into the very heart of whatever subject had his attention. Whether he was investigating a language, or expounding a passage of Scripture, or unfolding a doctrine, or discussing a practical measure, or exploring the recesses of a convicted soul; the most notable trait he exhibited was this power of rapid penetration. I do not think that his acquisitions were ever so thoroughly organized under an intellectual system as were those of his pupil, Charles Hodge; and hence the massive unity of Charles Hodge's intellectual products does not appear in those of Archibald Alexander. But in place of it is this rapid, brilliant and penetrating movement into a wide variety of subjects. And what gave the unity to this varied and almost dramatic intellectual activity was his human interest in all interests that were human. And therefore it was that, intellectual as he was, linguist and philosopher and theologian and preacher, his profoundest interest was his interest in men; his deepest love was the love of souls; and the ambition which laid under tribute all his gifts and attainments was the ambition to bring his fellow-men to

their Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ. No wonder that we venerate the memory of our first professor.

We bid you welcome, gentlemen, to the Theological Seminary of Archibald Alexander; to the curriculum he first organized; to the studies he first methodized. And we can offer for you no better prayer than that here where he lived and taught and passed to his reward, where his memory is to us so great a blessing, your devotion to the work of the ministry of the Church of Jesus Christ may be exalted and beautified by a love like his of the Redeemer and of your fellow-men.

Princeton.

JOHN DE WITT.

IV.

NEW LIGHT ON THE OLD TESTAMENT.

THE critical method of handling the Old Testament always recalls to our thoughts Richard Bentley, the prince of his school. His efforts were not meant for a joke or an excursion *in nubibus*; for he was serious and scholarly. And Sir R. J. Jebb concedes that if Horace had been favored with an opportunity of examining Bentley's proposed seven or eight hundred amendments to his poems, the great Latin poet should probably have accepted two or three of them as genuine improvements. Bentley could scarcely have been even so successful with Homer, whose epic he tried to make into mince-meat, by representing it as merely a conglomerate of brief songs. His treatment of Milton was worst of all. Bentley charged Milton with many blunders, some of which he excused on account of the author's blindness; and he added that the great epic was further injured by being badly and cruelly revised by some unknown editor who had got hold of it. In short, he alleged that between Milton and the editor Paradise was *twice lost*. It is just to add that his proposal to prepare a new edition of the New Testament promised to confine his own amendments to the notes, and to make the revised text depend only on the copies and the versions. But his proposal to rearrange the poems of Horace according to the supposed chronological order of their composition, so as to present the old poet as having written only one kind of poetry at a time, is matched by the new chronological rearrangement of the Old Testament, which is recommended by the possibility of thereby rendering all the early parts picturesque mythology.

As a whole we feel rather pleased by the general trend of recent discussions, even when some of the proposals are of the extreme Bentleyan kind. They sustain the interest; and we like to find the Bible where it ought to be, in the thick of the fight between the evil and the good. Better to have it attacked than to have it forgotten. When problems are started which compel investigation, we are cheered; for investigation brings light, and light is what the Bible wants and promises. Thus far the promise has been fairly kept. During the two centuries which have elapsed since Bentley flour-

ished, a great deal of new light has shone on this subject. The revision of the text, on which he worked, though he did not live to publish, has been carried out, with great benefit to its authority. Even Roman Catholics concurred with Bentley, and since his days with others in this great enterprise.

1. Reason and Revelation.

The first book of Calvin's *Institutes* (A.D. 1559 in its final form) furnishes a specimen of the interplay of orthodoxy and the criticism of Reformation times. Both Calvin and the critics labored under the hallucination that Moses lived in an illiterate age. With this assumption, and relying for the rest on the internal evidence, Calvin argued that Moses "antedated all other writers by a long distance of time," and that "the Holy Scripture exceeds in antiquity all other books." The adverse critics retorted, "Who has assured us that Moses and the prophets actually wrote those books which bear their names?" and "they even dared to question whether such a man as Moses ever existed." Some critics of recent date have added that no nation of the time of Moses could have prepared a code of laws; but, thanks to Abraham's contemporary Hammurabi (Amraphel of the Book of Genesis), whose great code has recently been recovered, that objection is obsolete.

The only reply that Calvin could make to his opponents was that the miracles of the Mosaic record, taken along with the fact that they were recognized by the people among whom they were openly performed, and whose sins they openly condemned, confirmed the divine legation as well as the historicity of Moses.

This argument, of a miraculous element, is now with many a reason for not accepting the Mosaic authorship of the books. But Nabonidus, the last king of Babylon, praised his heathen gods for aiding him in making great archæological discoveries. Xenophon the Athenian declares in his *Anabasis* that his gods often helped him in answer to his sacrifices. And Poole's *Synopsis Criticorum*, a leading Christian authority, declares that in the life of Charles the Second of England "many of the miracles of Holy Writ have been repeated." Now whilst we do not believe in any of these allegations of miracles, we do not regard their asseveration as an argument to refute the claims to authorship of Nabonidus or Xenophon or Poole. If Poole was foolish enough to fancy that the royal touch, even of a lewd man like Charles, could heal the king's evil, as by a perpetual miracle, this could not negative his claims as an author. If Moses had entertained a foolish opinion of the same kind it should not have divested him of the claim to authorship, though the book

that taught it must have fallen to the same level with Poole's valuable commentary. We admit that Moses records miracles which cannot be explained away on any naturalistic hypotheses; yet we draw a distinction in this case, because of the unique character of the course of events of which they form an important factor. Calvin's argument for them is still valid; and Xenophon honestly informs us that on many important occasions his confidence in divine help was disappointed. Here are questions of sanctified human reason which unscrupulously condemns one kind of claims to miracles as heartily as any skeptic can do, and yet insists on standing by others. And we may add that modern science has certainly not increased the difficulty which was always felt in distinguishing between divine miracles and lying wonders.

In dealing with these problems the great leaders of Reformation times were not rationalistic; nor yet were they irrational. They believed that human reason has a high place in theology; whilst they were strongly convinced that it had been grossly abused, and made into an obstruction between man and his Maker. We have recently seen somebody's argument against the apologetic use of reason, on the ground that because Christians believe in the Bible they have no need of apologetics; whilst non-Christians, not having their reason sanctified, are not accessible to arguments from reason. That style of argumentation should have received little encouragement from the heroes of the Reformation. In fact, the chapter from which we have quoted was primarily addressed by Calvin to the unsanctified king of France, and is entitled "Rational Proofs to Establish the Belief of the Scripture." Its author was rational to the core, but not at all rationalistic. He believed in rationality, and for that reason he believed in a revelation from God as to matters which cannot be reached by unassisted reason; and he accepted this as divine because it appealed to his reason with such evidence as satisfied him that it came not of man but of God.

One of the difficulties which Christian work has to face in our day is a very ingenious twisting of reason into a declaration of war against itself in religious questions. It proclaims that because this is the devil's world it is hopeless, and all the Lord's people have to do is not to improve it, but to testify against it, and to sit by, awaiting the advent of the Lord. Even missions are represented as a mere testimony against the heathen, not as rescuing the perishing. For the past, we are informed by one of the ablest that the geological world before man's creation was under the jurisdiction of Satan; for the present, the world generally and most of all the

"Churches" still remain under his bondage. One good feature is said to be the Zionist movement, which is interpreted as the Jews fleeing to the Holy Land, where the Lord is to meet them, and then all shall be changed. A worthy lady publishes a booklet to show that she is not under the law; that it has no authority over her. Yet she is a good woman and admits that she is a "slave to God": never considering how she can be a slave, and yet not at all under law to her master. How can we meet such whims? Not by quoting Scripture; for they know its letter as well as we. Only by soundly using reason and warning people against an irrational ingenuity in the very use of Revelation.

It was about a century after Calvin that another of the greatest of theological writers, Francis Turretin, took up the same question, in his *Theologia Elenctica*. His first *locus* is devoted mainly to a discussion of the office of reason in questions of faith. He charges Socinians with giving too much power to reason, since they set it up as the norm, or supreme authority, on all religious questions. And he charges against others, some of them Protestants, that they err by giving it too little respect. Amongst the uses which he ascribes to reason in theology are the illustrating of Scripture doctrines, comparing the old and the new, dealing with versions and the originals of the Bible, deciding on the value of the opinions of learned men, and of Church councils, drawing inferences, deducing consequences, and arguing against heterodoxy. He also distinguishes between reason and faith, saying that reason has only the office of drawing out the meaning, whilst faith deals with its truth as divine and infallible. In another part of his work (*De Petra Christo*) he elaborates the use of reason, as often setting aside a literal in favor of a figurative interpretation of Scripture: and argues that in such cases the figurative is the true interpretation. Some illustrative cases are cited by him, as when the Scripture appears to ascribe bodily members or passions to God; where the literalistic exegesis would imply God's commanding us to commit a crime, as where our Saviour was supposed by the Jews to say that they must eat His flesh; and where the subject requires a figurative application, thus when the Spirit is represented as if He were a dove; or where the manifest purpose and scope of the passage require something other than the terms used. Cunningham carries this system into the many passages of the New Testament which Catholics as well as Protestants agree in considering as only local or temporary, or as figurative. In a few cases a difference exists between Roman and Reformed, as about extreme unction and transsubstantiation,

and with some sects the kiss of peace or the ceremony of foot-washing. Turretin gives as a mixed case the dogma held by some Churches of the omnipresence of Christ's human nature. Scripture teaches us that Christ has a true human body and soul; and reason teaches us that such cannot be ubiquitous. It has always appeared to us that our Lord's method of dealing with literalistic proposals, as about Moses' law as to divorce, as to the punishment of adultery, and as to prophecies of the reappearance of Elijah, are significant in suggesting the necessity of applying our judgment. On the other hand, the system of supplementing the commands of Scripture, as seen in sacerdotalism and clerical celibacy and the confessional, are warnings of danger.

The general principle must be conceded that in theology, as in everything else, we must apply our reasoning faculties for all that they can do. But here we encounter a stumbling-block in the fact that men have often confounded reason with the processes of abstract ratiocination. Such abstract processes really can teach us very little that we have not previously known; they rather enable us to methodize the contents of our attainments, than immediately to enlarge their area; though they may indirectly aid in enlarging it by guiding our surmisings about its outworks. Abstract reason could not have proved to Ferdinand and Isabella that another great world existed beyond the western ocean; but it helped them to recognize the proposition as conceivably or even probably true. It still remained for Columbus to go and see, and returning, to report what he had seen, exhibiting his trophies as substantial evidence; and then at last it dawned upon the nations that their old speculations had borne fruit. Nor any more can abstract reason bring us light as to what exists beyond death, or of the world that may now exist somewhere beyond the reach of telescopes. Well might we join in the prayer that somebody should come up out of the grave to enlighten us as to the unseen world; but even that failed when Lazarus arose, for men will not believe though one rise from the dead. Our want has been met by Moses and the prophets, and by the inspired apostles, and by Him who spake as never man spake. It is very strange that in a world in which we ourselves can talk to each other, any one should question either the power or the probability of God speaking to beings whom He created after His own image. Human reason is at its best when hearkening to God as He speaks of the unseen and of everlasting life.

In revelation, as in every other field, reason has its rights and its responsibilities; and no deductions can satisfy its requirements un-

less they are backed up with all the confirmations that are necessary for their validity. Sir Henry Rawlinson's celebrated incident in excavating the ruins of Birs Nimroud illustrates its use. Whilst he was using his pocket-compass one of the Arabs reported that the diggers had reached a corner-closet; whereupon Rawlinson shouted out, "Put in your hand and clear away the sand, and bring out the cylinder." Quickly a sculptured cylinder was held aloft by the astonished workman; and whilst some of the Arabs ascribed the feat to magic, one thoughtfully remarked that the *compass* is a wonderful instrument. There was no magic, nor compass-triumph in the matter; but there was a syllogism, the major of which, that "all corner closets contain cylinders," was certainly not known to be true, but Rawlinson knew enough to surmise that in this case it was probably true, and he was rewarded for a happy guess. The general harmony of the works of man as well as of his Maker justifies such surmisings, when cautiously made. And this is what the syllogism does, yet to be always limited by the maxim, "*In generalibus latet dolus.*"

It may be laid down as a sound rule that in every such case the practical test is more important than the abstract deduction, as it is also generally the more difficult to apply. What is called a man's special knowledge comes in here for its application. The Bible contains many elements which appeal not only to our ratiocination, but to special opportunities and our personal powers. It calls on the philologist, as a treasury of literature—a sort of counterpart of the *stelæ* of Oriental cities which are now fascinating explorers and interpreters. And the chief value of such monuments is incidental to their function of testing the sacred records. The Bible is history, and also involves as incidental to this the study of chronology and of geography. It is variously sociological and archæological and poetical, and (with apologies to the shades of J. S. Mill) it is full of lofty patriotism, and is eminently optimistic in its preview of all the world in general, and of Israel in particular. Whilst its supernatural elements are everywhere, its various parts must be investigated each in its own way, whether that way be digging ruins in the field, or poring over cuneiforms and hieroglyphs in the library, or comparing Scripture with Scripture by the dogmatist, or proclaiming its words as a rule of life and the Gospel of salvation to all nations. Our modern theological development would probably have greatly astonished some of the old patriarchs who walked with God; and yet we can see the germs of all the great principles present from the beginning. Some commentators are

afraid to identify any of the early statements as signifying redemption or salvation, or a resurrection. But the New Testament is not afraid of this style. Furthermore, this is the scientific style, if there is anything of God in the Old Testament. It is fascinating to recognize in the recently laid egg the first outlines of the chick which shall not fail to come in full symmetry and completeness. So in the Bible the man who "walked with God, and was not because God took him," knew enough of God and His mercy to encourage his faith and to have a hope of life beyond; and the words have not their last success with him, but still they may encourage us to the end. Maine, in his great work on *Ancient Law*, turns aside to warn us that our doctrine of the Trinity came not from the Scripture but from the philosophical Greeks, and that our doctrine of forensic justification was derived from the Jurisprudentia of the Civil Lawyers of Rome. He is all right if he intends to say that the men who were best fitted for special lines of study elaborated each his specialty, when studying the Bible; but he is grossly astray if he intends to leave the impression that the doctrines in question were imposed upon, rather than extracted from, the Word of God. The fascinating spell of Scripture has always been that, among many writers and great differences of style, the "marrow of divinity" has been of the same character, first and last. The words to Abraham had a full and blessed accomplishment for him and his proximate prosperity; but they are not on that account dead or obsolete. They are our inheritance, even to the end.

2. Research as an Instrument of Reason.

The modern method of reasoning about concrete questions sends us out of our study and away from books to examine the things themselves, and to test the books by comparing with the facts. As this is often impracticable, we compromise the case by starting museums in which we collect specimens of the facts, and have facilities for comparing with each other facts that have been widely scattered. If you cannot spend years with your Bible in hand over the holy fields of Palestine, you may visit a Bible Museum, such as a worthy friend of Sabbath-schools constructed in the city of Edinburgh. There you could see nearly all of the movables of Scripture, and some of the fixtures, set out in order, each with its label, and giving the Bible text in which it was mentioned. It would make you feel very much at home with your Bible, and help you to believe in its historicity; it would also in some respects be better than a visit to modern Palestine, for it would carry you back to the days of the old patriarchs and of the rural Israelites. Getting together a collec-

tion of this character involves a great deal of time and trouble and money: but nothing of permanent value can be done without all these outlays, and without enthusiasm and skill to back them. Of this sort have been the researches with pick and spade in Egypt and Assyria and Babylonia, and in some parts of Palestine and Phenicia, supplemented as they have been by home studies of hieroglyphs and cuneiforms and of other kinds of literature by men who stay at home. This is preëminently the romantic part of Bibliology, as missions form the romantic part of working Christianity.

The history is becoming familiar, and cannot even be summarized here. It makes small matter, apparently, whether the investigator is personally orthodox or heterodox, provided he works before the world, and brings into daylight things that will tell their own tale. There is also the highest guarantee in such work that every man shall try to discover the genuine facts, without regard to the question whether they shall help or hinder his side. A man like Francis Delitzsch may indeed be overzealous to show how Hammurabi's Code explains all that needed explanation in the work of Moses, without our needing any supernatural hypothesis; but he did good by enlightening the world to the fact that long before Moses lived literature flourished and legislative codes were in fashion, and consequently that the objection which rested on the assumption that Moses could not have written a book, or composed a code, was born of ignorance and sheer skepticism. On the other hand, a conservative investigator like R. W. Rogers warns us that the apologetic value of the work done in this line has often been grossly exaggerated.

We admit that in some respects the outcome has been disappointing; most of all for the chronology. The ancient Egyptians were so anxious to have religious sentiments on their monuments and to flatter their kings that they gave no dates. Thus we are dependent on casual records of foreigners, few and fragmentary, for all that we know of the early chronology of Egypt. Berossos, the Babylonian priest, of about 300 B.C., gives us a record of Egyptian history, whose early part reminds one of Hindoo chronology, lengthened into infinity, but whose latter part appears soberly to place the beginning of the Babylonian empire. Near 1500 B.C. we put the Tel-el-amarna tablets, or correspondence in cuneiform letters of the king of Egypt with his subordinates in Jerusalem and in Lachish and in other parts of Palestine—letters which have revolutionized our ideas as to the literary and social life of those times.

The early Greeks and the Romans seem to have been not much

better than the early Egyptians as to chronology; so that they give us little assistance. In general the Hebrews were equally careless; and in some important cases we have ourselves distorted what is stated in the Old Testament. Ussher's so-called Bible chronology has been most troublesome; as, in fact, we have no Bible chronology. When we come to the historical age, as with Moses, the difficulties are rather in detail. Exod. xii. 40 gives the sojourning of the children of Israel in Egypt as 430 years; and it has been supposed that this was contradicted by Gal. iii. 17, which speaks of the covenant having been made 430 years after the promise given to Abraham and his seed. If we interpret this as we do a promissory note, by letting time run from the last renewal (which was given to Jacob), there is complete harmony. In Gen. xv. 13 the same time is given, only in round numbers as 400 years. Here Ussher, like many others, was wrong; but his greatest errors were on the earlier part.

What is the precise significance of the difficulties as to dates in later parts of the Old Testament we cannot determine; but it is remarkably consistent in not departing far from what is otherwise known to be correct. Some of us are so intensely precise in our demands for exactness when the Bible is concerned, that it is only fair to remind each other that we are very far from being exact when we are ourselves concerned. This year of grace, 1905, is confessedly wrong by several years; and not long ago, under the Old Style, the day of the month was wrong. We Sabbatarians are observing a day that is not the prescribed day of the week, and we begin it at a different hour from the original. Even the hours and minutes of the day we have got wrong; the sun itself goes irregularly, as seen by us; and we cannot conveniently use the stars as our guide, and so we have turned to clock time; but this has been superseded in America by Standard time, and convenience more than strict accuracy is made to rule. As to the general harmony of the Bible and the monuments there is no longer room for doubt. The hypothesis of an illiterate Egypt and an illiterate Moses is forever dead and buried; and we may thank Prof. Delitzsch for having assisted at its obsequies.

On the general outcome of the evidence the great work is Schrader's *Cuneiform Inscriptions*, which is all the more reliable when favoring the Bible, because when occasion comes he does not shrink from speaking on the other side. These occasions are few and of the kind familiar to lawyers, where an apparent discrepancy is helpful; and most of them have been cleared up by subsequent

writers. The work of Prof. R. W. Rogers, of Drew Theological Seminary, on the *History of Babylonia and Assyria* is also very helpful. From this last we learn that the city of Babylon probably existed since before 4000 B.C., Nineveh since 3000 B.C., and that Sargon I was king of Nippur as early as 3800 B.C. These dates are well ascertained; and they imply, what is otherwise fairly proven, that the antiquity of man considerably exceeds what had been commonly supposed to be established on Biblical evidence. At a later date, about 2300 B.C., Babylon reached the foremost place as the world's greatest city for power, wealth and learning; and it continued more or less to hold the primacy until its destruction in 538 B.C. At times, as in the eighth century B.C., Assyria was pre-eminent, and Babylon only the second capital, and all along for many centuries Egypt and Assyro-Babylonia were rivals for the world's leadership.

The most important historical links between the Assyro-Babylonian records and the Old Testament are: (1) Abraham's forefathers, the old Semites, were from Arabia, where there is some evidence that they were monotheistic, and whence many of them, like Abraham's own father, migrated northward to Babylonia and Assyria. Here some of them came into power, and gave up their old religion, and also learned cuneiform methods of writing. (2) The four kings, who made a raid into the Jordan valley and carried off Lot, until Abraham came to the rescue, after long being a puzzle to commentators, are now well known. The greatest of them is Aniraphel, now known by his Babylonian name, Hammurabi, whose legal code has been recently found at Susa. It was long maintained that these men were, like Abraham himself, only imaginary personages. As we now know their date approximately, we thus have the chronological situation of Abraham, who was their contemporary, and probably one of their remote kindred. Prof. A. Clay, of the Assyriological Department in Philadelphia, states that if we put Abraham's entrance to Canaan near 2200 B.C., the later dates of the Old Testament until after the Exodus will fit very well. This agrees well with Conder's estimate, which gave 2186 B.C. as the date of Abraham's leaving Haran for Canaan, an estimate that was reached before the late discoveries as to Hammurabi. (3) The condition of southern Palestine and the close connections of Egypt and Assyria before the Exodus have been cleared up, so that our critics shall no longer be groping in the dark. (4) In the days of David and Solomon, both Assyria and Babylonia were in temporary decadence. (5) In B.C. 842 Jehu paid tribute to Shalmaneser II,

thus bringing Assyria and Israel into close relations. Shalmaneser in two inscriptions designates Jehu as "son of Omri"; not erroneously, we think, but according to the royal style, by which a usurper would affiliate himself to the most famous of his predecessors. And long afterward the kingdom of Israel is termed in the monuments *Omri-land*. This Shalmaneser became overlord of Babylonia. But decline followed, of which a famous eclipse of the sun, in 763, was regarded as an evil omen. That eclipse, however, is for us the most important that has ever occurred; for it determined that the Assyrian chronology was correct, and as in this case the Bible chronology closely agrees with the Assyrian reckoning as to the downfall of Samaria in B.C. 721, we thereby obtain the most reliable of Old Testament dates. (5) This marks the change from palæohistoric to the mesohistoric age of humanity. It may go alongside of the foundation of Rome, 753; the first Greek Olympiad, 776; Nabonassar's era in Babylonia, 747, and the accession of So (Sabaka, an Ethiopian) in Egypt, in 725. The Tiglath-pileser of the Bible (called also Pul, and Poros) became king of Assyria in 745, and overlord of Nabonassar of Babylon; and though a usurper he was the greatest of all the Assyrians, replaced the old system of massacring enemies by the new method of carrying away into captivity, and otherwise reorganized his great empire. When he invaded Syria and Palestine, every ruler yielded to him saving Uzziah, and he leaves a monument with the roll of dishonor of those who became his tributaries. Sargon II, who became king in 721, is famous for his new city and splendid library in Khorsabad, much of which now constitutes the Assyrian treasures of the British Museum. On these matters Schrader, whilst thinking that the chronological setting is often wrong by a few years, testifies that the inscription of Sargon agrees exactly with the Bible in the case of the fall of Samaria, and in general that "the historical record of the Bible, apart from the chronological details, is on the whole sustained," and he adds that the monuments themselves are sometimes inaccurate.

(6) The Bible narrative of the destruction of Sennacherib's army is confirmed by Herodotus and also by the Assyrian inscriptions. Herodotus interprets the destroyer as being mice; just as previously the Bible itself presented the "angel of the Lord" as plagues or as flying fiery serpents. Schrader supposes it was a pestilence which formed God's messenger on the occasion: and Rogers says that Sennacherib "probably reached Pelusium, on the confines of Egypt, a place famous both before and since that day as a centre for the dissemination of the plague, and there pestilence suddenly fell upon the

Assyrian army." Sennacherib returned home with the wreck of his army, and he partly informs us of his disaster in his inscriptions, though he endeavors to avoid the whole story. He boasts of having taken many cities of Phenicia and Palestine, also of having besieged Jerusalem, where he shut up Hezekiah "as a bird in a cage," all of which was quite true; but he twists the truth by representing Hezekiah's payment of tribute as occurring at the close, whilst it was only an attempt to soothe him at the beginning of his campaign. To all this Dr. G. F. Wright's argument is apposite, that Biblicists should never oppose the interpretations of great events as caused by naturalistic methods, when such explanation can apply; in this case the supernatural came in as predicting the time of occurrence, though even in miracles there may be a large share of natural instrumentality. The Bible is not always so emphatic in insisting upon its universal supernaturalism as its expositors were apt to be; but the expositors are now becoming more cautious.

The murder of Sennacherib by his son is attested by the monuments, which here confirm the Scripture, though the Bible tells us that two sons were implicated; parallel with the one or two blind men who, according to different accounts, were relieved at Jericho.

(7) The monuments have cleared away much of the criticism which had clouded the Biblical account of King Manasseh. The improbability of the record of his having been carried off in iron chains and hooks, and this to Nineveh instead of Babylon, and after all having been restored to his throne again, is beautifully met by evidence that all this treatment was accorded to Pharaoh Necho of Egypt; it would now be in order for some critic to give the *benefit of the doubt contra* by alleging that the Bible errantly applied to Manasseh the experience of another.

The destruction of Nineveh in B.C. 606 by a concert of enemies brought forward the Chaldees and their leader Nebuchadnezzar, who was great in war, and who distinguished himself by rebuilding Babylon. The monuments frequently speak of him, but of course do not report his insanity. Daniel's report on that subject is rather favored by the evidence of his insatiable warring and cruelty; and by his having besieged Tyre for thirteen years, and after all in vain, like that other monarch whose incipient insanity inflicted war upon his God-fearing colonists for half as long. After Nebuchadnezzar's death, and a couple of transitional assassinations, Nabonidus, last of the Babylonian kings, came to the throne; but as he was an archæologist rather than an autocrat, he worked with his enthusiastic helpers at exploring old temple foundations and rebuilding

their ruins, whilst he devolved the government on his son Belshazzar, who is named in some of the father's prayers on the monuments, and whose transgressions and his sad end are described in the Book of Daniel.

(8) It is now generally known that Belshazzar was not the real king, but only vice-regent. Prof. R. D. Wilson has shown that whether he was chief or secondary, there was only one word which could be applied to the acting ruler; a word which, recognizing him as king, does not determine whether he was first or second in rank. The cylinder with a prayer for his health clears an old problem, and Herodotus seems to have been in error in alleging that Cyrus had diverted the river Euphrates when besieging the city. If the Bible had said this we should have heard just criticisms on its mistake.

With Cyrus the sceptre departed forever from the Senites and came to the Indo-Europeans, with whom it still remains, though a shadow of royalty persisted for some generations with the sons of Abraham.

(9) Where Nahum's prophecy employed the fate of No-ammon in Egypt as a warning to Nineveh, the commentators were puzzled and suggested a later editorial interpolation. The Assyrian inscriptions have cast an unexpected light upon this by giving details of the Egyptian city (better known as Thebes). Asurbanipal of Nineveh, son and successor of Esarhaddon, destroyed Thebes. His account completely tallies with that of Nahum. The prophet threatens the Assyrians with the same fate which they had themselves visited upon the Egyptian capital. This also helps us to assign the date to Nahum's oracle (which was guessed to have been near 700 B.C.). Asurbanipal informs us that his campaign in Egypt was two years after Tir-hakah's death. This should give about 663 B.C. for the campaign. And as the event must have been fresh in the memory when Nahum used it for warning, we may assign his prophecy to about 660 B.C. This is an important and safe conclusion. And we think that the method may be well extended. It would show that the many events of the Books of Kings which have received confirmation were, either in their present form or in their prototypes, penned whilst the events were fresh; and that the narratives and references of the Book of Isaiah are too vivid to have been first written down after they had become stale. The Book of Esther is only one of several testimonies that monarchs had their annalists, often religious teachers, who wrote down events as they occurred, and on occasion would produce and read the annals for the royal edification. This may help us to

appreciate what G. F. Wright frequently states, that the narratives in the Pentateuch have so often the aspect of the reports of eye-witnesses. Moses may have used family records of his own people, as well as the old records, mythological and traditional, but usually written rather than oral, many of them all the way from Babylonia; and in a very realistic fashion, whilst with unsparing efforts he condensed much into little, he left us the old parts as a help to our faith and an exercise for our wits, whilst he put down in greater detail the records of his own time and the regulations which were to guide the people of God.

3. The Code of Hammurabi.

Who could have anticipated that after four thousand years Anraphel, who exhibits himself to Abraham as a ravager, and gets punished along with his three companions, should reappear in a more honorable rôle, so as to enable us to make a study of the high civilization and the literary and legislative skill, and even to begin a study of comparative religion, many centuries before Moses was born? It is a very bright light that he throws over ancient society, and over the problem of how the Old Testament may have originated. Friedrich Delitzsch's attempt to exploit Hammurabi's work at the expense of Moses has also borne good fruit by stimulating others. The best account of the Code which we have seen is the work of David Heinrich Mueller, of Vienna, on a *Comparison of Hammurabi's Code with the Legislation of Moses*, and with the *Twelve Tables of Rome*. There is also an excellent little book on it in English by Stanley A. Cook, and Prof. R. F. Harper, of Chicago, is preparing a commentary.

(1) The Code itself is elaborate and follows a somewhat natural method. Dating as it does from about 2200 years before Christ, it is wonderfully exhaustive, and is pervaded by a religious spirit of the polytheistic kind, as where the prologue declares that his deities had called him to cause justice to prevail, to prevent the strong from oppressing the weak, to illuminate the land and to promote the welfare of his people. And again in his epilogue, he boasts that he had made an end of raids (the raider suppresses other raiders), "that the strong might not oppress the weak, that they should grant justice to orphan and widow." And he continues to say, "by the command of Shamash (the sun god), great judge of heaven and earth, may I make justice to shine," and he calls on the oppressed to come before his image as king of righteousness, a term that recalls to memory the name of his Canaanitish contemporary, Melchizedek. Thus we may say that the king at least meant well; and in some measure his good intentions were not futile.

(2) What we have not seen much noticed by others, and yet is most remarkable to our view, is that the best part of Moses' work is not at all represented either in Hammurabi's Code or in the Twelve Tables. That is the Decalogue, which embodies the law of love as toward God, and toward our neighbor. In Scripture it is the foundation of both law and Gospel, giving us the active principle. Cook remarks that whilst the *patria potestas*, by which the father had power of life and death over his offspring, obtains in Hammurabi as in Roman law, it is absent from the Mosaic law. It seems to hold with Abraham as to his son Isaac, and with Jephthah over his daughter. But Moses appears to have softened it into the fifth commandment, which is shown by the Bible to be two-sided, requiring inferiors and superiors equally to be faithful and loving toward each other. In Oriental countries the *patria potestas* has run into an insane worship of ancestors, dead as well as living, and it has exalted paternalism with civil and ecclesiastical rulers into autocracy. Moses has made it a cement for binding together all society, a law that cannot be improved even for heaven; and when men learn how to use it, all the troubles of labor and class-friction and race-friction shall be solved. As a whole the Decalogue appears to be a new element, like modern works on jurisprudence which go back of positive laws to emphasize their fundamental principles; but it is higher than these because it reduces all to the Divine principle of love.

(3) Leaving out the Decalogue, the Books of Moses, whilst stating various laws, cannot properly be said to have a Code. Scattered through these books, as occasional regulations, are notes of regulations and of penalties for such offenses as are apt to occur in a rural community, not at all exhaustive, and in a few cases with repetitions; thus not at all artistic, and so contrasting with Hammurabi's Code, which is very artistic, and primarily concerns city life. The Mosaic system has the look of being in some cases judge-made law, incidental to particular judicial cases, and often consists of old customs perpetuated, and their defects trimmed away, often with notes of tenderness for widows and slaves and for other cases of hardship. Moses retained a few rules of the *lex talionis* which Hammurabi carried out to extremes of harshness and cruelty.

(4) Notwithstanding its fair promises Hammurabi's Code is fundamentally unfair, having one class of treatment for rich people and a more severe treatment for poor people, and especially for poor children, and worst of all for slaves; and with the penalty of death declared against thirty-five kinds of offenses, including certain

cases of theft; besides these the State offenses are not included, against which death was probably very often the penalty, though arbitrary power did not deign to limit these by codifying the offenses or the penalties.

The Mosaic regulations assign death for about a score of crimes, but not for offenses like theft. Half of the capital offenses are aggravated offenses against religion, attacking the theocracy. The Pentateuch is remarkably free from class legislation; the rich and the poor, the Hebrew and the stranger that is within the gates, being treated alike before the law.

(5) The two systems agree in certain of the regulations, so as to show a measure of affinity, and so as on some occasions to explain how some questionable rules were admitted to the Mosaic system; as the rule about divorce "for the hardness of their hearts"; and why on one kind of wrong five beasts should be restored, on another only four, thus illustrating David's exclamation to the prophet Nathan that the wrongdoer should restore fourfold for a lamb. If the case had been that of an ox, the penalty should have been fivefold; and the passage proves that Exod. xxii. 1 was written before David's time. The agreement between the two systems is not such as to signify the derivation, even partially, of one from the other; but both must have been derived from a primitive system, probably traditional rather than written. Hammurabi changed the primitive laws, supplementing them with regulations about trade, houses, boats and canals, and soldiers, shepherds, business agents, physicians and the many intricacies of a commercial centre.

(6) There is some connection between both systems and the Roman Tables; but not very close. The transition from Babylon to Rome may have been *via* the Semites (Minæans) of Arabia to the Phenicians, thence to Greece, to which the Roman Decemvirs appealed for advice. It may be worthy of mention, that although Hammurabi as well as Moses gives some examples of deathbed counsels as to family matters, we can see in neither of them any predecessor of the Roman Will, which seems to have originated with the Latins, and thence to have spread to other nations.

(7) It is quite possible that documents may have been utilized by Moses in his legislative as in his other writings, but there is no evidence whatever that he had read Hammurabi's Code. And everything was remodeled and improved by him. Such considerations favor the view that the Pentateuch was written early and not late. Its teaching breathes of antique modes of thinking and administering justice; and nobody in post-exilic times could have

written it. Until recent times this view was vigorously combatted; but it is now clear that the opposition to it is not according to the evidence.

4. Physical Science and the Benefit of the Doubt.

Our esteemed friend, Prof. William North Rice, in his book on *Christian Faith in an Age of Science*, has taken a somewhat radical position on the question which we are considering. He believes in inspiration, and in many of the New Testament miracles; but he confines inspiration to the religious part of the Bible, and labors earnestly, and we think sometimes unjustly, to prove the errancy of its scientific and some of its historical statements. President Patton urges that we must hereafter rest our cause on the argument for Christianity rather than on that for the Bible. It is true that Christianity is more important than the only authoritative book, just as a property in land is more important than the deeds of conveyance. Even Rice's book may in some quarters have a useful mission in attracting some who are repelled by other methods.

It is, of course, a fact that revelation was given before it was committed to writing in any book. This has been used as an argument for the doctrine that an infallible Church gave the Bible, and can take it away or claim a monopoly of its interpretation; but the Bible claims a higher authority than it concedes to any Church. There are some glimmerings of light among men who have never directly or indirectly received it from this book. The British exploring ship *Challenger* found a savage island in which a native had some notion of what is right. "A hatchet was given to a guide at D'Entrecasteaux Island, as his pay, according to promise; he seemed grateful, presented his own shell adze unasked in return, and made signs that the others had got enough, and that more should not be given away." It is also stated in the *Narrative* (p. 727) that some of the islanders refrain from the use of betel, which is "a proof of considerable strength of character."

All these considerations are in harmony with Turretin's concession, that Natural Theology may teach that God is *placabilis*, but not that He is *placatus*, or even *placandus*; and we are not certain but that even in some cases the *placabilis* would be a basis of saving faith, though Turretin does not go so far. In our time, however, the teaching of the Scriptures has so widely permeated the world, that some Christianity might possibly survive the loss of the book, or even the proof, if that were possible, that our belief in its supernatural elements was all a mistake.

As to the particular question of errancy on non-theological parts,

we regard the trend of research as strengthening its claim rather than the reverse. Bruce states the case very fairly when he says that, whilst Scripture is in popular language, this view is held without prejudice to its scientific merits, its invariable accuracy of descriptive reference to natural phenomena, its keeping aloof from all false science, especially from any theological superstitious views of nature; a feature which comes out conspicuously in its account of creation, as compared, *e.g.*, with the Chaldean genesis; and even free-thinkers have been struck with this, though unwilling to see in it a mark of divine guidance.

We do not believe that the advance of science has done or is likely to do anything inimical to the great mission of Scripture as a message of redemption to a lost world.

We entirely differ, however, from our friend's estimate of the drift of discovery as to its supposed errancy. The only possible view at present for an educated man to take is (1) that it has higher elements as to its theology, but is, like all other books, under human limitations and mistakes as to its outer aspects; or (2) that it is entirely right, though written freely, and never posing as a revelation of merely secular knowledge. These views appear to differ more in our mode of regarding the Bible than in principle; yet experience indicates that men who begin by small departures tend to larger aberrancies; and the New Testament, whilst often free in its use of the Old Testament, is always respectful to it as God's Word.

It is the tendency of the errancy theory to make every case of difficulty pose as a case of error. Hence the system of giving the benefit of the doubt against the Bible. In the great majority of cases it must, of course, be impossible to correlate the words of Scripture and the facts of science. The old method with divines was to claim the right of way for the Bible; Biblical science and Biblical chronology were dominant; and the rule that good and necessary inferences are valid was carried even so far as to decide at what season of the year the week of creation should be put. And every scientific fancy was used as a confirmation of inspiration. We have in our notes quite a crowd of pseudo-scientific fancies that have been used by respectable men for the help of faith; such as Archbishop Whateley's suggestion that the antediluvian longevity is to be explained by men having once eaten of the tree of life, which had a lasting influence through many generations.

The present-day bias gives the benefit of the doubt against the Bible. When a respectable author like Schrader comes to the men-

tion of fig-leaves in Eden, or the mention of Cush in Babylon, as he is ignorant of the facts, he fancies that Moses was wrong both in his geography and in his knowledge of Babylonian botany. It turns out, as has been shown by others, that in these, as in many other matters, Moses was all right. Once the benefit went against the Bible because Herodotus said that the grapevine does not grow in Egypt, whilst Moses, himself living in Egypt, spoke of a butler pouring out wine for Pharaoh; and many authorities condemned Proverbs for stating that ants store up for winter. Even recently Beddard, an English zoologist, says that Moses is obviously astray when he speaks of the coney chewing its cud. In all these cases, and a great many besides, the Bible has been found right; and with the reservations which we shall now make, we know of no case in which error has been brought home to it. We would not ask for the benefit of doubt to be given in its favor; it is a mistake to clear away doubts by short cuts in either direction. The safe and honest course is until evidence comes to confess our ignorance. The Bible is not a discredited witness, and the least we should insist on is that in matters still hidden judgment shall be withheld till we get further light. That we may expect more light is readily indicated by the records of the last half-century. We have seen a great many statements of Scripture which were then puzzling becoming cleared up, and shown to be nothing more than extraordinary natural occurrences, parallel to those which have occurred at other times. In the Bible they are connected with special acts of Divine providence, and often with the addendum of revelation as to their significance. Thus the chief difficulty is their religious setting. Of this sort is the creation of the world; but as the world is here, it must have been created or itself be eternal. Now although our geological friend seems willing to revive the old fancy of the geologists about an eternal evolution in the past, we rather think that from the scientific side that hypothesis is dead and buried. The evolution of animals and plants, as the mode of their creation, has been at length so far cleared as to remove any difficulty in that part; though, of course, a sheer miracle was necessary not only to start the world, but to create life and intelligence and conscience. The idea that the second chapter of Genesis is only another account of creation, and that it conflicts with the first chapter, appears to us only an invention by somebody who was in search of disharmonies. Other matters of this order are the deluge, which geology has established as a historic or rather a prehistoric event, and the incident of the Tower of Babel (Schrader referred it to the ruin still existing at

Borsippa), the destruction of Sodom (like the recent events at Martinique), the plagues of Egypt, crossing the Red Sea, and again crossing the Jordan. After the late Prof. Prestwich died, leaving his work on the *Tradition of the Flood* only about half completed, Prof. G. F. Wright and his son undertook a tour of Central Asia and Egypt in order to complete the work. Their conclusion is that the present condition of the Bible lands, taken along with the well-known principles of geological activities, proves the historicity of the events referred to as natural occurrences, though the Bible shows that they were associated with Divine actions, to which they were subsidiary. The events must be admitted as sustained by the evidence, though every man must consult with his conscience as to their religious affinity and significancy. Other incidents would be accepted if reported in a respectable newspaper, though many balk at them when in the Bible; of this kind are where young men thrived very well on vegetable food, where a herd of swine ran down in panic into the water and were all drowned, and where a fish was found that had swallowed a coin; and where after trying in vain to catch fish, quite a crowd of them were found to be on the farther side of the boat; also of a tree actually withering, so that whereas on one day it bore leaves but no fruit, a few days later it was found to have neither leaves nor fruit. Even a prophet might in our own time dream that he saw many dry bones come together, and flesh grow on them, until at last they stood up as a mighty living host. And any young man might fall into a deep sleep, in which he saw a lovely female form grow from his side; and if, after awaking, he should behold the very one of whom he had dreamed, he might well say that God had thus taught him that she was one with himself, and was his appointed helpmeet. These are the charms of the Bible, and they puzzle only such as will not be charmed.

The Bible does indeed contain a number of supernatural events of which we have no counterparts in nature. These can be explained only relatively to its unique claim; and all that can be said for science is that it slightly relieves or at least does not increase their difficulty. They are not anti-scientific, but extra-scientific, so far as present-day science reaches. The recent discoveries about radio-activity and the electric-theory of matter do not explain, but they teach us to be careful not to condemn what we cannot understand. Such are the origins of things everywhere; and the enabling a man to live in fire, or to fly to heaven in a chariot, or to survive a sleep within a fish, or raising from the dead, or feeding thousands on a few loaves and fishes, or changing water into wine, or

causing the sundial to move back, or the sun to halt in the sky,—it is easy to conceive how any of such events might be possible, viz., if in some respects the natural movements could be reversed. But a reversible process is something beyond our skill, except as an act of our imagination. In extra-biblical cases there are surmisings that something of that character may in some unknown way be part of the kosmos.

Some of the troublesome cases in the Bible are nothing more than modes of expression which we have failed to grasp because of our remoteness from the scene of action. Thus when it is said that a serpent should eat dust, what more is this than what Homer means when one of his heroes compels another to bite the dust? Our friend whose book we have cited is specially unfortunate on this part. He quarrels with Moses for speaking of man as formed from the dust; and we are confident that Moses might retort by asking if the friend had not himself, over the open grave, given back his dear brother, earth to earth, ashes to ashes, and dust to dust, though he did not believe in any of these statements. How easy it is to strain at the gnat and to swallow the camel! We do not imagine that Moses knew physiology any more than evolution; if he had known both, however, he would not have improved his narrative if he had put the new wine of modern science into the old bottles of ancient simplicity.

Then our friend argues that Moses might as well have represented the patriarchs as being fifty feet high as have made one of them live 969 years. We speak with great hesitation of this, as we entirely agree that the probability is against this age having been reached by anybody; the Bible does not hint at anything miraculous in the affair; and how to deal with it is about the only case which we have been disposed to give up. But we ask our friend's attention to the fact that the Jews represented the giants as monstrous, far beyond even the fifty feet which he cites; but Moses himself gives only modest giants, by stating the length of their beds, or in some other picturesque way he presents us with their measure as within the range of reasonableness. This was one of the phenomena on which good Dr. Kitto laid emphasis in his precious *Pictorial Bible*. It compels us to ask whether there may not be something in the case of patriarchal longevity that would clear the difficulty if only we knew it. Some of us are called by names which make us the son of somebody who lived hundreds of years before we were born. The MacCampbell of Argyllshire would seem to have been the great man ever since the Norman Conquest. The Pharaoh of the Bible

marches over its pages for about 1300 years. Even the Hebrew is seen in the Bible to last for about five centuries, though at one time as Terah, at another as Abraham, at another as Isaac, at another as Jacob, after which monoeracy fades and patriarchy merges into the phylocracy of the twelve tribes, or rather into the theocracy which introduced the families of the different tribes as units of the larger seed of Abraham. It is not our purpose to offer any special hypothesis, but only to ask for arrest of decision until the case is better known. Our friend, however, makes a bad mistake when he argues, "When an inerrant writer says that a man lived 162 years, and begat his great-great-grandson, the common mind wonderingly inquires whether words have any definite meaning or not." He will find, if he will examine the first chapter of Matthew, that this is just what the Scriptures do. It is there stated (ver. 8) that "Joram begat Uzziah." Now by referring to 2 Kings, viii. 24, xi. 2, xiv. 2, and 2 Chron. xxvi. 1, he will find that the unabbreviated genealogy is that Joram begat Ahaziah, then Ahaziah begat Joash, next Joash begat Amaziah, and Amaziah begat Uzziah; thus Matthew makes Joram beget his great-great-grandson, within a single link of the chain that tortures our friend. In Ezra vii. 1 he will find a pedigree with fifteen stages from Aaron to Ezra, where there is evidence to show that at least twice that number occurred. The fact is, that in ancient as much as in modern times pedigrees and family names cannot be managed except on some system of abbreviation.

The most unfortunate venture is where the Saviour is placed under a double condemnation because He stated that except a corn of wheat die it abideth alone. It is stated that this is opposed to science as to the mode of germination, and also that it teaches spontaneous generation; although it is added that the errors are of little importance. If the writer had been with us when we read his book, we fancy that we could have easily convinced him of his error; for the seedling wheat plants were flourishing in the laboratory, each carrying on its back its dead mother-seed; and proving that the seed's life had been sacrificed for its young as completely, though not as instantaneously, as Rachel's life was given up for Benjamin. In an old volume of the scientific journal *Nature* there is an account of the germination of barley, which is like wheat; and it is there shown by the regular scientific method of experiment that the seed is exhausted and dies in producing the young plant. The Apostle Paul repeats the fact in his discussion of the resurrection: "That which thou sowest is not quickened except it die." Neither Jesus nor

Paul made any reference to spontaneous generation. On the contrary, the one said that a seed grows, the sower "knoweth not how"; and the other said, "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap," expressions which look in another direction.

The New Testament is quite free from pseudo-science. Some have taken exception to the expression, "if the salt have lost its savor," on the plea that salt cannot thus change; but it can be decomposed, and so the error is the critic's. We are pleased in observing that Prof. Rice's book is all right as to the miracles of the New Testament, and that the last part of his book is the best. There are many events recorded in the Gospels and in the Book of Acts which are not according to science, but they are not anti-scientific, though they can never be explained by it, as they are extra-scientific. The difficulty is from the supernatural power which dominates them, and which is characteristic of the Saviour whose mission they came to illustrate. Prof. Rice justly asserts that deism in this age of science is discredited, that unbelief has been compelled to take refuge in agnosticism, and that a profound reverence for the person of Christ prevails, so that the evidence for Christianity is perhaps stronger than that for Theism. And asking whether the faith of the unscientific first century can breathe in this scientific age, he replies that the changes can involve the abandonment of no essential doctrine, and specifies as still remaining our faith in a Heavenly Father, a risen Saviour, an inspired and inspiring Bible, and an immortal hope; and the present generation is more strongly influenced by the teaching of Christianity than any previous generation. These facts foster the trust that even where darkness still reigns, we may some day find that the defect was in ourselves.

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V.

THE DOCTRINE OF BAPTISM IN HOLY SCRIPTURE AND THE WESTMINSTER STANDARDS.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WE have now examined all the instances of baptism found in the Acts of the Apostles, and we have seen them to be in perfect harmony with the doctrine we deduced from the words of our Lord. Let us turn next to the writings of the apostles and ascertain whether we have correctly placed ourselves in their point of view. Their references are all of a homiletic or hortatory character, and will therefore be full of instruction regarding the bearing of the sacrament upon the Christian life.

In the sixth chapter of Romans we have an argument against anti-nomianism based upon the nature of the ordinance of baptism. "What shall we say then? Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound? God forbid. We who died to sin, how shall we any longer live therein? Or are ye ignorant that all we who were baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death?" (verses 1-3). The tense of the verb "died" (aorist) shows that a specific act in our past history is referred to. When did this death to sin take place? Dr. Charles Hodge says, "The act which in its nature was a dying to sin, was our accepting Christ as our Saviour." But to evade the conclusion which we would naturally draw from the mention of baptism in the next verse he says, "The object of the apostle does not require that a formal argumentative answer should be supposed to commence in this verse." But we submit that there is a clear grammatical and logical connection with the context following. The "or" (ἢ), with which verse 3 begins, continues the argument, as in the first verse of the next chapter (R. V.). It introduces an explanation in proof of the assertion preceding (Alford). We may paraphrase the apostle's words as follows: "Can it be that you are ignorant of the meaning of your own baptism? Every catechumen knows that 'all we who were baptized into union with Christ Jesus were baptized into union with Him in His death.' Now see what follows from this. We were buried with Christ. We are risen with Christ and share His life. Must you

not then 'regard yourselves as dead to sin, but as living to God, through union with Christ Jesus?'" This is clearly the apostle's line of argument. He urges their sacramental union with Christ in baptism as a reason why Christians should loathe sin as contrary to the instincts of the new life which they have received from Him. A mystical union has been consummated with the crucified, buried and risen Saviour. The life that they now live is a heavenly one. Its activities have nothing to do with the old life of sin save to abhor and resist the tendencies which characterized it. In verse 5 the same topic is illustrated by means of a new figure: "For if we have become united with him (literally "coalescent") by the likeness (*ὁμοιότητα*) of his death, we shall be also by the likeness of his resurrection." Here "the likeness of his death" points back to verse 3, in which baptism is stated to be the means by which we were united to Christ in His death, and it is appropriately so termed, because it sets forth our death to sin—a moral renunciation having "likeness" to Christ's expiatory sufferings. Through baptism we receive remission of sin and engrafting into Christ; thus, sacramentally, we are identified with Him in His humiliation, and have the assurance that the same union will bring to us the quickening power of His resurrection, by means of which we may overcome our corrupt nature which was crucified with Him when we were baptized. It necessarily follows from this vital union with Christ with respect to His death that we shall be participators in His resurrection life. The words "by the likeness" are inserted unnecessarily in the second clause: "We shall be coalescent with Him in regard to His resurrection." The Christian's union with the risen Saviour is real, although he shares His death only "by a likeness" and by the imputation of its merits. The use of the perfect, "have become united," points to the fact that the union consummated in baptism is permanent: "We were and still are united to Him." The vivifying grace of baptism "is not tied (or, limited) to the moment of time wherein it is administered" (Conf. of F., 28 : 6) but continues throughout life, and according as it is improved will there be what Meyer calls "ethical participation in the new everlasting life of Christ."

The passage, taken as a whole, illustrates the homiletic use of baptism which pervades the Epistles. The man who would abuse the doctrine of salvation by free grace through indulgence in sin is met with an exposition of the ordinance of baptism. It is pointed out to him that its acknowledged meaning implies a real and vital union with Christ; that in it are conferred spiritual advantages which

carry with them corresponding responsibilities; and that consequently a sinful life is a practical renunciation of baptism and repudiation of the grace conferred therein. The doctrine of the Christian life taught in this passage is that a holy walk and conversation are due to the operation in the Christian of the life of the risen Saviour, and the possession of this grace is guaranteed to him by the union with the crucified Saviour effected by the Holy Spirit in baptism (see Larger Catechism, Quest. 167). It will be observed that the apostle speaks of all baptized persons including himself: "We who died to sin," "All we who were baptized." There is not the slightest hint that his argument applies only to those who had experienced a subjective change, such as is described in our Shorter Catechism under the name of "effectual calling": "Effectual calling is the work of God's Spirit, whereby, convincing us of our sin and misery, enlightening our minds in the knowledge of Christ, and renewing our wills, he doth persuade and enable us to embrace Jesus Christ, freely offered to us in the Gospel." If this were the apostle's meaning why did he refer to baptism at all? Why did he not say, "All we who are savingly united to Christ by faith are one with Him in His death"? As we have already shown, washing with water is not an appropriate symbol of the infusion of spiritual life. The term "baptism" would not suggest the quickening influence of the Holy Spirit unless the ordinance as a whole essentially implied this. "Baptized into Christ Jesus" must mean "united to Christ Jesus by the sacramental operation of the Holy Spirit in baptism." Much confusion of thought arises from the habit of thinking only of the outward action and symbol when baptism is spoken of. We should never lose sight of the fact that the supernatural action of the Holy Spirit is necessary to constitute a sacrament. Without this there may be a washing, but not a baptism—the spiritual reality set forth in the outward and sensible sign is absent.

Turning next to the First Epistle to the Corinthians, we are struck with the tone of expostulation and reproof which pervades it. Those whom the apostle addresses have shown themselves to be very unworthy Christians. The Church is torn by factions (iii. 3), shameful incest is allowed to pass without rebuke (v. 1), sins of impurity are hinted at (vi. 15), frauds and litigation are rampant (vi. 8), the Lord's Table is profaned (xi. 21), some deny the doctrine of the resurrection (xv. 35), and even the gifts of the Spirit are used for the purpose of vainglorious display (xiv. 21). Yet the Corinthian Christians are never told that such as offend in these things

show by their conduct that they are strangers to the grace of God. On the contrary, they are all addressed as "sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be saints" (i. 2); of all it is said, "of him (*i.e.*, God) are ye in Christ Jesus" (i. 30); all "are God's husbandry, God's building" (iii. 9); to all it is said, "know ye not that ye are a temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you" (iii. 16); those "within" include all who are not "without," or heathen (v. 12); to all are addressed the words, "know ye not that your bodies are the members of Christ" (vi. 15); and in numerous other passages the strongest language indicative of church membership is used without any hint that it is to be considered as applicable to an inner circle of "true Christians," and not to the whole congregation of professed believers and their households. He admonishes the offenders as "beloved children," and affectionately appeals to them not to dishonor their baptism. He does not upbraid them with living inconsistently with their profession—(that they did so most scandalously was obvious)—but for trampling under foot the grace they have received from God—a much more heinous offense.

Take, for example, the sixth chapter. After rebuking the litigious spirit which had become prevalent, and the fraudulent practices which fostered it, the apostle solemnly warns the Corinthians that the unrighteous shall not inherit the kingdom of God, but shall share the doom of the vilest sinners. "But," he adds, appealing to their better nature, "ye were washed, ye were sanctified, ye were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, and in the Spirit of our God: walk not contrary to the grace ye have received. Such things ought not to be, and they need not be. The Spirit of God is given you in order that you may live the sanctified life" (vi. 11). When did this washing, etc., take place? The verbs are in the aorist, denoting a past event at a specific time. We understand all three terms to refer to the one occasion, and the threefold description points to a threefold aspect of it for the sake of emphasis. They were "washed" by the remission of sin, "sanctified," or consecrated to God, by their renunciation of the world, and "justified" because accepted of God and admitted to the fellowship of the people of God. Nearly all the commentators, including Calvin, see in this passage a reference to baptism. It is true, as Dr. Charles Hodge says, that there is nothing in the context compelling us to take this view, yet there is no other point in the life of those to whom he wrote at which it could be said that they were "washed," "sanctified," "and justified." It may be said that the apostle refers to the time when they believed and were subjectively renewed, and

that he courteously and charitably assumes that all to whom he wrote were genuinely "converted," however inconsistent their conduct might appear. But this seems to us a very wild supposition. Would any modern pastor speak in this way? Paul does not for a moment ascribe to the offending Corinthians a subjective state which their conduct belies, but he says in effect, "The grace of God came to you at your baptism. That grace brought you into living union with the pure and holy Saviour. Do not forsake this blessed fellowship. Put off these works of darkness. The Spirit of God dwells in you. Do not despise unto the Spirit of grace. Be not rejected branches of the true vine." This theory of a charitable assumption on the part of Paul seems to us quite inconsistent with his crystal sincerity and plain speaking. He bases his exhortation, not upon an assumption, but upon a fact, the bestowal of grace in baptism on all who rightly receive that ordinance. He warns all Christians that unless they repent and forsake their sins they will be castaways and their doom will be the second death of the twiceborn. He does not speak in verse 11 of what the Corinthian Christians had professed, but of what God had done for them. His admonition rests, not upon their profession, but on God's grace in uniting them to Christ, and bestowing His Holy Spirit upon them.

Turning to the second part of the chapter, we find an earnest appeal to those who were guilty of sins, alas! too prevalent still, although seldom rebuked in such plain language. What, according to the apostle, constitutes the peculiar guilt of fornication in the case of Christians? Is it that sins of this nature sap the foundations of society, undermine character, are the fruitful source of every crime, spread loathsome diseases, and cover with shame the hypocritical professor who is guilty of them? All this, and much more that is true, he might have said, but he takes far higher ground in the fifteenth verse: "Know ye not that your bodies are members of Christ? Shall I then take away the members of Christ, and make them members of a harlot?" On what ground does the apostle assert that our bodies are members of Christ? In chapter xii, verse 13, he says, "For in one Spirit were we all baptized into one body . . . and were all made to drink of one Spirit" ("were all watered with one Spirit."—XX Cent. N. T.). The unity of the Church rests upon the one baptism which all had received. In this they were united to one another by being united to Christ. This is the meaning of the allusion, according to nearly all commentators from Chrysostom to Calvin and down to Charles Hodge, who adopts another

view on what seems to us irrelevant grounds. The apostle is not addressing "true Christians" only, but the whole Church of baptized members. There is no sign here or elsewhere in Paul's writings that he has one line of argument for "communicants," another for "adherents," and still another for baptized children. All who had been baptized were thereby made, by the Holy Spirit acting in the sacramental ordinance, members of Christ's body, and were watered, as soil into which seed was planted, that they might "grow up in all things into Him which is the Head even Christ" (Eph., iv. 15). Their bodies became members of Christ when they were by baptism made members of His mystical body, the Church. In virtue of this they are temples of the Holy Ghost, who dwells in them (vi. 19; iii. 16; 2 Cor. vi. 16). In the passage before us the apostle inculcates the duty of a "white life" on the ground of our baptism, wherein the body was united to Christ. The sin of which he speaks is committed within the sacred sphere of the organism itself (verse 18). The stimulus to it arises from a polluted heart; the very *penetralia* of the temple reek with the stench of lust's foul incense. "Glorify God, therefore, in your body." This, it appears to us, is the apostle's argument.

In the tenth chapter we have another illustration of the same hortative reference to baptism as the great motive to steadfastness in the Christian life. In the preceding passage the duty of strenuous effort to keep the carnal nature in subjection is enforced by a statement of the writer's own watchful efforts. He now further illustrates his subject by deducing a lesson from the history of the ancient people of God, a history that was much more than a record of a nation's progress: it was typical and prophetic on every page. The very words with which the argument opens indicate that the statement to follow must be received as an indubitable truth—"I would not have you ignorant": the lesson to be deduced from it is authoritative inspired teaching. Two points are emphasized: first, that the fathers, at the beginning of the Mosaic economy, stood in a relation to God comparable to that of Christians at the beginning of the new dispensation, the technical expression "baptized into" is tropically used to describe it; and second, that the whole congregation, without exception, were brought into this relationship. By "Moses" is to be understood, not the person of that name, but the dispensation of which he was the founder and representative. The name stands for a certain method of administering the affairs of the kingdom of God which obtained from the Exodus until the day of Pentecost. The Israelites were under "the cloud," not literally,

for we have no reason to believe that it spread out horizontally over them, but metaphorically, under its protection and guidance, *i.e.*, it was the symbol of the divine presence. They passed through the sea, but were neither immersed nor sprinkled by the spray; or if they were, the fact has no significance whatever. The likeness lies, not in the aqueous nature of the object mentioned, but in the essential meaning of the new relationship to God established at the beginning of the theocracy. The passage of the Red Sea marked the moment of transition from the life of bondage to that of liberty. The people renounced Pharaoh and his taskmasters, and pledged themselves to follow henceforward their covenant God and Saviour. Such was the spiritual meaning of the events referred to. Exactly similar is the standing of the baptized under the Christian economy. Their baptism sets forth their deliverance from the power of Satan and entrance into the service of Christ. They, too, are "God's elect, holy and beloved" (Col. iii. 12). His presence is among them and His grace provides for their spiritual necessities. The connection of thought expressed by the first word of the chapter (R. V.) "For," and the subsequent application of the incidents referred to, seems to be this: The apostle practices rigorous self-subjection lest, in spite of his faithful preaching to others, he should find himself rejected as not having fulfilled all the conditions of the Christian athlete. Such a rejection he regards as far from impossible. Not only the analogy of the Isthmian games, with which the Corinthians were familiar, suggests this, but God's method of dealing with His elect nation supplies us with an unmistakable type of such apostasy. Every man, woman and child in the vast multitude which joined in the song of triumph on the eastern shore of the Red Sea had been brought into a relationship to their divine Deliverer analogous to that in which all baptized Christians stand to the same gracious Saviour. Yet most of them were rejected because they proved unfaithful. "So," says the apostle, "may you, although you have all received the grace of the Spirit imparted through baptism, fall from your steadfastness and be rejected at last unless you exercise constant vigilance against sin. Wherefore let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall." The implied truth which gives all its force to the admonition is that by baptism the Corinthian Christians—all of them, not a select group of "true believers"—had been brought into a peculiarly gracious relationship, fraught with all the blessings of salvation to those who strove to realize the divine intention in the ordinance, but one which might be forfeited if its blessings were despised and sin alienated the life from God.

Whatever the baptism "for the dead" referred to in chap. xv. 29 may mean, it at least shows the high estimate placed upon the sacrament in the apostolic Church, and that it was held to be ordinarily necessary to salvation.

Our next passage, Gal. iii. 27, occurs at the close of a long and very important argument. Ellicot says, "The declaration of verse 7 is substantiated and expanded by twenty-two verses of the deepest, most varied and most comprehensive reasoning to be found in the whole compass of the great apostle's writings." The thesis, or starting-point of the argument, is verse 7: "Know, therefore, that they which be of faith, the same are sons of Abraham." In establishing this statement he shows, first, that the divine intention to include all nations in the Gospel offer was distinctly declared in the original covenant itself. He next points out that the Mosaic economy did not, and could not, abrogate this more ancient charter of salvation. So far from rendering null the promise to the patriarch, its real end was to assist in giving effect to it. The chosen race had lapsed from the simple faith of their great ancestor, and required a process of education and discipline to prepare them for entering into possession of their spiritual heritage. But now that the promised "Seed" has come, that time of tutorship is at an end, schoolboy days are over, and all, whether Jews or Gentiles, who have faith in Christ are sons of God. The filial relationship, with its freedom of home and estate, supersedes the virtual servitude which characterized the state of pupilage. "For ye are all the sons of God, through faith in Christ Jesus. For as many of you as have been baptized into Christ did put on Christ. . . . Ye are all one man in Christ Jesus" (verses 26-28).

Let us look at these verses a little more closely. The logical emphasis is on "all": "All ye are the sons of God." "According to the expression in the second person, used without any limitation, the *Galatian Christians* must have considered themselves addressed as a whole without distinction" (Meyer). The apostle virtually says, "There is no necessity for you to be circumcised and keep the law in order to become God's covenant children. Your faith makes you all sons, and nothing more is called for. Is not this the truth set forth in your baptism?" The "as many of you" in verse 27 corresponds to the "all" of verse 26. There is no suggestion that some of them had not been really "baptized into Christ." Unless the two expressions be coextensive the "for" loses its force—there is no cogency in the argument. The verse may be paraphrased thus: "As surely as ever each one of you was baptized into Christ,

so surely did he become clothed with Christ." In exactly the same form the following passages, in which the same word occurs, may be rendered, viz., Rom. vi. 3, viii. 14; Gal. iii. 10. All those addressed, having been baptized "into Christ," did in that very act "put on Christ." This was the designed effect of their baptism. It is of importance, therefore, to understand correctly the meaning of these two expressions, for in them lies the peculiar virtue of the sacrament. We understand the phrase "baptized into Christ" to be a technical term derived from the baptismal formula, and to have the pregnant sense that we ascribed to it when that formula was under discussion. To quote the words of Rev. E. Huxtable in the Pulpit Commentary, "That is, meaning that Christians are in their baptism brought into that union with, in-being in, Christ which constitutes their life." "Christ is perpetually set forth as for Christians the very sphere of their existence, *in* whom they are, that which distinctively they are." Here, as in Rom. vi. 3, "the apostle is evidently penetrating into the inmost significance and operation of the rite; and, therefore, beyond question, means to indicate its function as verily blessed by God for the translation of its faithful recipients into vital union with Christ." In this ordinance the Holy Spirit effectuates the union which faith subsequently realizes. If this be the force of "into Christ," then being "clothed with Christ" must mean more than assuming the *toga virilis* of the Christian adult, or the distinctive uniform of a leader. The apostle is not here speaking of the outward signs of sonship, but of its inward and spiritual grounds. These are not legal and ceremonial, but are valid in the case of the uncircumcised Galatians as much as in that of born sons of Abraham. It must be such an enduement with Christ as makes them one with Christ in God's sight so that they are "accepted in the Beloved" (Eph. i. 6). It makes them "one in Christ Jesus." No commentator has perceived the meaning of these verses more clearly than the oldest, St. Chrysostom: "If Christ be the Son of God, and thou hast put on Him, thou hast the Son within thee, and art fashioned after His pattern, hast been brought into a kindred and nature with Him. . . . 'Ye are all one in Christ Jesus,' that is, ye have all one form and one mould, even Christ's. What can be more awful than these words! He that was a Greek, or a Jew, or a bondman yesterday, carries about with him the form, not of an angel or archangel, but of the Lord of all, yea, displays in his own person the Christ." "Therefore," the argument concludes, returning to the statement of verse 7, "if thus one with Christ we are collectively Abraham's seed, heirs in virtue of a promise and not through obedience to the law."

This whole argument is addressed to those who had been baptized on profession of their faith, and assumes that all received the grace contained in the sacrament. Nevertheless the doctrine must apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to the case of infants, or we have a distinct ordinance under the same name. If it is of the essence of baptism to bring the recipient into vital union with Christ, it must produce this result whenever applied to children, or else we have no right to admit them to the ordinance until they are capable of believing. The "putting on of Christ" which is the result of baptism does not immediately imply the putting on of the "new man." It denotes a new filial relation to God which results in the renewal of the whole nature progressively. Christ becomes to the baptized the principle of a new life by which He is subjectively transformed. This is the work of the Holy Spirit acting through the appropriate means. The child receives baptism on the ground that he is within the covenant by right of his parents' faith. Whenever the claim is warrantably presented and the ordinance is administered according to Christ's appointment the child receives "the promise," *i.e.*, the gift of the Holy Ghost, enduement with Christ, and a right to be considered a child of God. By the terms of God's gracious covenant with His people the child receives adoption into His family, and is accepted as standing within the same circle of divine love as the parent, although as yet he is unconscious of the fact. This must carry with it positive spiritual blessings, not merely the promise of such on conditions which cannot possibly be fulfilled by the child, as the common view of Presbyterians teaches. That view makes baptism, like the law, only a "shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the things themselves." In the measure in which the child comes to conscious faith in Christ does he make the transition from mere possession of into actual profiting by the grace received in baptism. The filial relationship into which he was brought is itself the efficacious means of producing this response of the will and affections to pious teaching and environment. To quote the words of Dr. Schmoller in Lange's Commentary: "What, therefore, with the adult, come to self-consciousness, is one act, namely, the communication of the blessing and the consciousness of having it—the translation into the adoption of children and the enjoyment of the same—is with the child divided. The possession is assured to it, in order that from the very beginning of self-consciousness it may feel itself already in possession of the good, and may so much the more certainly make use of the same." The American editor, Dr. Riddel,

adds the following in a footnote: "It must be added that any consistent pædo-baptist view must admit as much as Dr. Schmoller maintains here. The practice, however cherished from custom or superstition, must inevitably fall into disuse (where there is no law compelling it) unless parents and children are brought to look on it in this light. Undoubtedly, to my mind, it were better that it should fall into disuse than be a mere public naming of the child, without any such delightful reality in it as is here held. Of its efficacy as a means of promoting 'the conscious apprehension of the promise of God in Christ' in after years instances are still occurring, despite the prominence of 'spasmodic' over 'educational' Christianity in these days."

In the fourth chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians, Paul urges, with a touching reference to his own sufferings, that the Church would walk worthy of its holy vocation, "giving diligence to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." He then reminds them that this unity rests upon seven foundation stones, of which baptism is the sixth. Baptism is a ground of unity only because it is the means employed by the Holy Spirit in uniting each believer with Christ. "In one Spirit were we all baptized into one body" (1 Cor. xii. 13). "As many as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ . . . ye are all one man in Christ Jesus" (Gal. iii. 27, 28). To say that "baptism" is used metaphorically of the ordinary operations of the Spirit, apart from the sacrament, would be to make it a mere repetition of the second ground, "one Spirit," the animating principle of the "one body." The coördination of baptism with faith and the lordship of Christ excludes as inadequate any view which regards it as a mere symbol, or an ordinance of hypothetical value. The argument would in such a case be quite inconsequent, for such a baptism could be no evidence of the unity of all professed Christians and their children. If, however, the "one baptism" effects, as we think, a real union in every case in which it is legitimately applied, then the rupture of such a bond is rightly condemned as schism or apostasy and its penalty is deservedly perdition.

That baptism is referred to in Eph. v. 26, "That he might sanctify it (the Church), having cleansed it by the washing (marg., laver) of water with the word," is, says Dr. Eadie, "the general and correct opinion." It is literally "the laver of *the* water," *i.e.*, the well-known water of baptism. The "word" is the baptismal formula, "In the name of the Father, etc." There is no article in the original (ἐν ῥήματι), showing that the phrase, or saying, meant is that which

belongs by preëminence to the "laver of water." It is treated as a quasi-proper name (Meyer). The modern grammatical objections to this view which are based upon the absence of the article ought not to overrule the fact that St. Chrysostom, who spoke the language, and would understand perfectly why it was not used, gives this meaning to "the word" without any remark, as if no other suggested itself to his mind. What light does this verse throw upon the import of the sacrament? The apostle is urging upon husbands the duty of cherishing such affection toward their wives as Christ manifested toward the Church. Baptism is the Bride's antenuptial bath wherein she is prepared for her divine husband. In this she is cleansed from her defilement of sin and made responsive to the love that has chosen her. She is sanctified thereby, or set apart as holy, belonging henceforth only to Him who loved her and gave Himself for her. In baptism that intimate union is consummated which makes the Church the Body of Christ, and its several members parts of that mystical union. The mystery of that union is great, but it stands as the heavenly analogue of the union of human souls in holy matrimony. It means all that this can imply in regard to mind and heart, but infinitely more. Baptism is the soul's betrothal to Christ. It is the act of the Bridegroom in which He gives effect to His electing love and begins a process of sanctification by which the Bride is to become "a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing," but being "holy and without blemish." How dark the guilt of those who treat their baptism as a matter of little or no moment and yield their souls to the embrace of sin!

In Col. ii. 11, 12, we have an argument very similar to that of the sixth chapter of Romans. "The circumcision not made with hands" consisted in taking off and throwing away, as a rejected garment, "the body of the flesh," *i.e.*, the domination of sin, which has its seat in our corrupt nature (Rom. vi. 6). This moral transformation takes place "in Christ," hence it is called "the circumcision of Christ," that is, it is wrought by union with Him. It took place at a definite time in the past: "were circumcised" (aorist). When was this? When they believed, or when they were baptized? These two facts of the spiritual life are never placed in antithesis, or in any way disjoined from one another in so far as they mark the first experience of the Christian, nor is baptizing ever regarded as a mere external rite, for in that respect it is as much "made with hands" as circumcision. In baptism faith is invested with the rights and prerogatives which belong to it. This is the way in

which Richard Baxter represents the matter in his *Plea for Confirmation*. It was at baptism that the Christian "died with Christ from the rudiments of the world" (verse 20) and was, in virtue of the union which is therein consummated, raised with Him to "newness of life" (Rom. vi. 4). This Christian circumcision is, instrumentally, the result of faith in the power of God to accomplish that spiritually which He wrought upon Christ physically when He raised Him from the dead. Faith must rest upon the sensible fact of baptism as certifying to the supersensible fact, occurring outside the sphere of consciousness, that we were made partakers of the resurrection life, that our sins were forgiven, and that the claims of the law have been satisfied in regard to us. The aorist tense is used throughout. The verbs in verses 13 and 14 point out the significance of a past event and cannot describe a present, or continuous, state of the Christian. Because such was the status attained in baptism the Colossian Christians are exhorted to loyalty to the Head of which they have thus been made members (1 Cor. xii. 13); to offer spiritual worship and service; to seek the things that are above; and to mortify their fleshly lusts. They are to remember that they are now "God's elect, holy and beloved," and must put on a glorious garment of Christian graces instead of the "body of the flesh" (iii. 12). In chapter iii, verses 12-17, this robe is described as regards those characteristics which belong to every one who has "put on Christ," but the special graces pertaining to wives, husbands, children, fathers, are separately detailed in verses 18-25. The interpretation which would limit the spiritual circumcision of chap. ii. 1-15 to those who have received baptism on profession of faith is refuted by this mention of the classes included under the common head, amongst which we find children. Their duties are simple, but they are incumbent upon them as being "in the Lord." In this passage, and in the sixth chapter of Romans, "we have," says the late Dr. John Macleod, "characteristic examples of a habitual usage of expression. When in search of a solid basis of incontrovertible fact on which to rest their exhortations the apostles found, not on the profession that the persons to whom they were writing were then making, or had previously made, but emphatically upon what God had wrought for them in the past; and the specific act of God to which they point as thus making certain their engrafting into Jesus Christ, and corresponding responsibility henceforward, is invariably, explicitly or implicitly, His act in Holy Baptism. The fact that baptism is God's sacrament for ingrafting into Jesus Christ is, in truth, what explains to us the

constant use by the apostles of the past tense (descriptive of an act already finally accomplished at a certain definite date) when desiring to set forth the certainty of grace having been communicated by God, as distinguished from the measure of response to that grace afterward given in the life of conversion." We understand the whole passage to teach that in baptism the "worthy receivers" have true and vital union with Christ, the forgiveness of sins, and an interest in the satisfaction made for sin on Calvary. They are therefore God's elect, holy and beloved, and under the strongest obligations to resist sin and manifest the graces and affections belonging to children of God. Yet that it is possible, through the response of our fallen nature to the blandishments of sin, to be robbed of our prize, and it is against this dread contingency that the apostle's earnest warning is uttered.

In Titus iii. 4-7 we have one of the "faithful sayings" found only in the Pastoral Epistles. It contains in a condensed and rhythmical form essential Gospel truth. Let us see whether it is in harmony with the views we have deduced from other passages. Here we are assured that when the world-embracing love of God burst forth as the sun from behind a cloud it brought salvation. It was a love which had all mankind for its object, but which realized its aim only in those who were recipients of God's saving grace. This was brought to them individually by means of (*διὰ*) "the laver of regeneration," or the ordinance of baptism, in which is received "the renewing of the Holy Ghost," which is in this sacrament "richly poured out," so that there may be no meagre result but full justification and heirship of eternal life, the Christian's hope. This seems to be the meaning of the passage so far as it is pertinent to the present inquiry.

That baptism is referred to under the expression "the washing of regeneration" is the opinion of nearly all commentators, and is the natural sense of the words (compare Eph. v. 26; Heb. x. 23; 1 Cor. vi. 11; Acts xxii. 16). By it, since it includes the renewing of the Holy Ghost, we are saved. Not that this result is accomplished by the ritual use of water, any more than by the mere listening to the word, but it results from the presence of the Holy Spirit in the sacrament. We understand the two clauses to denote the two parts of the sacrament, the outward and sensible sign, "washing," and the inward and spiritual reality accompanying it, "the renewing of the Holy Ghost." In thus connecting salvation with baptism our text does not stand alone. Ten of the passages we have considered predicate things necessary to salvation, and one

other will be noticed (1 Peter iii. 21), which says distinctly "baptism doth now save us." Surely the inference which Samuel Rutherford and other most spiritually minded men have drawn is fully warranted, namely, that baptism is the divinely instituted and ordinary means by which salvation is actually conveyed. Not that no one can be saved without it, for the grace of God must not be limited. Doubtless there are many sincere Quakers and Salvationists who conscientiously reject the sacraments, and others who, from no fault of their own, were never baptized who will be accepted on the ground of their faith alone. Nor are we bound to hold that saving results must follow every administration of the ordinance, for the conditions necessary to a valid baptism may be lacking, or the child may fail to implement the terms on which it is bestowed by acceptance for himself of the grace proffered—he may "quench the Spirit" and "trample under foot the Son of God, and count the blood of the covenant wherewith he was sanctified an unholy thing, and do despite unto the Spirit of grace." Yet we are here warranted in believing that there is a conveyance, to the right recipient, of the grace of God set forth in the sacramental symbol, and this includes regeneration, justification and adoption. Notice again the practical use which the apostle makes of this doctrine: "Affirm these things constantly, to the end that they which have believed God may be careful to maintain good works."

We turn next to Heb. vi. 1-8, which is universally regarded as one of the most difficult passages in the New Testament, but which yields easily a consistent meaning when we interpret it in accordance with the doctrine of objective grace in the sacraments. The writer chides the Hebrew Christians for their slow progress in the attainment of a fully developed spiritual life. Instead of attaining such apprehension of the profounder truths of the Gospel as would qualify them to be teachers of others, they are still in the primary class of the school of Christ, needing that some one teach them again "the rudiments of the first principles of the oracles of God." They were milk-fed babes without experience of the word of righteousness. Thereupon he proposes to pass from the "first principles of Christ" that He may lead them on the way to maturity, or perfection of Christian manhood. These first principles all relate to subjects common to Judaism and Christianity; but the teaching of the latter is in every case an advance upon the former. For example, repentance embraces a renunciation of the work-righteousness of Pharisaism; faith finds its object in Christ as the suffering Messiah; the illustrations of the Mosaic ritual become illustrative of Christian

baptism; the imposition of hands carries with it new and more potent endowments of the Spirit; the darkness of "sheol" has been illuminated by the resurrection of Jesus; and the promise of the second coming of the Son of Man fills the Christian with a more glorious hope than animated the fathers of old. Baptism is thus coördinated with repentance, faith, imposition of hands, the resurrection and final judgment. Certainly this is not the relative position which it holds with those who call it "a mere external ordinance," and utterly ignore it as having any real significance as a spiritual experience. The writer of this epistle classes it among those channels of supernatural blessing which bring within the personal experience of the neophyte enlightenment, the heavenly gift, the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come. The rejection of the blessing conveyed by these means entails hopeless perdition. Those who fall away cannot be renewed again to repentance, they are as a barren field sown with good seed, and which has drunk in the vivifying showers, but refuses to produce aught but thorns and thistles. They share the guilt, in an aggravated degree, of those who nailed the Redeemer to the cross, and mocked his dying agonies. We submit that this is a fair paraphrase of the passage in so far as it throws light upon the place of baptism amongst the means of grace.

The word used here for "baptism" is βαπτισμός instead of βάπτισμα. The latter is used of Christian and Johannine baptism alone, except in two instances, where it denotes the metaphorical baptism of suffering (Luke xii. 50 and Mark x. 38, 39). The former is used in the New Testament only in two passages besides our text, and in these it refers to Jewish ceremonials of cleansing (Mark vii. 4; Heb. ix. 10). The writer is here treating of Christian baptism as belonging to the same genus, as far as its symbolism is concerned, with the "washings" of the former dispensation, and therefore uses the form of the word which is cognate to this view. Its specific difference doubtless formed part of the instruction given in the "rudiments" or "first principles" in which those he addressed lingered too long. We have here, we may note incidentally, one illustration of the difference between the doctrinal point of view of the writer of this epistle and that of the apostle Paul. With him baptism is invariably the analogue of circumcision and the covenant sign of the new economy.

That the term "enlightened" or "illuminated" (φωτισθείντας) means "baptized" is the opinion of most commentators. In the middle of the second century Justin Martyr writes (*Apol.*, 1, 61):

"And this washing is called 'illumination,' because they who learn these things are illuminated in their understandings." Chrysostom, writing in the latter part of the fourth century, says, "It (*i.e.*, baptism) is called also illumination"; and refers to this passage and chap. x. 32 in proof (*Ante-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. 9, p. 161). Chrysostom also sees in the word "once," *i.e.*, "once for all," a reference to the inutility of a second baptism. In this sacrament a new and indissoluble relation is created so that the ordinance need not and ought not to be repeated, no matter although a long lifetime of worldliness and sin may have elapsed between baptism in infancy and conversion in old age.

Calvin explains "tasted of" by "*gustare extremis labris*," or, as we should say, "tasted with the tip of the tongue." Dogmatic considerations must have prompted this interpretation, for it is manifestly the aim of the writer not to minimize the blessings which by supposition are despised, but, heaping phrase on phrase, to emphasize the greatness and preciousness of the spiritual gifts they have received. They who fall away have had a personal experience of a real and supernatural character. The impossibility of "renewing them again to repentance" lies in the fact that such influences, objectively operating upon them, have effected no permanent subjective change. "The powers of the age to come," *i.e.*, of the Christian dispensation (ii. 5), have exhausted themselves upon them in vain. We have in these solemn words a powerful appeal to all baptized Christians not to rest satisfied with living under the means of grace and enjoying the privileges which are so freely bestowed, but to rise by means of these to a more intelligent understanding of the doctrines of the Bible, and to the attainment of a matured Christian experience based upon the practical application of these doctrines to the whole life.

In the tenth chapter we have two passages which contain a reference to baptism and show that the spiritual meaning of the ordinance is always in mind when the sacrament is mentioned. In the twenty-second verse we read: "Let us draw near with a true heart in fulness of faith, having our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience, and our body washed with pure water." The perfect participle of the verbs "sprinkled" and "washed" is used, denoting a specific act in the past the effect of which is abiding. In the preceding context the writer urged the objective warrants which the Christian had for approaching the mercy seat, namely, a true propitiation and an accepted High Priest, and now passes to the subjective conditions necessary, namely, a sincere heart and a fully assured faith,

which ethical worthiness is due to the fact that the guilt of sin has been washed away and the whole nature brought under the operation of the Spirit of God by baptism. The first clause, "having our hearts purged from an evil conscience," refers, without doubt, to the believer's "justification on the ground of propitiation" (Moll), and the figure is taken from the blood-sprinklings of the Hebrew ritual (Exod. xxiv. 8, xxix. 21; Lev. viii. 30; Heb. ix. 13, 14). The second clause, "our body washed with pure water," as clearly refers to the "washing" (*βαπτισμός*) of the High Priest on the Day of Atonement, viewed as the emblem of the Christian's baptism in preparation for his priestly service. This, we have seen, is the connection of thought, in this epistle, between baptism and the Old Testament lustrations. We cannot spiritualize the meaning in the light of Ezek. xxxvi. 25, for the "body," the whole outward life, stands in clear antithesis to the "heart" as the sphere of the affections and emotions. There is clearly what Meyer calls "a reminiscence of an outward act." The rhetorical and doctrinal balance of thought requires us to think of the inward sprinkling of the cleansing blood and the outward washing of the sacramental water. The first clause refers to that which is deeper than any sacramental ordinance, namely, the believer's warrant to approach God, on the ground that he is righteous in His sight because of the imputed righteousness of Christ received by faith. The second refers to baptism, not as a mere external ceremony, but as the ordinance in which there is a real preparation for drawing near as accepted worshippers. The water is called "pure" because of its cleansing efficacy, which depends solely upon the sacramental union in virtue of which the Holy Spirit operates. "Baptism forms the transition point from the objective system of salvation to its subjective appropriation through the grace which, by virtue of the divine arrangement, it sacramentally imparts, and contains in itself the obligation to holiness on the part of the reconciled and justified" (Moll). The homiletic application of the doctrine in the succeeding verses is quite similar to that in the passage we have already examined in chap. vi. 1-8.

In the thirty-second verse of this chapter we have a passage referred to by St. Chrysostom as warranting his statement that baptism was also called "illumination." "But call to mind the former days in which, after ye were enlightened, ye endured a great conflict of sufferings." The reference is clearly to the beginning of their experience as Christians. The interpretation of Chrysostom is at least probable, for their baptism would mark the time when the

Hebrew converts were called upon to endure persecution. It would be preceded by intellectual enlightenment and accompanied by spiritual experiences of a very blessed character. "‘Enlightened’ denotes conversion to Christianity as a translation from the power of darkness into the realm of light, so that the truth has found recognition and efficient action in the soul, and Christ is not only believed in and praised as the Light of the world, but shines in the soul as the Sun of Righteousness" (Moll). Baptism, accompanied by religious instruction and conveying the illuminating grace of the Holy Spirit, was the starting-point of their religious life, and the failure to implement all that they were obligated to in the sacrament meant perdition (verse 39). Thus again the solemn warning of the sixth chapter is repeated.

We are not called upon to attempt an interpretation of the much controverted passage in 1 Peter iii. 21. One clause only comes within the range of our subject, namely, the reference to the water of baptism as the antitype of the waters of the Flood. Noah and those with him were saved by water, that is, the waters bore up the ark, likewise the water of baptism instrumentally saves the Christian. But how? In virtue of the resurrection of Christ. This has been shown at greater length by the apostle Paul in Rom. vi. 1-11 and Col. ii. 11, 12. But the writer is careful to add in parentheses that the quickening power of Christ's resurrection does not come through "the putting away of the filth of the flesh"—the outward application of the symbol of cleansing—but in the response to "the interrogation of a good conscience toward God," that is, the appeal of the penitent sinner, in faith, for the inward cleansing bestowed by the Holy Spirit in the ordinance. Baptism is here said to "save." The verb is in the present tense, is "now saving." Salvation is not yet wholly accomplished. Baptism introduces us into a state of salvation, into covenant relations fraught with blessed influences and containing a pledge of full redemption to all who abide in them. The seed of the divine life has been implanted which, if nourished by the means of grace, will bring forth the fruits of the Spirit. The Christian life is here viewed as a continuous progress toward a goal the initial step of which is baptism, and all the spiritual development manifested grows out of the grace conferred in the sacrament, as the oak from the acorn.

In this connection we may compare the remarkable expression in chap. i. 23, "Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, through the word of God which liveth and abideth forever." The word of God is the instrumental means (*διὰ*),

conveying a knowledge of saving truth, but the originating and efficient cause (ἐκ) of the new birth is the incorruptible seed of divine grace. This, bestowed in baptism, becomes the germ out of which the spiritual life grows. Accordingly we find in 1 John iii. 9, "Whosoever is begotten of God doeth no sin, because his seed abideth in him." The tense of the verb "is begotten," in both clauses of the verse, is the perfect, denoting the abiding present effect of an event in the past. The past event implied is baptism, and the "seed" is the new life from Christ bestowed therein. A life of sin is the negation of this life "from above" (John iii. 3). The two are as antagonistic as light and darkness. He who is realizing in his spiritual experience the heritage secured to him in baptism has nothing to do with sin but to abhor and resist it. "In this the children of God are manifest and the children of the devil" (verse 10). The whole end and aim of engrafting into Christ by baptism is the destruction of sin, the obliteration of its effects, and the filling of the soul with all that is holy and good. "If the child of God falls into sin, it is a sin against nature, deadly to life, hardly endured, and bringing bitter repentance; it is as the taking of a poison, which, if it be not corrected by its antidote, will sap the very springs of life" (Alford on verse 6). All the life long the blessed effects of baptism are showing themselves in the God-led life. Calvin says: "We ought to conclude that at whatever time we are baptized, we are washed and purified for the whole of life. Whenever we have fallen, therefore, we must recur to the remembrance of baptism, and arm our minds with the consideration of it, that we may be always certified and assured of the remission of our sins. For though, when it has been once administered, it appears to be past, yet it is not abolished by subsequent sins. For the purity of Christ is offered to us in it; and that always retains its virtue, is never overcome by any blemishes, but purifies and obliterates all our defilements" (*Inst.*, B. IV, chap. 15, sec. 3).

We have now completed an exhaustive discussion of all the passages in the New Testament bearing directly upon the meaning of baptism. We have yet to consider the relation of the ordinance to circumcision as a sign and seal of the covenant.

It is not necessary to prove to Presbyterians that the Church of God is one under both dispensations. A very brief summary of the argument will suffice. (1) The term "Church" is applied to the Israelites when in the wilderness (Acts vii. 38). (2) The truth revealed to Abraham is called "the Gospel" (Gal. iii. 8). (3) The perpetuity of the Abrahamic covenant is insisted upon (Gal. iii. 17,

iv. 22-31; John vii. 22). (4) The terms of salvation are the same under both economies (Gal. iii. 11; Rom. iv. 1-16; Heb. 11). (5) The initiatory rite of both has the same signification. It is contended by some that circumcision was the sign of a temporal covenant merely and had reference to the possession of the promised land. But in that case the covenant failed. Many circumcised persons never were in possession of Canaan, indeed, do not seem to have dreamed that they had any right to it. The Gibeonites, too, were circumcised (Josh. ix. 23), but remained in the condition of serfs. Also many Persians (Esther viii. 17) who did not share the temporal fortunes of the returning captives. Circumcision was a religious rite, and its spiritual significance was clearly apprehended by the people of God (Rom. ii. 28, 29; Deut. xxx. 6; Jer. iv. 4; Rom. iv. 11; Phil. iii. 3; Col. ii. 11, 12). (6) The ideas of spiritual cleansing, and of faith as the ground of acceptance, were well understood as underlying the ordinance and giving it its virtue. (7) Nowhere in Old Testament prophecy do we read that an entirely new Church was to be founded by the Messiah, but it predicted a revival and extension of the old (see, for example, Isa. lx-lxv). The New Testament represents the Church of Christ as the same "olive tree" with the Gentile grafts inserted (Rom. xi. 17-26).

It follows from this unbroken historical continuity that the Church of the baptized stands in precisely the same covenant relationship as the Church of the circumcised, and is addressed in similar language whether of commendation or of reproach. There is not the slightest warrant for limiting certain expressions of the New Testament to so-called "true" Christians and attributing no analogous mental limitation to the statements of the prophets of the Old. Everywhere throughout the Old Testament we find the whole circumcised nation called God's children (Heb. xii. 5), with never a hint that this is to be considered a figurative expression based on the charitable assumption that all were what their circumcision supposed them to be. A multitude of terms are used to denote that they are God's "peculiar people," and that in virtue of the covenant mark upon them. God is ever in the midst of them; they are a holy people; "the high God is their Redeemer"; and Israel is His "peculiar treasure." Their apostasy is characterized as adultery, and is denounced with such Dantesque realism that we cannot read publicly some of the most fervid passages (*e.g.*, Ezek. xvi). These words are not addressed specially to those who had voluntarily assumed for themselves the responsibilities consequent upon circumcision. The fact that they had been by that rite brought into

a holy relationship, and had despised their birthright, warranted their being classed with the violators of the most sacred of human ties. They are never addressed, even when most thoroughly corrupt, as other than the wayward and rebellious children of a long-suffering Father, a nation which could not, if it would, dissolve the holy bonds which held them. The only basis on which this uniform method of appeal could rest, the only fact which warrants it, is that by circumcision they were all "debtors to do the whole law" (Gal. v. 3).

Turning to the New Testament, we find the Church addressed in a precisely similar manner. "Saint" was from the first the accepted designation of believers, just as "Christian" is now, except when the very incorrect "American" usage is followed which restricts the term to those who have professed conversion. Ananias said of Saul: "Lord, I have heard by many of this man, how much evil he has done to thy saints at Jerusalem" (Acts ix. 13). Peter came to "the saints which dwelt at Lydda," and "when he had called the saints and widows he presented (Dorcas) alive" (verses 32 and 41). The Macedonian and Achaian churches made "a contribution for the poor saints which are at Jerusalem" (Rom. xv. 26), and Paul in giving instructions in regard to it calls it "the collection for the saints" (1 Cor. xvi. 1). Other instances of the use of the term are found in 1 Cor. xiv. 33, xvi. 15; 2 Cor. viii. 4, ix. 1, 12, xiii. 13; Eph. vi. 18; Phil. iv. 21, 22; 1 Tim. v. 10; Philemon 5, 7; Heb. vi. 10, xiii. 24. Turn up these passages and read them and no doubt can remain on the mind that the apostles viewed Christians as "a holy people to the Lord" set apart in their corporate capacity to His service.

We notice further that the epistles are directed to the whole company of the baptized, and not to the true members of the invisible Church alone—"To all that are in Rome, beloved of God, called to be saints." "The Church of God which is at Corinth, with all the saints which are in the whole of Achaia." "The saints which are at Ephesus," "at Philippi," "at Colosse." "The elect who are sojourners of the Dispersion." They are all saints and elect in the same sense as was Israel of old, they are the true circumcision, "God's elect, holy and beloved" (Col. iii. 12). Under these titles we find admonitions addressed to baptized children regarding obedience to parents (Eph. vi. 1; Col. iii. 20), and avoidance of sin (1 John ii. 1); they are assured that their sins have been forgiven (the perfect tense is used denoting that the effect of forgiveness is abiding, they have been and therefore still are forgiven), and it is assumed that, having thus become children at the time when their sins were

forgiven, they "know the Father" (1 John ii. 12, 13). It is also incidentally manifest, as the unquestioned belief of the Church, that the children of even one Christian parent were to be considered "holy" (1 Cor. vii. 14). Not only are children included under the term "saints," but it is evident that the designation covers many who were far from deserving this title in a subjective sense. This is specially noticeable in the Epistles to the Corinthians. In these we find the clearest recognition of the baptismal bond in the case of persons who were guilty of offenses which are wholly inconsistent with the Christian character. The whole Church is composed of "saints"; they are "God's husbandry," a vineyard of His planting; they are "God's building," resting upon the one "Cornerstone" (Eph. ii. 21, 22); they are "the temple of God," in which the Spirit of God dwells; they are "washed, sanctified, justified"; their "bodies are members of Christ," "temples of the Holy Ghost"; to sin against the weakest member is to sin against Christ. Yet of some of those so addressed the apostle says that they are "carnal"; that they "defile the temple of God," making their bodies members of a harlot; that they are guilty of sins of impurity that would shock the heathen; that they are dishonest in business (1 Cor. vi. 8, 9); that they deny the resurrection of the body and give way to epicurean license (1 Cor. xv. 12, 32); they are shamefully ignorant of God (verse 34) and grossly profane the most solemn ordinance of Christianity. The prophets dwell more elaborately upon the sins of apostate Israel, and use more vigorous language, but they do not accuse the degenerate children of Abraham of more flagrant violations of their sacred covenant obligations than we find this Church of the saints charged with by the apostle of the new dispensation.

We need not pursue our argument further. The "Church Visible" and the "Church Invisible" may be a convenient distinction for polemical purposes, but there is only one Church of God on earth recognized in Scripture, namely, that founded in Abraham and continuing to the end of time, entered, under the old economy, by the rite of circumcision, and under the new by the sacrament of baptism. Those who are members of that Church are special objects of the divine love and solicitude. They are recipients of spiritual blessings up to the measure of their capacity to receive them. They are under holy bonds which they cannot break until, by wilful rejection of their birthright, they wipe from their brows the covenant sign and fall from the grace of their baptism, to their own everlasting undoing.

St. John, N. B.

T. F. FOTHERINGHAM.

VI.

THE NEW TESTAMENT ACCOUNT OF THE BIRTH OF JESUS.

FIRST ARTICLE.

EVERY narrative, of whatever kind, is itself a phenomenon of history, and as such in an age of science requires an explanation. In the case of a narrative which claims to be historical, either one of two general lines of explanation may be followed. In the first place, the narrative may be regarded as really based upon facts; so that the genesis of the narrative is to be explained chiefly through the facts. Or, in the second place, the narrative may be regarded as false; in which case the genesis of the false ideas must be explained. If the supposed facts are difficult of explanation, whereas it is easy to see how the false ideas could have been developed and embodied in the narrative, then we pronounce the narrative untrustworthy. But if, on the other hand, the facts are easy to explain, whereas it is difficult to see how the ideas, if false, ever could have been developed and embodied in the narrative, then we pronounce the narrative trustworthy. So in order to determine whether any particular historical narrative is trustworthy or untrustworthy, we must balance the difficulty of explaining the facts and their transmission against the difficulty of explaining the origin of the ideas if they were not determined by facts.

It is evident that the New Testament account of the birth of Jesus professes to be a narrative of fact. Nor is there, so far as means of transmission are concerned, any improbability in supposing that the claim is a just one. In the narrative of Luke, there are certain indications that point toward Mary as the channel of communication. She it is to whom special revelations are made, she it is whose inmost thoughts are described, and she it is who could have had the best possible knowledge of the events. She would also have had abundant opportunity to communicate the story to the early disciples, either directly or through the company of women described in the latter course of the Gospels. In the case of Matthew's account, Joseph seems rather to be indicated as the channel of communication—at any rate he could have been such a channel.

So if the facts are real, the explanation of the rise of the narratives is, in general, if not in detail, an easy task.

Therefore, we may examine, first, the hypothesis that the narrative is to be regarded as a copy of the facts, reserving the alternative hypothesis for subsequent discussion. Is the narrative near enough to the facts to be a copy of them, and if so, can the facts themselves be reasonably explained? If the facts are extremely unlikely, then only enormous difficulty in explaining the narrative without reference to the facts could force us to this explanation of the narrative through the facts.

1. The external attestation.

The New Testament account of the birth of Jesus and of related events is contained in Luke i. 5-ii (with Luke iii. 23-38) and in Matt. i, ii. This account is therefore contained in two of the New Testament books, whose attestation is so strong as to make it practically impossible that they were written after the close of the first century, and exceedingly probable that they were written very much earlier. Nor is there any external evidence really worth considering to show that these Gospels did not originally contain the accounts of the birth. These accounts appear in all the Greek manuscripts, in all the ancient versions and in the *Diatessaron* of Tatian (omitting the genealogies). It is true that Cerinthus and Carpocrates and a class of Jewish Christians did not believe in the virgin birth, and did not accept those portions of the Gospels which supported that doctrine; but it is pretty evident that their action was motivated by dogmatic rather than historical considerations. Even if it is held that heresy in the early Church was, in most cases, a tenacious holding to the ancient simplicity in the face of the developing theology of the Church, yet this does not affect the narrower textual question now under discussion. It may be perfectly true, for example, that a certain class of Ebionites were not mistaken in regarding the natural birth of Christ as the correct and original belief; yet it is evident that their omission of the opening chapters of Matthew and Luke was not textually justified. Perhaps the Ebionites were right in refusing to assert that the virgin birth was a fact; in any case, there is no good reason to suppose that they were right in omitting the account of that supposed fact from their copies of the first and third Gospels.* Marcion's rejection of the first two

* Usener (*Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen*, I, 92f., 98f., etc.) is of a different opinion. He maintains that the ancient heretics, who belonged to a time when the Gospels were not yet fixed, bear witness by their doctrines to the state of the Gospel tradition at the time when they wrote. Thus, for example,

chapters of Luke shares in the low estimate which is to be attached to his other numerous alterations of the text of the New Testament books.* As Harnack says, Marcion felt himself to be a reformer, and so the principle† that heretics become heretical only because they faithfully maintain conditions beyond which the main body of the Church has since the separation advanced, is certainly, in his case at least, not to be applied.‡

One other supposed testimony to an original form of Luke's Gospel which did not contain the first two chapters must be mentioned for the sake of completeness. In 1902, Conybeare§ called attention to the fragments added to the two manuscripts (both from the year 1195) of the Armenian translation of Ephraem's *Commentary on the Diatessaron*. These manuscripts, which, Conybeare believes, represent widely separated texts, both add to the *Commentary* various fragments, which are attributed to Ephraem. One of them—a brief account of the manner of writing of the Gospels—contains a notice about Luke, which Conybeare translates as follows: *Lucas autem initium fecit a baptismo Ioannis, sicut primum de carnalitate eius locutus est et de regno quod a Davide, et deinde quidem a Abrahamo incepit*. This notice, Conybeare supposes, was found by Ephraem at the end of the *Diatessaron*, and, since it follows the more ancient tradition in various particulars, is very old. The text and the interpretation of the latter part of the notice about Luke are exceedingly uncertain, and this might seem to suggest the notion that the text is corrupt in the first clause; but Conybeare insists that the reading "baptism" could never have arisen if the reading "birth" had been original. With regard to this point we should certainly not be too positive, but it does not seem altogether impossible that a scribe

if Carpocrates did not hold the doctrine of the virgin birth, it was not because he mutilated the Gospels, but because the Gospels that he knew contained no account of the virgin birth. But Usener has failed to take account of the evidence in its entirety—for example, he seems to have ignored Aristides and Ignatius. As witnesses with regard to textual questions, they are of far more value than those heretical thinkers who, from all that we can judge, would presumably be more influenced by the requirements of their systems. As Harnack remarks, Usener, in his zealous investigation of the Gnostics, seems almost to forget that there was in the second century such a thing as a Catholic Church. Why should we look to the Gnostics to establish by indirect means the literary development of the Gospel tradition, when we can establish it directly through the writings of the Catholic Church?

* For a very different estimate, see Usener's section on the Gospels of Marcion and Luke, *op. cit.*, 80f.

† Usener, *op. cit.*, I, 14.

‡ Harnack's criticism of Usener, *Theolog. Literaturzeitung*, 1889, 205f.

§ *Zeitschrift f. d. neut. Wissenschaft*, 1902, 192f.

might have been confused by the notice about Mark which immediately precedes, and thus might have been led to change the unusual phrase "birth of John" to the more usual one "baptism of John." It must be borne in mind that Ephraem's copy of the *Diatessaron*, without the slightest doubt, contained the first two chapters of Luke, so that if Ephraem appended the note in question to his *Commentary*, or left it as he found it at the close of the *Diatessaron*, he must have done so without observing its real meaning. It seems more probable to suppose that the corruption of the text of the notice extends further than Conybeare thinks; but if not, it is possible that the note was written by one of those heretics who, as we have already observed, did not accept the first two chapters of Luke. In any case, it cannot be said that this notice, existing only in manuscripts of the year 1195 and there attached to a work of the fourth century, carries us back to the fact of an addition to the third Gospel, which, if made at all, was made early in the second century; especially since we can point to circles where such an idea about the Gospel arose at a later time from dogmatic considerations, and whence the notice in question might have come. We conclude, then, that there is no external evidence of any account to show that the Gospel of Luke ever existed without the first two chapters.

But our proof of the early date of the accounts of the birth is not indirect and negative merely. We are not forced to rely solely on the argument that the chapters under discussion are firmly fixed in the first and third Gospels, that these Gospels have early attestation, and that therefore the chapters are early. On the contrary, there is the strongest kind of evidence for the early use, not only of the first and third Gospels in general, but of those very parts of the Gospels which contain an account of the birth.

For the virgin birth—the most remarkable thing narrated in the chapters under discussion—was part of the firmly fixed Christian belief at a very early time. In the first place, it formed part of the original "Apostles' Creed" (though expressed in slightly different words from those we use to-day), which arose, according to Harnack, about 150 A.D., according to Zahn, certainly not later than 120. And even aside from the question as to the origin of the Creed as a whole, more or less fixed and creed-like statements of the virgin birth—statements pointing to what Harnack calls "an Eastern Christological *μάθημα*"—can be detected in early writers.*

* The evidence for the early knowledge of the virgin birth has been admirably collected in convenient form by Gore in *Dissertations on Subjects Connected with the Incarnation*, 41ff.

It is beyond dispute that Irenæus gave to the virgin birth a place in the rule of faith, at least in so far as he had any definite rule of faith at all. As to Justin Martyr, Hillmann* has raised objections, not, indeed, to the fact of Justin's testimony, but to the manner of it. He says that Justin is evidently a pioneer in the support of the virgin birth, because he regards as Christians (*ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡμετέρου γένους*) those who deny the doctrine (*Dial.*, 48). But how else would you expect him to speak of those who accepted Christ as the Messiah, though holding a peculiar view of the manifestation of His Sonship? In other words, how else could he express the idea of "heretic" as opposed to "unbeliever"? And to hold that Justin regarded the virgin birth as something uncertain or unimportant is to run counter to the large number of passages (both in the *Dialogue* and in the *Apology*) where it is mentioned as one of the fundamental facts about Christ.

That Aristides believed in the virgin birth is attested by the Syriac and Armenian versions as well as by what remains of the original Greek,† and it is probable that the phrase "born of the Virgin Mary" found a place in his creed.‡

In regard to Ignatius, it would seem that the two passages, *Eph.* xix. 1, καὶ ἔλαθεν τὸν ἄρχοντα τοῦ αἰῶνος τοῦτου ἢ παρθενία Μαρίας καὶ ὁ τοσετὸς αὐτῆς ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ θάνατος τοῦ κυρίου· τρία μυστήρια κραυγῆς, ἅτινα ἐν ἡσυχία θεοῦ ἐπράχθη, and *Smyrn.* i. 1, ἀληθῶς ὄντα ἐκ γένους Δαβὶδ κατὰ σάρκα, υἱὸν θεοῦ κατὰ θέλημα καὶ δύναμιν θεοῦ γεγεννημένον ἀληθῶς ἐκ παρθένου, were sufficient. Hillmann, however, by a process of reasoning, arrives at the conclusion that the author did not know Luke i. 34, 35, iii. 23. The author, he says, in *Eph.* xviii. 2, xx. 2, and *Smyrn.* i. 1, regards Jesus as begotten (1) ἐκ σπέρματος μὲν Δαβὶδ, (2) πνεύματος δὲ ἁγίου. This can be explained only on the Adoptionist view, for the generation from the seed of David cannot be regarded as coming through Mary, since in the first passage it is parallel with πνεύματος δὲ ἁγίου, and since in *Trall.* ix. 1 ἐκ γένους Δαβὶδ is regarded as distinct from ἐκ Μαρίας. Now, even if we admit that Ignatius regarded Mary as not of the tribe of Judah (which does not seem to me to be clearly proved by the passages cited above), it does not follow that because he then derived Jesus' Davidic descent through Joseph, he did not know Luke i. 34, 35, iii. 23. For if those passages stood where they stand to-day, the very same supposed contradiction was present in the first part of the third Gospel as is present in

* *Jahrb. f. protest. Theol.*, 1891, 255f.

† J. Rendel Harris, *The Apology of Aristides*, 78.

‡ Harris, *op. cit.*, 25. Cf. Swete, *The Apostles' Creed*, 44ff.

Ignatius. Ignatius simply took over the two sides of the account in Luke without reflection. That this view of the matter is correct is made perfectly evident by the fact that Ignatius in the two passages quoted above distinctly states the virginity of Mary—a fact which nullifies the inferences of Hillmann. Without sufficient reason, Hillmann regards the phrase *γεννημένην ἐκ παρθένου* (*Smyrn.* i. 1) as an interpolation; *Eph.* xix. 1 (which Swete calls the classical passage) he does not mention at all. Swete calls attention to the fact that the testimony of Ignatius is made more valuable by the nature of his argument. He is arguing with Docetics, and is urging against them the reality of the birth of Jesus. It would, therefore, have suited his purpose to point to the natural birth; but instead of this he says in effect that, though of course supernatural, the birth was yet real. So there is nothing against the statement of Harnack that “Ignatius has freely reproduced a ‘*kerugma*’ of Christ which seems, in essentials, to be of a fairly definite historical character, and which contained, *inter alia*, the Virgin Birth, Pontius Pilate, and the ἀπεθανεν.”*

We have thus traced a firm and well-formulated belief in the virgin birth back to the beginning of the second century. The question at once arises whether the accounts of Matthew and Luke were the sources of that belief. Some kind of an argument might be derived from the manner of statement of the doctrine in the early patristic writers, but this would not be absolutely convincing, for example, in the case of Ignatius. However, the decision is made very probable by the following considerations. It is just this virgin birth which is most urged as necessitating a late date for Luke i, ii; Matt. i, ii, or certain portions of those chapters—indeed, if it were not for the virgin birth, probably those chapters would, in view of the great weight of manuscript attestation, have passed unchallenged as original parts of the Gospels. But it is just this virgin birth which we have shown to have been accepted as a fundamental fact so early as the days of the Apostolic Fathers. At the beginning of the second century, then, the first and third Gospels were used, and the virgin birth was accepted. According to a great weight of manuscript evidence, the virgin birth found a place in those Gospels. The conclusion is at least a natural one that the Christians of that time derived their belief in the virgin birth from the account of that birth which is so firmly fixed in the Gospels, or at any rate that they derived the belief partly from those Gospels. If, as seems to be

* Herzog, *Realencyclopädie*, 3. A., I. 751. *The Apostles' Creed*, E. T., 59f.

possible, for example in Justin, an extra-canonical source was also used, any argument for the trustworthiness of our canonical accounts is rather increased than otherwise, since another testimony is added to the two that we already possess. If the extra-canonical source was itself the source of our two accounts, then by it we are carried still further back. Our accounts are demonstrably old; if a still older account containing the virgin birth was used along with them at the beginning of the second century, then we have worked back very near to the time of the supposed facts. If the early writers enumerated above used only some account different from our account, then it is still significant that just that element in our accounts which has met with most objections was a firmly fixed part of the Christian belief at the beginning of the second century. But there is practically conclusive evidence that these early writers did know our accounts, and this fact, coupled with the evidence of the manuscripts and versions, leads to the conclusion that Matt. i, ii, and Luke i, ii, were parts of the original Gospels, and were therefore written in all probability before 80 A.D. This conclusion may be shaken by internal considerations, but they must be considerations of great weight if they are to overcome such an array of external evidence.

2. Thus far we have exhibited the external evidence which goes to show that the New Testament account of the birth of Jesus was written at a time when authentic tradition as to the facts might still have been available. We now turn to the internal evidence bearing upon the trustworthiness of the account.

In the first place, it may be well to see if the account itself gives us any evidence which will enable us to penetrate beyond it. The most obvious fact in this connection is that we have two narratives of the birth of Jesus. What is the relation between them? The hypotheses that one is a source of the other, and that they have a common source, might seem to be out of the question, if we did not, as a matter of fact, have before us attempts to prove them.

Pfleiderer,* choosing the former position, believed at one time that Matthew used Luke's poetical composition and presupposed a knowledge of it on the part of his readers; and that Matthew was therefore able to take for granted the acceptance of the virgin birth, which Luke had been obliged laboriously to introduce and support; but that he changed Luke's material to suit his own purpose: thus, for example, the account of the Magi is a story invented to typify Luke ii. 31 ("a light for revelation to the Gen-

* *Urchristentum*, I. A. 480f.

tiles"), the star especially being a sensible counterpart of Luke's indefinite "light." This whole theory is beset with such obvious difficulties that it is not at all surprising that Pfeiderer has himself abandoned it.*

Recently there have been several attempts to indicate a common source for the infancy narratives. One of these—that of Conrady—we need not consider at this point; for Conrady undertakes to show that both our accounts are derived from the so-called *Protevan-gelium of James*, which he thinks is a work of pure invention. His treatise, therefore, is an attempt to explain our narratives without the help of the facts, and so belongs to the second part of our discussion. At present we shall confine our discussion to an examination and criticism of the view that the narratives are what they are, only because the facts were what they were. When we come to the the other view of the narratives, we shall criticise that as well.†

The other attempt to exhibit a common source for the birth narratives of our Gospels is that of Resch.‡ He thinks that this common source was a סֵפֶר הולדות ישוע המשיח, written originally in Hebrew after the plan of the Book of Ruth (and so provided with a genealogy), and translated afterward into Greek; that from this family history, the first Evangelist took those portions which suited his purpose of exhibiting events as the fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy; that afterwards the third Evangelist made use of the rest of the book, but was pressed for space (owing to the exigencies of ancient book-making), and so was obliged to omit what had already been narrated by the author of Matthew, as well as to condense what he was actually able to relate. The differences to be observed in Justin are due, in Resch's opinion, to Justin's use of a different recension of the source, while the pro-

* Pfeiderer, *Urchristentum*, 2. A. II, 550f., now accepts the suggestion of Hillmann and others that Luke i. 34, 35, is an interpolation. So even if Matthew did know Luke, the earlier Gospel (about which point Pfeiderer is no longer at all certain), it does not follow that he acquired from it the idea of the virgin birth. In general, Pfeiderer abandons the theory that Matthew's infancy narrative is in any way dependent upon that of Luke. There is something suggestive in Pfeiderer's change of view. If the new interpolation theory about i. 34, 35, could be proven false, would Pfeiderer, on the supposition that the virgin birth was not a fact, be forced back again into the insecure position we have just been discussing? However, there are, of course, many other things besides the interpolation theory which have led Pfeiderer to shift his ground. All this would belong, properly, to the second part of our discussion.

† The less fully developed theory of Reitzenstein may best be treated in connection with that of Conrady.

‡ *Das Kindheitsevangeliem*. Gebhardt-Harnack, *Texte und Untersuchungen*, X, 5.

logue to the fourth Gospel, as well as even the apocryphal Gospels, are thought to preserve for us certain isolated readings of the original writing which but for them would be lost. In support of this theory Resch urges the following considerations:

(1) The title at the beginning of Matthew's account, *βίβλος γενέσεως, Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*. A brief narrative of forty-two verses could not be called a "book," whereas if we put Luke i, ii, and Matt. i, ii, together we have a writing about the size of the Book of Ruth.

This argument ignores the very probable view that *βίβλος* refers merely to the genealogy—a view which the parallels in Genesis seem at least to suggest, even though, according to the usage there, this would be called the book of the generations of Abraham, rather than of Jesus. The noun in the genitive indicates the main purpose of the genealogy, hence, perhaps, the change in usage. In any case, it is extravagant to claim that we can say just how large a *βίβλος* had to be. Furthermore, even though we could show that the title stood originally at the head of a larger work, it does not follow that the rest of that work was occupied by the narrative at present contained in Luke.

(2) The character of the extra-canonical recensions.

To criticise the details of this argument would be too great a task for the present occasion, since Resch has amassed a great number of interesting citations from the early patristic literature and the apocryphal gospels; but in general it may be said that, in the first place, he attributes too much importance to variations which might well be due to careless citation, and in the second place, he has not shown with sufficient clearness why the phenomena must be due to just the particular cause which he assigns. It may be true, for example, that Justin used some extra-canonical source; but it has not been proved that that source was a recension of the hypothetical *Book of the Generations of Jesus Christ*.

(3) The points of contact, with regard to matter, between the two accounts. But these, so far as they go, might be explained by the basis of the two narratives in a common series of facts.

(4) The Johannine Prologue shows evidence of being a philosophical reflection on the original source, which was, however, used in an extra-canonical recension.

An examination of the supposed parallels (pp. 243ff.) will show the insufficiency of this argument. One of the most striking parallels is obtained only by means of the at least doubtful reading in John i. 13, *ὅς . . . ἐγεννήθη*.

(5) The habits of the two authors account for their choice of

matter. But the purpose of Luke to give only what was left, and to give it as briefly as possible, will hardly account for the particular wording of ii. 39.

(6) The two narratives exhibit linguistic affinities, and the differences may be accounted for by supposing that the first Evangelist broke in upon the original form of the source more than did the third Evangelist.

But an examination of the linguistic parallels on pp. 26, 27, leads to the opposite result from that sought by Resch, for the parallels consist merely of commonplaces; and where anything more than a commonplace is observable the difference is far more noticeable than the similarity. In general, it may be said that the difference in character between the two narratives is enough to destroy Resch's hypothesis. Matthew is terse and prosaic in form even where the subject would naturally lead to a more elevated style, *e.g.*, the story of the Magi. Luke, on the other hand, moves in a region of simple and fresh, but exalted poetry. It will not do to say that the original book was simple and dignified in the narrative portions, and flowing and poetical where poetry was demanded; for there are narrative portions in Luke's account, which yet exhibit the same contrast in style as against Matthew, as may be seen even in the Magnificat. On the whole, in view of the audacity of the attempt to reconstruct the original Hebrew of the source, and in view of the enormous weight of evidence which would be required to prove the contention, it is not at all surprising that Resch has remained the sole defender of his Hebrew *Book of the Generations of Jesus Christ*.

It seems, therefore, reasonably clear, on the hypothesis that the narratives are based upon historical traditions, that there was no common written source of the two widely diverging accounts. But we are not altogether debarred from attempting to trace a little further back the history of the ideas presented in our narratives. Zahn* makes such an attempt, on the basis of Luke and Matthew taken separately. He says, in the first place, that Luke, writing to assist the faith of the Gentile Theophilus, would include in his Gospel only those things which were generally held throughout the Christian congregations—an argument which perhaps takes too much for granted for our present purpose. Zahn's argument with regard to Matthew† is much more remarkable, although at the same time much more doubtful. He says it is clear that, as Mat-

* *Das apostolische Symbolum*, 58f.

† Cf. J. Weiss, *Theologische Rundschau*, 1901, 159, and Wernle, *Syn. Frage*, 189, 190.

thew's purpose throughout his Gospel is distinctly apologetic and polemic (see especially Matt. xxviii. 11-15), so it is polemic also in this first section—polemic against the Jewish slander to the effect that Jesus was a son of dishonor, silencing the slander, first, by the citation of prophecy to show that what had given offense is really a holy work of God, and, secondly, by the fact that Joseph had openly recognized Mary as his wife before she bore her eldest son. The polemic character of these first two chapters appears, also, Zahn says, in the genealogy. The women so singularly mentioned have all something shameful about them, at least to a Jew, even Ruth being a Moabitess. Matthew's argument, therefore, according to Zahn, is that if the Jews did not take offense at these dark spots in the history of the house of David (admittedly the bearer of the promises), neither ought they to take offense at the stain upon the birth of Jesus, even admitting it to be a fact; Jesus might still be the Messiah. Now this polemic, Zahn argues, proves that the opposing view was widely spread among the Jews at the time when Matthew wrote; and as every one [except Haeckel] admits, that Jewish view was a caricature of the original Christian report about the supernatural conception, the view that the two opinions stood in the reverse relation being clearly excluded. But in order that there may be a caricature, the thing caricatured must be well known; therefore, in order to allow time for all this, the belief in the virgin birth must have been widely current long before our Matthew was written.

The argument is perhaps ingenious rather than sound. In the first place, it is very doubtful whether the author who had chosen the lofty way of refutation represented in i. 18-25 would ever have descended to admit, even for a moment, and for the sake of argument, that the mother of the Lord might have shared in the disgrace connected in the popular mind with such names as Tamar and Rahab. And then, it is very doubtful whether the women mentioned in the genealogy are mentioned because of the disgrace connected with them, rather than simply because their names called up something remarkable in the line of descent. Finally, and most important, it may be objected that Zahn's theory must always remain a mere supposition. For, according to Hilgenfeld, we have no mention of that Jewish slander against Christ supposed to be combated in Matthew until the year 130, and the reference there is extremely doubtful. Indeed, the story is not mentioned even in Justin Martyr, as we should certainly expect (with Hilgenfeld) if Justin knew of it, and becomes prominent only in Celsus about

180 A.D.* It seems, therefore, extremely unlikely that the slander arose in the period between the crucifixion and the composition of Matthew, especially since the doctrine of the virgin birth does not seem to have been part of the earliest Christian preaching and therefore could not have been caricatured so early by the Jews. We therefore reject the attempt of Zahn to show by this particular line of argument the existence of a general Christian belief in the virgin birth long before the composition of Matthew. But we do not therefore by any means weaken our opinion that the doctrine of the virgin birth must have originated at a very early date. For the very independence of the two narratives, coupled with their agreement in the essential fact, shows that the two lines of tradition—so far as we can judge from objective considerations—must have begun to diverge at a very early time. Indeed, the suggestion is not an unnatural one that the lines began to diverge at the facts themselves—the two narratives being based upon the accounts of different eye-witnesses.

Thus far we have tried to trace back the accounts of the birth as far as possible, and then, merely from general considerations, to penetrate behind them to the tradition upon which they rest.† But we have pursued the investigation just as we should in the case of any historical narrative—we have taken no account of difficulties arising from the peculiar content of the particular narrative now under discussion. We must now examine the narratives themselves more in detail. What objections are to be opposed to the external evidence already considered?

The first thing to be noticed is, naturally, the miraculous character of many of the events narrated—indeed, the very sum and substance of the whole account is a miracle. Now, of course, for probably the majority of those who deny the essential truth of the narratives, the presence of miracle settles the matter at the outset. A miracle cannot be true; the narratives are suffused with the miraculous; therefore the narratives are false, be the origin of the falsification easy or difficult to explain. Such a position we cannot now attempt to refute. For we freely admit that in order to prove that miracles are possible and have actually occurred the virgin birth is not the place to begin. We are thoroughly in agreement with Peter and Paul, who began rather with what could be supported by direct and ample testimony—the Resurrection. The miraculous, further-

* Hilgenfeld, *Zeitschrift f. wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1900, 271f.

† To this latter discussion we shall return, from another point of view, in the second article.

more, must be supported by an argument which far exceeds the limit of bare testimony. For there is a presumption against every miracle which hardly any testimony will overcome. One might not believe a hundred men of the highest character and intellect if they told him that a man had arisen from the dead. But it is different if they tell him that Christ has arisen from the dead. He knows he is a sinner; he knows there is a righteous God; he knows he needs a tremendous event to save him, for a tremendous cure is needed for a tremendous ill; Christ is offered as the Saviour. That He should rise from the dead seems to be not impossible, for great as is the event, there is an adequate occasion for it. Our investigator is thus favorably disposed in this case for the reception of the direct testimony. It is only with men who at least see the force of some such reasoning that we now argue—men who are ready to accept a miracle, if the occasion and the testimony are sufficient, but who have some particular difficulties about the particular miracles contained in the accounts of the birth of Jesus.

These particular objections to the miracles of our narratives may be classified as occasioned either (1) by the angelic appearances or (2) by the virgin birth.*

(1) Against the angelic appearances it is urged that they exceed the limits which even supernatural revelation may allow itself. The extended conversations and especially the name "Gabriel" are objected to. Two lines of defense may be pursued. In the first place, we may say with B. Weiss that the form of the revelations is supplied by the author, who preserves, however, the essential truth. Or (with more reason as it seems to me) we may point to the conditions under which the revelations were made. It is perfectly true that angelic appearances in the twentieth century would be eminently out of place, and so, contradictory to the grave, unsensational spirit of revelation. But if we suppose, as is not unlikely, the existence in Israel just before the time of Christ of a circle of pious *πρωχοί* who were not contaminated by the prevailing formalism and corruption, but kept their faces turned steadily toward heaven in simple, childlike faith that Jehovah would yet fulfil His ancient promises; if there were really in Israel shepherds like the shepherds of Luke and saints like Symeon and Anna (and their existence seems presupposed by the later history), then the angels do not seem so unworthy of a God who adapts His revelations to the needs and capacities of His creatures.

Connected with the objection to the angels is the objection to

* Resch, *op. cit.*, 325.

the narrative of Luke because it is poetical. The fact we freely admit—indeed, even Conybeare credits the author with “a very pretty fancy”[!][—]but we refuse to draw any derogatory inference. The narrative may well be both true and poetical—especially if, as we have just tried to show, the poetry is largely in the facts themselves. Indeed, Prof. Briggs, for example,* suggests that the sources of the narratives were actually poems, and yet attributes to these sources a high degree of historic value.†

(2) The virgin birth is objected to (a) because it is not adequately attested, and (b) because, so far from there being any adequate occasion for it, it is positively detrimental to Christian doctrine.

To the second of these objections (referring to the occasion for the miracle) we cannot attribute so much weight as is sometimes done. True, the principle is a correct one, that the reality or non-reality of a miracle must be determined very largely by the occasion. But we must distinguish between the importance of the event and our understanding of its importance. If we admit that Christ was a supernatural person, we do not have to be able to explain the special reason for every one of His miracles in order to believe that the miracles really happened. The virgin birth, being connected with Christ, has an adequate occasion. The fact may well be enormously important—in view of our profound ignorance as to the origin of every human soul, to say nothing of the Incarnation of the Son of God—even though the futile physiological and psychological speculations with regard to its exact meaning have not brought us any nearer to the truth. Surely the Incarnation, if it was real, was an event stupendous enough to give rise to even the greatest of miracles.

Yet the question cannot be dismissed without a few words, even in a purely historical discussion. For if it be shown that the Church has made a mistake in including the virgin birth in the Creed; if it be shown that the doctrine of the virgin birth is not one of the fundamental facts of Christianity, so that without it the Christian religion could exist unimpaired; then one argument for the doctrine has been removed. For there is a great weight of evidence from Christian experience which goes to show that Christianity is essentially true. The question is whether we have to run counter to all this evidence if we deny the fact of the miraculous conception. You cannot quite get rid of the theological question, therefore, even in discussing the question of history.

In order to show a proper occasion for the virgin birth, it is not

* *New Light on the Life of Jesus*, 161ff.

† Cf. Box, *Zeitschrift f. d. neut. Wissenschaft.*, 1905, 95f.

necessary, as is so often assumed, to prove that this miracle was necessary to the divine Sonship of Christ in any sense that confuses His eternal Sonship with the conception by the Holy Ghost, or that it was necessary to His sinlessness. Indeed, the derivation of the sinlessness of Christ from the virgin birth is, as has often been pointed out, inconsistent. For if the law of heredity could not be suspended by the Spirit of God, then the only logical result would have been the immediate creation of the human body of Christ independent of both parents; for if sin is necessarily handed down by the ordinary course of generation, then the human motherhood of Mary is enough to carry on the taint. Yet the virgin birth is a great doctrine for all that, its importance being exhibited by history from the second century on into the twentieth. For the account of the virgin birth is the great testimony to the absolute miraculousness of Jesus throughout His whole life. If the virgin birth is a fact, then Christ did not grow up into His divinity—He is divine in a far higher sense than that. This doctrine is therefore the great obstacle in the way of the Adoptionists of all ages and of all shades of opinion; it is something to be gotten rid of not only by Cerinthus but also by all his modern followers. Perhaps we cannot see but that Christ *might* have been a miraculous person even if He had been born outwardly in the ordinary way; but if He was born in the way described in Matthew and Luke, then He *must* have been a miraculous person.*

We have tried to show that, rightly considered, the virgin birth is of enormous importance to Christian faith, so that there is ample occasion for the miracle. It is next in order to consider the actual testimony, which we shall most conveniently do in connection with the general question of the trustworthiness of the whole account.

Since, however, we desire to be as fair-minded as possible in conducting the inquiry, it may be well, by way of preface, to make a few remarks in exposition of what we conceive fair-mindedness to be. For, strange as it may seem, there is apparently a good deal of confusion afloat with regard to the matter. For example, we object most strenuously to the identification—widely prevalent in some quarters—of “apologetic” with “unscientific” or even “dishonest,” especially with regard to questions of harmony. If you have judged beforehand that any defense of a thing must necessarily be false, then the only truly scientific and impartial attitude would be to deny everything. If, however, you listen patiently to the

* For some suggestive remarks on this subject, see *Church Quarterly Review*, October, 1904, 207ff.

defense of theories which destroy the trustworthiness of a narrative but stigmatize as necessarily untrue any defense of "harmony" or of what may be called the "conservative" position, then you have been anything but fair-minded. Again, fair-mindedness does not require or even permit us to regard our accounts of the birth as fallen from the air, to be judged solely according to the inherent likelihood or unlikelihood of the events narrated—a principle which is apparently ignored by Soltau,* who seems to think he has made an important utterance when he says that "The murder of the infants at Bethlehem, . . . as well as the strange appearance of the Magi on the scene, would certainly not have been believed if it had not been the Evangelical recorder who related them." Of course they would not, but then, as a matter of fact, it was the Evangelical recorder who related them, and his testimony is worth more (on any critical view) than the testimony of a man, for example, who wrote ten centuries later. True impartiality does not consist in deciding every question in entire disregard of everything else. In order to judge impartially the narratives of the birth, we must keep in mind the results of related investigations. It is fully as great an offense against scientific method to refuse to hold presuppositions founded upon proven fact as it is to insist upon holding presuppositions founded upon fancy. Therefore, in discussing the trustworthiness of the accounts of the birth, we must remember that they are firmly united from an early time to two very ancient books which admittedly possess very considerable historical value. On such testimony we ought to be inclined to admit as historical many things which we should reject if the testimony were not so strong. This much we regard as justifiable presupposition. On the other hand we must regard as a false presupposition, based on theory rather than fact, the statement of Soltau that all records in the first and third Evangelists which are not derived from the "two definitely established sources are of eminently slighter trustworthiness." For (aside from the question of the truth or falsehood of the two-document hypothesis) it would be necessary for Soltau to demonstrate the unity of those portions of the gospels not derived from the two sources in order to involve the accounts of the birth in any supposed untrustworthiness attaching to the other fragments. On Soltau's theory, the Evangelists used some trustworthy documents as well as some untrustworthy ones. We ought not to connect the accounts of the

* *Die Geburtsgeschichte Jesu Christi*, E. T., 6, 7.

birth with the latter class, rather than with the former, until we have carefully examined the accounts themselves.

After these preliminary remarks, we proceed to examine the special objections which have been urged against the trustworthiness of our narratives. These objections may conveniently be classified as follows: (1) inconsistency with well-attested history; (2) inconsistency with the other New Testament literature; (3) inconsistency within the birth narratives themselves.

1. Under the first head some objection has been made to the slaughter of the innocents at Bethlehem, on account of the silence of Josephus; but the argument from silence is not conclusive, and it has been pointed out that the massacre is quite in accord with the character of Herod during his later years. A far more serious objection is that against the census of Luke (Luke ii. 1ff), a discussion of which would be beyond the scope of the present paper as well as beyond the ability of the writer. We refrain from this intricate chronological question with the better conscience because we do not believe that it has such a vital connection with our subject as is sometimes assumed. If, indeed, it can be proved that the whole census passage is an invention in order to change the place of birth to Bethlehem, then, indeed, the trustworthiness of the narrative will be seriously impaired. But it is just this that has not been proved. On the contrary, it seems unlikely that the author should have put all this imperial machinery in motion, and thus exposed himself to easy refutation, in order to accomplish what might have been easily accomplished by a simpler expedient and one which would perhaps have been less ignominious to the Messianic king.* Nor is the census passage to be explained as an invention of the author by appealing to the tendency of Luke to bring the facts of Christianity into connection with events of the Roman empire, for that very purpose could not have been attained unless the events related about the empire were authentic and could thus command general recognition. There are thus grave objections against regarding the census as a mere invention of the author or redactor. If, on the other hand, the note about the census is conceived of as the result of a mere blunder, we need not necessarily give up the general trustworthiness of the account. It all depends upon the nature of the blunder. If there never was and never could have been any census which might have brought Joseph and Mary down to Bethlehem, or rather which might have been one motive for their journey, then the attack upon the narrative at this point is a serious one. But in view of the ten-

* Gore, *op. cit.*, 20.

acity with which the Jews held to their real or supposed family trees, it does not seem impossible that an enrolment based upon genealogical principles might have been held; and the narrative does not preclude the supposition that the actual execution of the decree was carried out in Judæa under Jewish auspices. If, however, Luke has merely made some blunder such as placing the first governorship of Quirinius a few years too far back (*i.e.*, at a time when Saturninus was really governor), it does not seem reasonable to draw any very serious conclusions about the trustworthiness of the whole infancy narrative—especially if, as is very probable, the chronological note is an addition made by the author or redactor of the whole Gospel. In general, it may be said that the archæological researches of Ramsay and others have at least made it clear that our knowledge about the official history of the Augustan age has not been (and probably is not yet) so complete as to warrant us in using too confidently the argument from silence. It will not be worth while to notice here the various specific attempts to solve the difficulty—some of them are not at all unlikely, though no single one of them can be firmly established as correct. At any rate, these attempts have shown that the difficulty might not be insoluble if we had more information. Meanwhile, it does not seem unfair to regard the census passage as neutral with regard to the question of the trustworthiness of the account—at any rate, as affording no decisive evidence on the negative side. The question must be settled on the basis of other considerations.

2. It is objected further that the infancy narratives are in disagreement with all the rest of the New Testament literature, in which not only are the minuter incidents of our narrative not referred to, but even the virgin birth and the birth in Bethlehem are not mentioned. From all that we could learn from the rest of the New Testament, it is argued, Jesus was born at Nazareth, of Joseph and Mary; while some passages seem even to exclude the virgin birth.

In the Gospel of Mark, and in Matthew and Luke outside of the first two chapters and the genealogies, there is probably no allusion to the virgin birth; indeed, in Mark vi. 1, Nazareth is evidently referred to as the *πατρίς* of Jesus; in Mark vi. 3 His brothers and sisters are mentioned—all of which, however, is not inconsistent with the infancy narratives. That the Spirit should be said to be the source of Jesus' miraculous power (Matt. xii. 28) is inconsistent with His activity in Luke i. 35 only on a very mechanical view of the Spirit and of His activities. Furthermore, Holtzmann's objection at

this point is based upon a false view of the meaning of the descent of the Spirit at the baptism. More serious, perhaps, is the argument from Mark iii. 21, 31ff. where Jesus' kinsfolk are represented as thinking Him mad, and His mother is included among them, if ver. 31 is to be connected with ver. 21. The latter point is not certain, but even if it be granted, the mother might have been overpersuaded by the brethren, as Swete suggests. Or, more probably, we should have to think of another case of her failure to understand. She might have had the announcement from the angel, and thus been led to expect a great career for her Son—yet His actual conduct must have seemed strangely inconsistent with what she had expected of the Messiah (compare the doubts of John the Baptist). The objection that Christ would not have spoken about His mother as He does in iii. 31ff. if she had been so highly favored of God as is implied in the fact of the virgin birth is, of course, frivolous. It is remarkable that Mark has *ὁ τέκτων* in vi. 3, as against *ὁ τοῦ τέκτονος υἱός* in Matthew xiii. 55 (cf. Luke iv. 22, *οὐχὶ υἱός ἐστιν Ἰωσήφ οὗτος;*). If there is any reference here to the virgin birth,* then there can be no question but that the form of the statement in Matthew is the original one, for of course the scoffers did not know of the miracle. The form in Mark would rather be a correction made by the Evangelist to prevent misunderstanding from the absence of an account of the birth in his Gospel. But it is, after all, far more likely that the form in Mark is due to the fact that Joseph had died.†

In the fourth Gospel, Jesus is called the son of Joseph not only by the Jews (vi. 42), but also by Philip (i. 45); He is regarded as coming from Nazareth (vii. 41); His brothers did not believe on Him (vii. 5). Yet in no case is a suitable occasion indicated for correcting these opinions, supposing them to be false, for that Jesus should describe the manner of His birth in opposition to false ideas would be out of all harmony with His established methods, and furthermore, could give rise only to suspicion, not to faith. Beyschlag lays stress upon the objection that the statement in John i. 31, 33, *καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ᾔδειν αὐτόν* is inconsistent with the intimacy of Mary and Elisabeth as described in Luke i; but the objection is not necessarily fatal. If John was in the desert until the time of his public appearance, he may well have never seen Jesus the Galilean, and exactly what he would have been told is merely surmise. The view of Soltau that "throughout

* As Hilgenfeld, *Zeitschrift f. wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1901, 317, and A. Wright, *Synopsis*, Introd., xli, xlii, suppose.

† See Meyer-Weiss on the passage in Mark.

the Johannine writing there prevails what might be described as a polemical attitude toward those who will only believe in Jesus on condition that He is a son of David and a native of Bethlehem" is without a shadow of evidence.

In general we may conclude that the virgin birth was, according to the Gospels, not generally known during the lifetime of Jesus; indeed, was not known even within the circle of His neighbors and kinsfolk. On the other hand, there is no satisfactory evidence to show positively that Jesus Himself or His mother did not know it; for even if they had known it, they could not be expected to correct the current impression. It was not the habit of Christ to reveal sacred mysteries to those whose hearts were hardened.

As to the Evangelists themselves, we should not expect that Mark would mention the virgin birth even if he knew it, since he is concerned to give only the events of the public ministry of Jesus—things which formed the basis of the earliest preaching. Luke and Matthew would not need to express themselves again on the matter if they included in their Gospels the infancy narratives giving a full account of the event. But how is it with John? The Prologue might be interpreted in three ways: as presupposing the virgin birth (Zahn), as containing a polemic argument against it, or as saying nothing about it one way or the other. The verse especially referred to is i. 13. It has been suggested that the author urges against the view that Jesus was born in a peculiar way the consideration that all Christians may be said to be born "not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." Schmiedel* has suggested this view of the matter only to reject it, for, he says, the meaning of the verse is simply that in the case of the elect it is not their human birth that matters so much as their election. We are thus led to the view of Zahn that ver. 13 presupposes the virgin birth.† According to Zahn, John means to say in vers. 13, 14, that what is true of the new birth of the children of God is true of the real birth of Christ. Thus the reading of Irenæus and Tertullian and of some Latin authorities, $\delta\varsigma \dots \epsilon\gamma\epsilon\lambda\lambda\eta\theta\eta$, though not original [as Resch supposes], yet exhibits a proper sense of what is the true meaning of the juxtaposition of ver. 13 and ver. 14a. Such an interpretation, however, attributes to the Evangelist a confusion between the spiritual and physical spheres, or rather an elaborate parallel between them, which, if intended, would have to be more clearly indicated. Furthermore, there is a good connection between

* *Encyclopædia Biblica*, Art. *Mary*, ¶ 10.

† *Op. cit.*, 62f.

ver. 13 and ver. 14a other than that suggested by Zahn. In ver. 13 the two spheres—the heavenly and the earthly sphere—are contrasted, and this leads the author to speak in ver. 14a of the descent of the Logos from the heavenly to the earthly. Ver. 14 describes the connection formed between the two spheres, by means of which the new birth described in ver. 13 is made possible. We must conclude, therefore, that, although the interpretation of Zahn is possible, it is not proved. On the other hand, the objection that the pre-existence of the Logos excludes the virgin birth is even more unprovable. In the Prologue, then, John does not clearly imply the virgin birth, though his exalted doctrine of the Incarnation seems rather to favor some such event than to exclude it. How explain his silence? It should be noticed that some of those who deny the early date and historicity of the birth narratives in Matthew and Luke yet feel constrained to put the fourth Gospel still later, so that the temporal relation between the two is the same as upon the most “conservative” view. For these critics, therefore, the silence of John is a problem as well as for those who accept the virgin birth, and they can only say with A. Sabatier* that, whereas the other Evangelists did not mention the virgin birth because they did not know of it, John did not mention it because he had something better, *i.e.*, the doctrine of the Logos. Now if the two doctrines were exclusive of each other, then we should have here what Schmiedel calls a “tacit rejection” of the virgin birth by the fourth Gospel. But if the two doctrines cannot be shown to be inconsistent, then there is a sense in which we can heartily accept Sabatier’s statement of the matter. John omitted in his Gospel what had already been related in the others. Accordingly, he omitted the account of the birth, and went on to speak of what had not been touched upon by his predecessors, *i.e.*, the preëxistence of Christ. It is therefore true that he omitted the virgin birth, if not because he had something better, at least because he had something more. Again, if the purpose of his Gospel was to bring forth testimony (xx. 31), it is natural that he should not mention the virgin birth, for from the very nature of the case it never could and never can be a proof that Jesus is the Son of God. In the Apocalypse, chap. xii seems to show a knowledge of Matt. ii, but the matter is not at all certain, and the relation has even been reversed.

In Acts, the speeches of Peter and Paul would indicate that the virgin birth was no part of the earliest missionary preaching; but to regard these speeches before hostile or uninstructed audiences

* *Enc. des Sciences Religieuses*, Art. *Jésus Christ*, vii, 363.

as fine opportunities for mentioning the virgin birth is to stifle the historical sense.*

In Paul, Rom. i. 3 and Gal. iv. 4 are the *loci classici*, and have been claimed with equal futility as involving the virgin birth and as excluding it. In Rom. i. 3, 4 (τοῦ γενομένου ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυὶδ κατὰ σάρκα, τοῦ ὀρισθέντος υἱοῦ θεοῦ ἐν δυνάμει κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγίωσόνης ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν), it is claimed that since Paul is contrasting the earthly physical life of Jesus with His heavenly life after the resurrection, if he believed in the virgin birth, it would not have been true to say that Christ was born of the seed of David according to the flesh. The Spirit would have had a part even in His physical life. But is this not an over-refinement? Paul is simply saying that Christ took upon Himself the form of a man—that is just as true on the theory of the virgin birth as on the opposite theory—and that in so far as He was a man, He was of the seed of David. In Gal. iv. 4 (γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικός, γενόμενον ὑπὸ νόμον), it is absurd to expect Paul to say γενόμενον ἐκ παρθένου, since the matter in hand is the likeness of Christ to men, not His difference from them.† On the other hand, Zahn is claiming too much when he argues that if Paul had not known the virgin birth, it would have served his purpose far better, according to Jewish ideas, to have mentioned not the mother but the father. For “born of a woman” is just a paraphrase for “human,” as the commentators prove, especially from Matt. xi. 11.

As to Paul's doctrine, it can hardly be used one way or the other with any degree of certainty. How preëxistence is incompatible with the virgin birth it is difficult to see. If anything, it rather favors the doctrine. The comparison of Christ with the second Adam might seem to suggest something in the nature of a creative act to correspond with the creation of Adam.‡ In general it may be said that while Paul's doctrine agrees better with the virgin birth than with a birth from Joseph and Mary, yet he does not say anything definite one way or the other. With regard to his silence, it is of great importance to notice that, in general, “his epistles are almost exclusively occupied in contending for Christian principles, not in recalling facts of our Lord's life.” Where Paul does relate facts of Christ's life (1 Cor. ix. 23ff., xv. 3ff.), he does it in so purely incidental a way as to suggest that he actually knew a great deal more than he tells in his Epistles.§

* Against Hillmann, *op. cit.*

† Zahn, *op. cit.*, 64.

‡ Gore, *op. cit.*, 11.

§ Gore, *op. cit.*, 10ff.

The net results of our examination, therefore, are the two propositions: (1) that the New Testament, outside of the infancy narratives, does not affirm the fact of the virgin birth, and (2) that it does not deny it. In order rightly to understand the significance of this we must ask the question whether the spread of the report about the virgin birth might have taken place in a way consistent with this silence. If the virgin birth were true, must it have been mentioned in any place where as a matter of fact it is not mentioned?

Let us suppose the narratives of Matt. i, ii, and Luke i, ii, to be substantially correct, and ask ourselves what we should expect the course of development to be. According to those narratives, there were only two persons who at first knew of the virgin birth—Joseph and Mary—nor is there any record that they confided in any one else. The report of the shepherds (Luke ii. 20) and of Anna (Luke ii. 38) need not have reached a very wide circle, and like the visit of the Magi (in which case there were special reasons for silence), took place in Judæa, far from Nazareth, the subsequent home of the family, and several years before their return. It has been further suggested by Ramsay that fear of Antipas may have been a special reason for silence after the return.* Probably Joseph died before Jesus reached maturity, in which case Mary was left as the sole keeper of the secret. True, this "secret" is denounced as an apologetic expedient, but a little exercise of the historical imagination will remove the odium. One great fault of the treatment of this subject is that too little account has been taken of the personal equation. For it seems hardly in accord with the character of Mary, as it is painted in such distinct colors in the infancy narrative of Luke (the truth of which we are assuming for the sake of the argument), that, after she had undergone experiences of the most mysterious kind and had submitted to a command which ran counter to every instinct of her soul, she should proceed to engage in idle gossip about the matter, thereby subjecting herself to the blackest slander. Some women might have done so; the Mary who "kept all these sayings pondering them in her heart" certainly would not. There is every reason to suppose that she would keep the secret even from her younger children—or, rather, most carefully of all from them. So the years went by, and He who was to rule over the house of Jacob forever continued to labor at a carpenter's bench until the time of His majority had come and gone. Must not the miraculous events of

* *Was Christ Born at Bethlehem?* 76.

thirty years ago have come to be to Mary like a wonderful dream? Must not her faith have undergone a terrible trial? And then when her Son did come before the nation, how different was His coming from what she had pictured to herself! It does not seem at all surprising that, like John the Baptist, she should have been puzzled, and should have begun to wonder whether she had interpreted those far-off mysteries aright. But she learned like the rest, and after Pentecost had come, and the little company of Christians were praying together, comforted by the Spirit whom Jesus had sent, she must have continued to ponder over all those things, though in a far different spirit. Then, at last, within the little circle of believing and sympathetic women or near friends, she may have been led to breathe things too sacred and mysterious to be spoken to mortal ears before. These things were, of course, not reported at once to the official governors of the little Church, like the progress of the daily collections. Still less were they included in missionary sermons, where the great effort was to adduce facts which could be testified to by all, and where the humble woman's mystery would have brought forth nothing but scorn and slander. And so, perhaps supplemented by a long-hidden family register, the marvelous tale of the Mother of the Lord found its way gradually into the Gospel tradition and Creeds of the Church, and into the inmost hearts of Christians of all centuries.*

Like Beyschlag (with regard to his own very different theory), we do not say that it was thus; we only say that so it might have been. If the infancy narratives were true, the silence about them in the Gospels and in the Acts does not involve any psychological impossibility. The silence of the other books has already been explained.

3. Lastly, it has been suggested that inconsistencies in the birth narratives themselves destroy any belief in their trustworthiness.

We shall examine for a moment, first, the alleged inconsistencies between the two accounts. We may safely pass over without much discussion such objections as those of Usener, that "the divinity[?] of Christ is attested in Luke by the angel's words to the shepherds and the song of the heavenly host, in Matthew by the appearance of the star in the East; the new-born Messiah receives his first adoration in Luke from the shepherds, in Matthew from the Magi."† The obvious answer in the former case is that there might be more than one attestation of the divinity of Christ; in the latter case,

* See Ramsay, *op. cit.*, 73ff.; Sanday, *Hastings' Bible Dictionary*, Art. *Jesus Christ*, II, 644; Gore, *op. cit.*, 12ff.

† Usener, *Encyclopædia Biblica*, Art. *Nativity*, § 4.

after the word "first" (for which there is no warrant in the accounts) has been removed, a similar answer might be made. It is objected with more show of reason that "Joseph's home in Matthew is Bethlehem, in Luke Nazareth." But it should be noticed that Matthew does not expressly say that Joseph's home was Bethlehem before the birth of Jesus; indeed, the mention of Bethlehem in ii. 1 rather than in i. 18 might possibly suggest that the facts were otherwise. Very likely, however, it suggests nothing at all. For the story about the Magi (Matt. ii), the place (Judæa) and the time (while Herod was alive) were of vital importance. Hence what look like local and chronological data about the birth of Christ (Matt. ii. 1) are probably only incidents in the narrative of the wise men. Not very serious is the objection of Beyschlag that if Mary had had such a revelation as is recorded in Luke i. 30ff. she would have repeated it to Joseph; so that he would not have been ignorant of the true cause of Mary's pregnancy, as is implied in Matt. i. 19. On any adequate view of the character of Mary, she might be expected to do anything rather than speak of the mystery to her betrothed husband.

Most formidable, perhaps, is the objection that, according to Luke, the family returned to Nazareth forty days after the birth (Luke ii. 39); whereas in Matthew they are represented as still in Bethlehem a considerable time (perhaps two years) after the birth, and as then obliged to flee into Egypt. In answer we first suggest the order of events which seems to do most justice to the narratives, and then ask whether the narratives cannot be harmonized on the basis of such an order. The order we suggest is (1) Birth, (2) Adoration of the shepherds, (3) Presentation, Circumcision, etc., (4) [Return to Bethlehem], (5) Adoration of the Magi, (6) Flight to Egypt, (7) Return to Nazareth. Now it is perfectly evident that neither one of our evangelists or of their sources knew of such an order of events (Luke ii. 39, Matt. ii. 23). One explanation is, that each writer had only limited material at his command, being left ignorant of much that the other relates and of still more of which we have no record at all. Are the narratives such as to preclude the view that each author used his sources faithfully in the main, though, here and there, in working up the narrative, he may have used terms of expression which he would not have used if he had known more? We believe that they are not. For example, suppose the author of the chapters in Luke had in his sources the account of the birth, the shepherds, the presentation, etc., and then in addition merely the notice of the life in Nazareth. In working this material up into a narrative, what more natural than that

he should join two parts together by the use of the sentence in ii. 39? Even in a modern work, unless, perhaps, of the most strictly scientific character, such a mere copula would hardly be objected to as going beyond the established data. Similarly, suppose Matthew did not have any note that the former life of Joseph and Mary had been in Nazareth, but only the account of Joseph's suspicions, etc., without mention of the place, and then the notice of the place of birth. Under such circumstances, Nazareth in ii. 23 would be new to the reader, and so would naturally be mentioned merely as "a city." As for the cause assigned in Matthew for withdrawing to Galilee, the supposition that Joseph and Mary had settled in Bethlehem after the birth is by no means worthy of the contempt with which it is treated. Of course, it is only a suggestion, to show that perhaps some of the difficulties may be due to our lack of knowledge.

We conclude, then, that the alleged contradictions between the two accounts, being really only contradictions between the statement of one account and the silence of the other, destroy a belief in the trustworthiness of the accounts only if you maintain that in order to be trustworthy the accounts must form a complete and orderly life of Christ. Such a copula as Luke ii. 39, even if many events came in between, is quite in accord with the methods of arrangement prevalent all through the Gospels.

Now if this is a correct view of the matter, we have not only answered objections but also adduced positive evidence for the trustworthiness of the narratives. For we have clearly shown that the accounts, though not seriously contradictory, are absolutely independent of each other, so that they furnish a double witness for those things (and they are not unimportant) which are common to both.* It has even been argued with a good deal of plausibility that in various little ways the narratives actually explain and supplement each other. For example, on the basis of Luke's narrative alone, it is difficult to see how Mary could accompany Joseph to Bethlehem when she was only betrothed to him; so that ἐμνηστευμένη, the correct reading in Luke ii. 5, is explained by Matt. i. 24, 25. It may, however, be objected that if, as we have suggested, the accounts in Matthew and Luke go back to eye-witnesses, the eye-witnesses could only have been members of the same family, so that the very difference in the things chosen for narration (to say nothing of actual contradictions) is proof of the untrustworthiness of the

* See Resch, *op. cit.*, 18.

accounts.* To this we reply that the difference may have arisen not so much from the source as from the destination and purpose of the stories. The family of Jesus may well have been led, for example, to tell the things relating to the early persecution to one set of hearers who happened to be interested in that, and the things of a more private character to another set. And perhaps the matter was a little more complicated in the course of a brief line of transmission.

We come now to the alleged inconsistencies within each narrative taken separately. It is urged, in the first place, that Mary could not have failed to understand the adoration of the shepherds (Luke ii. 19), or of Symeon (Luke ii. 33, *θαυμάζοντες ἐπὶ τοῖς λελουμένοις περὶ αὐτοῦ*), or the answer of the boy Jesus (Luke ii. 50), if she had already received the revelation recorded in Luke i. 30ff. and undergone the experience there prophesied. Here we reiterate what we have already said about the character of Mary. It is preposterous to argue that Mary may have found nothing puzzling and mysterious about the events in the life of her remarkable child; about the strange words of the shepherds and of Symeon, and about the yet stranger answer of the quietly obedient child. A modern scientific mind might have had the whole thing reasoned out beforehand on the basis of the data already given; but the people of those days were not scientific. If we are going to enter into the realm of psychology at all (and we do so only to repel objections), all we can say is that it is perfectly in accord with the mental habits of the time, and especially with a quiet, incommunicative, simple character such as Mary's is represented to be, that she should keep "all these sayings, pondering them in her heart"; that she should marvel at "the things which were spoken concerning him"; and that she should not understand "the saying which he spake unto them."

A much more important objection is that Jesus is, in the infancy narrative of Luke itself, as well as elsewhere (see Acts ii. 30), regarded as the son of Joseph (*e.g.*, *γυνεῖς*, ii. 27, ii. 41; *πατήρ*, ii. 33).† These expressions are, indeed, perfectly natural as indicating merely the adoptive relation, especially as Jesus was actually born in Joseph's house and was at once acknowledged as his son. But more serious is the consideration that in Luke i. 27 and in the genealogies (*cf.* Luke i. 32) the Davidic descent of Jesus seems to be traced through Joseph. This has been denied, so far as the Lukan genealogy

* See Beyschlag, *Leben Jesu*, I, 150.

† *πατήρ*, in ii. 48, is not in the same category, being the word used by the mother to the boy Jesus.

and Luke i. 27 and Luke i. 33 are concerned, by B. Weiss, but his view is maintained only by a very questionable exegesis of Luke i. 27 as well as of the genealogy. It may be held as a private and pious opinion that Mary was also of the house of David (such an opinion is not excluded by the fact that she was a kinswoman of the Levite Elizabeth, Luke i. 36), and for this a good deal may be adduced, but it can never be proved from the narratives themselves. We see, then, two propositions lying side by side in the accounts of the birth: (1) Jesus is heir of the Davidic promises because He was the son of Joseph, (2) Jesus was not begotten by Joseph but of the Holy Ghost. It is hardly to be doubted that in the early Church these two propositions were both held by the same persons, viz., by the authors or redactors of the genealogies, who wrote Matt. i. 16 and Luke iii. 23 in their present form. Unless, therefore, the infancy narratives have suffered interpolation (which requires special proof), the most natural supposition is that the writers of those narratives, like the writers or redactors of the genealogies, held to both propositions—the supernatural conception and the Davidic descent through Joseph. Now if it be discovered that the two propositions are in point of fact contradictory, though the authors did not see it, then, of course, one or the other must be false, so that the narratives are not, as they stand, trustworthy. But if the two propositions are not actually contradictory, but only very difficult to harmonize (and the testimony of the writers themselves is very valuable in favor of this view of the matter, since they were better acquainted than we with ancient conditions), then the fact that the writers have made no attempt to harmonize, but have simply set down the two sides of the truth as they were handed down to them, is the best possible indication of their trustworthiness. Are the two propositions absolutely contradictory?

In attempting to answer this question, we do not for a moment try to slur over the difficulty. Indeed, we freely acknowledge that just at this point we lay our finger upon the really fundamental objection to the virgin birth, for it must be admitted that according to modern ideas, if Jesus was not the actual son of Joseph and if Mary was not of Davidic descent, then Jesus did not fulfil the conditions of the Messiah. Be it remembered, however, that the promises were made not to modern persons, but to Jews, and the promise is fulfilled if the fulfilment corresponds to the expectations of those to whom the promise was made. So in the first place, it ought to be noticed that, according to Jewish ideas, the line of descent had to be traced through the male side; this would explain why, even

if Mary had been of the house of David, still the Davidic origin of Joseph would, to Jews, have been of vital interest. Furthermore, there is evidence that among the Jews "ideas of genealogy were," as Gore expresses it, "largely *putative*," as is shown, for example, by Levirate marriage. Jesus, born of Mary and acknowledged by Joseph her husband, was Joseph's heir, and hence heir to the throne of David. But I venture to think we can go still further. E. P. Badham* has advanced the theory that the apparent contradictions in the birth narratives are explicable only on the view that the writers supposed Jesus to have been actually begotten of Joseph, but without his conscious instrumentality and in a supernatural way by the divine agency (*ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος ἁγίου*). We, of course, concur in the general rejection of this bizarre theory, yet we venture to believe that there is an element of truth in it which has been often neglected. Too often the conception from the Holy Ghost has been treated exactly like an ordinary conception, so that it is at once assumed that the relation between Joseph and Jesus was adoptive pure and simple. Rather ought we to consider that the conception of the Holy Ghost lifts the whole matter into the realm of the extraordinary and miraculous and mysterious, where rash affirmations should be avoided. I am not at all sure that we can say with certainty that Jesus was not, by the miraculous power of God, the son of Joseph and of David in some sense far more profound than at first appears. At any rate, we must remember that the relation of Jesus to Joseph was in any case far closer than that of an ordinary adopted child, in that Joseph was more truly an earthly father of Jesus than any other human being.

We have been answering objections. Let us now, before we leave this part of the discussion, pause for a moment to emphasize one or two of the positive considerations which make for the trustworthiness of the narratives. In the first place, the restraint of the narratives is very remarkable, in contrast, for example, with the apocryphal gospels where fancy had free play. In the second place, the character of Mary would have been exceedingly difficult to invent and, in general, the picture of the circle of pious *πρωχοί* among whom the events take place is finely suited to the later development, in exhibiting a starting-point for Christ's work.† In the third place, the delicate personal touches, pointing to Mary as the source of Luke's account and perhaps to Joseph in Matthew's account, could never have been produced artificially.‡ Finally,

* *Academy*, November 17, 1894.

† Resch, *op. cit.*, 321f.

‡ C. J. H. Ropes, *Andover Review*, XIX, 698.

the purely Old Testament character of the whole narrative could never have been invented in the later period. Especially would no later writer ever have invented prophecies like the prophecies of the Messianic King, Luke i. 30ff., which did not seem to have been fulfilled, or at any rate were not fulfilled in the sense originally understood.* And then the very difficulties of the account, especially those connected with such expressions as *γονεῖς* and *πατήρ* in view of the virgin birth, are an evidence that the author has followed fixed sources rather than allowed his invention free play, for in the latter case he could have smoothed out the rough places.

We have now arrived at the close of the first part of our discussion, namely, the examination of the hypothesis that the narratives are a true record of fact. Of course, we have not here demanded absolute verbal accuracy in the narratives, but rather have classed under this first head all opinions which explain the chief ideas in the accounts—notably the virgin birth—as due, not to myth or to invention, but to fact. If we keep in mind the strong external evidence and are unprejudiced with regard to the miraculous, we shall conclude that the objections against the trustworthiness of the accounts are not unanswerable. But it is, after all, useless to deny that there are difficulties, and grave difficulties. What we shall next have to consider, therefore, is the question whether there are not still graver difficulties against any view which explains the chief ideas in the narratives in some other way than as produced by the facts. Explanation there must be of one sort or the other.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

* Gore, *op. cit.*, 16ff.

VII.

REVIEWS OF

RECENT LITERATURE.

I.—APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

MAN AND THE INCARNATION: OR, MAN'S PLACE IN THE UNIVERSE AS DETERMINED BY HIS RELATIONS TO THE INCARNATE SON. By SAMUEL J. ANDREWS, Author of *The Life of Our Lord upon the Earth, Christianity and Antichristianity, God's Revelation of Himself to Men*, etc. 8vo; pp. xxvi, 309. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905.

"This book is written for those only who believe that Jesus Christ is the Incarnate Son of God, very God and very Man"; "and its object is to put the Incarnate Son, the God-man, in His central place in the Divine economy, as set forth in the Scriptures and in the Creed." In general conception it reminds us of Jonathan Edwards' *History of Redemption*, but it differs from it radically with respect to both its starting-point and its aim. It would give the history of revelation rather than of redemption, and it would find the motive for revelation in God's love for His creatures rather than in His regard for His own glory. In this Mr. Andrews seems to us to be distinctly in error. Of course, redemption reveals God. It makes known, and it was intended to make known, as nothing else could, "the unsearchable riches of His grace." But it is not scriptural thus to subordinate redemption to revelation. It is the crucifixion, not the incarnation, to which the Bible gives the central place. It is as "a lamb that had been slain" that the incarnate God is presented. Nor is it rational, even from the standpoint of revelation, that it should be otherwise. Grace could not be revealed by a scheme the chief end of which was revelation. God would cease to appear gracious, if His reason for becoming incarnate was that He might appear gracious. It would be love for Himself and not for His sinful creatures that He would thus manifest. It is just because the incarnation was both voluntary and for redemption that it can reveal as is claimed, and as it does, the infinite grace and condescension of our God.

So, too, to regard the manifestation of love as God's supreme end in "the Creation" is inadequate. Goodness is not His only attribute; and if it is not, why is it the only one the manifestation of which should be demanded by His moral excellencies? Moreover, it is not the only one that "the Creation" reveals or that it was intended to reveal. "What if God, willing to show His wrath, and to make His power known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction?" One who accepts the Scriptures, as our author does, is bound to reckon with teaching such as this.

Nor is Dr. Andrews' position as to the Scriptures consistent. He himself receives them unhesitatingly. It is to "the growing disbelief in the trustworthiness of the Bible" that he attributes "the partial disbelief in the Incarnate Son as the Living Head of the Church." But at the same time he underrates the

importance of the contest "going on to-day about the Bible, its inspiration and authority." It is not so near the truth that we believe in Christ because of the Bible as that we believe in the Bible because of Christ. He is the living and acting and teaching Head. The Bible is only "the record of what has been." This is so: but, on the other hand, we have no Christ but the Christ of the Bible; He Himself referred to the writers of the New Testament as those who should make Him known authoritatively, saying, "He that heareth you heareth me"; the Spirit whom He promised as the living ever-present Teacher of His Church would teach, He said, 'by taking of the things of Christ and showing them unto them'—not by making new revelations, but by interpreting and applying the Christ of the Bible. Our Lord, therefore, would seem to have assumed that it was infallible. Otherwise, would He have promised His Spirit, the Spirit of truth, to unfold and explain it, to *show* it unto you? Dr. Andrews is clearly right in supposing that distrust of the Bible has much to do with disbelief in the Incarnate Son, but he is clearly wrong in thinking that the infallibility of the Scriptures is not essential to their value as the testimony of Christ.

Dr. Andrews' view of humanity also seems to us open to criticism. He confuses what humanity is by nature with what it is to become by grace. It is true that "the head of the New Creation is the God-man," and that "through Him humanity occupies the highest place in the universe." But is it true that "humanity, being the creature-nature chosen by God to be the medium of Divine revelation through the Son incarnate," "is the highest of created natures?" The first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews would seem to give that honor to the angels.

There is much else in this interesting and stimulating volume to which we should like to call attention, notably that the earth is the centre of the universe, and thus far the only inhabited world. In taking this position Dr. Andrews sides with Mr. Alfred Russell Wallace and, indeed, refers for confirmation to the arguments of the latter. So, too, there is not a little in his interpretation of prophecy which is suggestive, if not always convincing. Indeed, while there is much in this discussion to which we cannot assent, we can scarcely recommend it too highly to the thoughtful reader. It is a fine piece of theological construction in a day when theological construction is rare; and it is theological construction which is based on and would build up out of the Bible as the Word of God in an age when almost all speculation on things divine consists merely of human fancies. From Dr. Andrews' exegesis and his conclusions from it we must often differ; but with his fundamental position, that the Bible is full of meaning, and that its meaning is the truth of God, we are in heartiest accord.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE THREE GREATEST FORCES IN THE WORLD, AND THE MAKING OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION. By WILLIAM WYNNE PEYTON, Minister of St. Luke's, Broughton Ferry, Forfarshire; Author of *The Memorabilia of Jesus*. Part I: The Incarnation. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1905. Small 8vo; pp. viii, 234. 3s. 6d. net.

The three great forces which have gone into the making of Western civilization, according to the author, are The Incarnation, The Crucifixion and The Resurrection. This volume treats only of the first. The author conceives the universe to be a system of social forces. Religion may be viewed thus, only it involves forces which are beyond the sphere of sense. In its widest interpretation, Religion is the human soul's response to the solicitations which come from the spiritual universe. Here is to be found the most potent and most important factor in the history of the Western World, and yet how few of the writers of that history have done it justice! The common account of the forces which have shaped Western

character and society is wholly one-sided. Witness Morley's account of the Puritan Age, with Cromwell as its hero; witness Froude's treatment of Calvinism; witness Matthew Arnold's *dilettante* handling of the Reformation; witness even Mr. Bryce's sole remark, in *The Holy Roman Empire*, namely, "It is on the religious life that nations repose," in which he sums up the true *rationale* of Christian history. Most historians make the mistake of calling products causes. Mr. Bryce finds the essence of the Reformation in one of its products, just as Gibbons' famous five causes were really five effects. Two honorable exceptions to this charge among historians the author allows, namely, Lecky, in his *History of European Morals*, and Benjamin Kidd, in his *Social Evolution* and his *Principles of Western Civilization*. It is maintained that to conceive of history only as a chronicle of facts is a grave mistake: "it is not so, it seeks first the discovery of the forces which shape facts" (p. 51).

Recurring to the generic idea of religion as the interaction of forces sensible and spiritual and as the responsiveness of the soul to unscen forces, the author leads up to the specifically Christian conception of religion. "Responsiveness to Christ reduces Christianity to its simplest terms, brings it into its nucleated essence. It is the axis on which revolve all the phenomena of modern history, both as evolution and regression, progress or regress. . . . The ethics of Buddha and Confucius is as high pitched as that of Christ. The morals of Stoicism was also on a high key. The distinction of Christianity is not in its mere morals. It is morals obtained in the medium of responsiveness to Christ. The worship of Christ gives a special character to the Western nations, and the originality of the social system—in morals, legislation, politics, philanthropy—is the product of it" (pp. 76, 77).

Thus we see the differentiating element of Christianity, having, however, its fundamental basis in common with all the religions. Mr. Spencer really has in mind the correspondence of the human with the Almighty Spirit when he talks about the most certain presence everywhere of an Infinite and Eternal Energy. Name that Infinite and Eternal Energy *Christ*, and Spencer's philosophy is sung in Cowper's "Jesus, where'er Thy people meet, There they behold Thy mercy seat"; and Keble's "Sun of my soul, Thou Saviour dear"; and Ray Palmer's "I see Thee not, I hear Thee not, yet art Thou oft with me." There is correspondence with Christ. But as the religious consciousness concerns itself with what lies beyond the sphere of sense, there must be some mediation between the sensible and the super-sensible—and this is *Incarnation*. There is nothing exclusively Christian in the idea of Incarnation; indeed, there is nothing exclusively religious in it, for as Incarnation is everywhere, so all things are religious. The author argues stoutly against the miraculous element in the Incarnation of Jesus Christ. Much is made of the late Prof. Huxley's words to the Dean of Wells, that "virgin procreation and resuscitation from apparent death are ordinary phenomena for the naturalist" (p. 135; quoted from Gore's *Bampton Lectures*, p. 246). The principle and proofs of parthenogenesis are strongly set forth, but we think the author goes far beyond the bounds of proper inference when he says, "Virgin birth in the human family is not a miracle in the sense commonly understood—that there is no known report or record of it; it is an actual working law in nature, of which we are only a part, but of whose laws we are illustrious illustrations. It is not supernatural in the sense that it cannot be conceived among the possibilities of nature; it is an ordered, regulating principle over wide ranges of life. It is not a physical miracle; it is a familiar function of physiology" (pp. 151, 152). Nevertheless, the author feels constrained to add, and the addition comes very near being a subtraction, "In so far as the human family is concerned, the most that you can say is that it (*i.e.*, this law) is in suspense. Nature is governed by use and wont, but in the spirit of them and not in the letter.

She takes pleasure in variation. The virgin birth of Christ is exceptional, and we shall presently see how this large Exception finds admission among other large exceptions in the scheme of nature, creating epochs" (p. 132). These epoch-making exceptions are, of course, Mr. Wallace's well-known three stages, namely, the appearance of vegetation, of sensation in the animal, and of consciousness in man. From all this, to be sure, it follows that the old familiar words "miraculous" and "supernatural" are out of employment, they are "counters of lost values." The argument thus indicated speaks for itself. The book is really a strong one. It deals not with generalities but with generalizations. It levels the altitudes of the supernatural to the smooth plane of naturalistic evolution. It Christianizes civilization and then naturalizes Christianity. Its implied apologetic is so concessive as to make it more of a task to argue clearly what we shall concede than what we shall maintain, what we are to give up than what we are to hold on to.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

HINDUISM AND CHRISTIANITY. By the Rev. JOHN ROBSON, D.D., formerly of Aginea; Author of *The Holy Ghost the Paraclete*, etc., etc. Third Edition. Edinburgh and London: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 1905. 8vo; pp. xv, 211.

In spite of the many books which have been written on Hinduism, "some dealing with the whole field, others with particular phases or localities," Dr. Robson's modest volume still supplies, in its almost wholly rewritten third edition, a want which no other book has sought to supply. It is the "introduction to the study of the religions of India." Brahminism, Buddhism, Mohammedanism, Jainism, Sikhism, the Brahma-Somaj, the Arya-Somaj—all are presented, in themselves, in their relations to each other, and especially in their contributions to the Hinduism of to-day. In each case this is done with so much attention to underlying principles and to practical results that though the book aims to be only an introduction to the religions of India, it gives an admirable account of each one of them. The differences between them are brought out with peculiar clearness, as, for example, in the case of Buddhism and Brahminism, by contrasting the philosophies on which they rest. Most happy, too, because most fair, is the comparison of Hinduism with Christianity, and the prediction of the ultimate triumph of the latter. The erudition and philosophic insight of the author are matched by the simplicity, clearness and vigor of his style; and a good index makes every item in the volume easily available. Were we asked to name the book which would help one the best to understand the religious situation in India, we should recommend first of all and at once Dr. Robson's *Hinduism and Christianity*. It is so popular that it must interest all; it is so scientific that no one could except to its statements; it is so philosophic that it will satisfy even the most thoughtful.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

II.—EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

BIBLE PROBLEMS AND THE NEW MATERIAL FOR THEIR SOLUTION. A Plea for Thoroughness of Investigation, Addressed to Churchmen and Scholars. By T. K. CHEYNE, D.Litt., D.D., Fellow of the British Academy, Oriel Professor of Interpretation in the University of Oxford, and Canon of Rochester. London: Williams & Norgate; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1904. Crown 8vo; pp. 271.

The "Crown Theological Library," of which this volume forms the eighth number, is a new propaganda of what in our modern nomenclature is miscalled

"liberal" Christianity. The most of the essays hitherto published in it are translations from the German and French of characteristic papers by such men as Friedrich Delitzsch, Harnack, Hermann, Pfeiderer, Lobstein, Réville, Sabatier. They give the series the appearance of an attempt to naturalize in lands of English speech the variety of "liberal" Christianity now so flourishing on the continent of Europe. An occasional paper of English authorship has, however, been included. Among these certainly none can put in a better claim to either representativeness or readableness than this sprightly essay by Dr. Cheyne. Were it only on the score of literary delight no one ought to miss anything which Dr. Cheyne writes. The fine patience with which he bears with the intellectual backwardness of the uninstructed multitude whom he considers it his duty to correct; the tender solicitude with which he chides his fellow-laborers in the field of Biblical criticism for their slowness of heart to believe all that this prophet has spoken; the depth of the interest which he exhibits in the religion which he makes it his business sedulously to undermine; the carefully chosen phraseology with which he gloves the hand with which he crushes; the childlike frankness with which he confesses his own great attainments and achievements, and congratulates the Christian world on its possession in these confused days of a guide to truth who unites within himself such clearness of sight, loftiness of aim, courage and tenderness—is it not all most engaging? When we add to these fascinations of manner the rich residuum of facts which the prudent reader may always strain out from Dr. Cheyne's imaginative constructions, and the stimulus which he is sure to receive from contact with so widely-read a scholar, it will be readily understood with what pleasure each succeeding publication of Dr. Cheyne's is received by a very broad public.

The present essay is an expansion of a lecture delivered before a society called "The Churchmen's Union," and is couched throughout in the tone of a heart-to-heart talk from a churchman to his fellow-churchmen, with whom he feels heartily at one in all that is of the deepest concern, though not perhaps insensible that it has fallen to him to become the leader of his brethren to a better outlook than may possibly at present obtain among them. He describes the task which he undertakes as "partly an exposition of new facts, partly a plea for a bolder style of Biblical criticism, justified and invited by those facts." This bolder Biblical criticism which he wishes to commend has its application not merely to the Old Testament, but also, and chiefly in this lecture, to the New. The new facts to which he appeals are the facts unearthed by recent Oriental archaeology. In effect the lecture is a plea for the employment of the results of recent research in the field of Oriental archaeology not merely to the elucidation but the reconstruction of the Biblical records—in both Testaments. Their bearing on the understanding of the Old Testament has been more fully recognized and therefore is here less fully entered upon: their bearing on the understanding of the New Testament it is therefore made the business of the greater part of the lecture to insist upon. "In short"—the lecturer himself thus sums up this part of his contention—"there are parts of the New Testament—in the Gospels, in the Epistles, and in the Apocalypse—which can only be accounted for by the newly discovered fact of an Oriental syncretism, which began early and continued late. And the leading factor in this is Babylonian." The purpose of the lecture may be, therefore, not unfairly described as an attempt to popularize the application of Pan-Babylonism for "accounting for" the New Testament as well as for the Old—although, of course, "Pan-Babylonism" must be understood here in no narrow sense, but rather, in accordance with Prof. Cheyne's effort to do justice to the entire range of recent Oriental investigation, broadly enough to include the entirety of ancient Shemitic culture.

The contention of the lecture with respect to the Old Testament is, in brief, that "it is a fact which cannot be argued out of existence that we have recently

acquired two new keys to the Old Testament, by which great problems are being brought nearer to a solution." One of these, he continues, "is furnished by a critical Assyriology, soon, we may hope, to be reinforced from South Arabia; the other, by a more methodical textual criticism." Why any one should attempt "to argue out of existence" such a fact as is here asserted, we cannot ourselves imagine. No one doubts the value of "a critical Assyriology" to Old Testament interpretation; and certainly one of the chief desiderata of Old Testament criticism is "a more methodical textual criticism"—for nothing has brought greater or more deserved reproach upon the reigning school of Old Testament textual criticism than its subjective arbitrariness. Dr. Cheyne is simply confusing in his thought the recognition accorded to "the two keys to the Old Testament" he instances, and the reception given to the use which he himself has made of these keys. The heartiest recognition of the value of "a critical Assyriology" "reinforced from South Arabia" is entirely consistent with a most decisive rejection, for both method and result, of Dr. Cheyne's attempt to apply what he deems the results already attained by these branches of investigation to the problem of the interpretation of the Old Testament. And the most convinced conviction of the clamant need of a "more methodical textual criticism" of the Old Testament, happily, need not commit us to the acceptance of Dr. Cheyne's textual criticism of the Old Testament: it may, on the contrary, be the very reason why we cannot accept Dr. Cheyne's textual criticism, either in methods or in results. There is much that Dr. Cheyne says about the textual criticism of the Old Testament with which we find ourselves in full agreement. We agree, for example, that the ascertainment of the traditional text or texts and the ascertainment of the true text are two different problems, and ought to be kept separate. We agree, moreover, that the ascertaining of the texts that underlie the Massoretic and the Septuagint transmissions is the prior duty, to which succeeds the further duty of "approximating as closely as possible to the true text" that lies underneath both transmissions. We agree, moreover, that much of the current criticism of the text is arbitrary and subjective and can lead us nowhither. We feel no impulse to demur to the declaration that further criticism of the text must take "account of Winckler's discovery of Muşri and Kûs in the inscriptions." But we should be sorry to think that this agreement in obvious principles would commit us to the acceptance of the new Bible which Dr. Cheyne has written on the basis of his Jerahmeel theory, or even of the new Psalms which he has produced by the help of a criticism which seems to us in its subjectivity and arbitrariness to surpass all that has gone before it—though that, of course, is saying a good deal.

The real purpose of the volume is to carry into the New Testament—somewhat *vi et armis*, it must be confessed—the "Pan-Babylonism" which has already become an old story in Old Testament criticism. Its fundamental thesis is that "facts of Oriental archæology (including mythology) may hopefully be brought into connection with the New Testament"; or, to be more specific, that "the form of the most peculiar and difficult New Testament statements can only be accounted for by the newly discovered fact of the all-pervading influence of Oriental and more particularly Babylonian and Persian systems of belief." When stated in this broad manner there is nothing, of course, in principle to be objected to this thesis. The New Testament writers were men of their time, and wrote, of course, in language and modes of statement formed under the influence of the ideas of their time. It would be strange if there were discoverable in their thought and speech no traces of systems of belief which could with any show of right be called "all-pervading." The mischief lies in Dr. Cheyne's definition of what he calls "peculiar and difficult New Testament statements," and his determination of the line which divides the "form" of these statements from their "essence." The particular "peculiar and difficult statements" which he adduces as illustrations of his thesis are the New Testament accounts of "the Virgin-birth of Jesus

Christ, His Descent into the nether world, His Resurrection and His Ascension." As the result of his discussion he suggests that "on the ground of facts supplied by archæology, it is plausible to hold that all these" "four forms of Christian belief" "arose out of a pre-Christian sketch of the life, death, and exaltation of the expected Messiah, itself ultimately derived from a widely current mythic tradition respecting a solar deity."

We must observe the slight difference in language between this last-cited proposition and the one formerly cited. There Dr. Cheyne spoke of the possibility of accounting for the "form" of certain "New Testament *statements*" from the influence of certain Oriental beliefs: now he speaks of these Oriental myths supplying an account of the "form" of certain "Christian *beliefs*." It is, in fact, the latter and far more serious proposition which his arguments are directed to justify. His contention is not that the New Testament writers tended to express the facts of the virgin-birth, the descent into hell, the resurrection, and the ascension of our Lord in language which had been formerly employed to express certain Oriental myths, and which therefore preserved a certain coloring derived from them. It is rather that Christians had already, when the New Testament was written, come through the influence of these myths to express their fundamental ideas in terms of a virgin-birth, descent into hell, resurrection and ascension. The fundamental ideas so expressed, therefore, have in themselves no implication of a virgin-birth, descent into hell, resurrection, ascension as actually occurring: these things all belong to the mythical form and are to be accounted for, not as things that really happened and are therefore recounted in the narrative, but as modes of conception inherited from immemorial mythological stories, running back, for the most part, to Babylon for their original forms. What the real nature is of "the essential Christian truths" which are enshrined in these mythical forms as in their "suitable caskets," and to which the faith "of the Christian is pledged," Dr. Cheyne indicates to us only with brevity—his main object in this lecture being to show whence the forms were derived, not what the substance is. In his most succinct statement he tells us that "the chief of them are,—the uniqueness of the personality of the Lord Jesus, and the immense worth of His act of absolute self-sacrifice; then, by inference, the indestructibleness of His personality, its perpetual redemptive capacity, and its identity with that manward aspect of the Divine Nature, so full of mingled grandeur and compassion, which by early efforts of theological thought acquired the names of the Messiah, the Son of God, the Word of God." It is only (or at least chiefly) these few starved and hunger-bitten dogmas that he recognizes as the substance of those "forms" of Christian belief.

Dr. Cheyne, of course, tells us that there is nothing disparaging to the Christian beliefs in his theory. He means, of course, the Christian beliefs he has just enumerated as "the essential Christian truths" enshrined in these mythological caskets. He would scarcely say that there is nothing in his theory disparaging to the Christian's beliefs of a virgin-birth, descent into hell, resurrection and ascension for Christ. At least those who will read, even with the best will, his equation of the Messiah and Michael and Marduk, and of the virgin-mother with the mother who was virgin only in the sense that she was not a wife, will scarcely credit that Dr. Cheyne supposes that there is nothing in his theory disparaging to the Christian belief in the virgin-birth of our Lord and Saviour. But these beliefs are in his theory not Christian beliefs, but only the forms in which the real Christian beliefs have become enshrined as men have sought to give them expression, limited as they were by the modes of expression accessible or familiar to them. If any chance still to look upon such beliefs as themselves "Christian beliefs," "essential Christian truths," which enter into the very fabric of Christianity (as all of the Lord's apostles did, and the Lord Himself as reported by them), why then, of course, he must recognize that the Christianity of which they are essential parts is shattered by Dr. Cheyne's theory. The most interesting part of Dr.

Cheyne's theory thus comes to be the conception of the essential truths of Christianity—of the nature, that is, of the Christian religion—which it embodies and, if it should prove to be sound, necessitates. These essential truths—we have already enumerated them—constitute in effect Dr. Cheyne's Confession of Faith. Do they constitute also Christianity? Certainly not,—as Christianity has been hitherto understood, whether by its founders, or its propagators, or its adherents. The upshot of Dr. Cheyne's theory, then, is that it offers us a new Christianity—a Christianity independent of such old forms of belief as the virgin-birth, the descent into hell, the resurrection, the ascension.

Is this new Christianity an improvement on the old Christianity? That is the great question. That is to say, for Dr. Cheyne. It is not an important question for the rest of us. For judging by the evidence that is here presented for it, it is not apt to become the Christianity of very many others, at least of those who are used to give a reason for the faith that is in them. But Dr. Cheyne's main interest, one would think, since this has become his Christianity, would naturally centre in the query whether this is an adequate Christianity. And one would think that, trained as he has been as a "Churchman," Dr. Cheyne might well cherish serious doubt on that point. The new Christianity he offers us is certainly not the Christianity one would expect from a good Churchman—whose professed creed is the Thirty-nine Articles, incorporating as they do "the Three Creeds"; and whose ordinary vehicle of public worship is the Book of Common Prayer. Of course, the modes of expression—and even the conceptions expressed—found in these documents may also be represented as mere "forms," quite as well as the modes of expression—and conceptions expressed—found in the Scriptures. But two questions will arise here—one for us, and one for Dr. Cheyne. We should ask where this interpretation of modes of expression and conceptions expressed as mere "forms"—husks concealing a kernel—is to end? Whether it may not be ultimately applied even to the essential truths of Christianity which Dr. Cheyne himself still enumerates as such? Dr. Cheyne should ask, and one would think should ask seriously, whether, if his representation be true, Socinianism has not at length won its tardy victory? For after all Dr. Cheyne's new Christianity is just old Socinianism.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRITICAL COMMENTARY. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Amos and Hosea. By WILLIAM RAINY HARPER, Professor of Semitic Languages and Literatures in the University of Chicago. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905. Pp. clxxxi, 424. \$3.00 net.

In the repleteness of the information which the author places at the command of his readers on these two prophecies from the northern kingdom, this book excels. The material, industriously gathered during fourteen years of incessant instruction in the classroom—it will be noticed that the President of the University of Chicago speaks in this volume as the Professor of Semitic Languages and Literatures—has been systematized and condensed until it has been brought within the limits of six hundred pages. Naturally no words have been unnecessarily used. The book is a marvel of compactness.

Of course the work is up to date. The writer possesses full acquaintance with recent investigations concerning the text and structure of the two prophecies, as well as the exposition of scholars of every generation. The author discovers more interpolations in the text than do Duham, Stade, Wellhausen and Cheyne: in Amos thirty-five verses or parts of verses out of one hundred and forty-six verses, and in Hosea fifty-one out of one hundred and ninety-seven, besides some slight emendations. But his additional excisions are of minor importance, and the rejection seems to be primarily determined by the requirements of the theoretical

strophical structure of the prophecies (see the comments on Amos iv. 7b, 8a; v. 18b, 22b; vi. 5, "like David"; vii. 1a; viii. 2a; Hos. ii. 6, 8, 9, 16, 17, 18). If the author's conception of the structure of these two prophecies is correct, then we must be prepared to acknowledge that Hebrew poets did not pour forth their words spontaneously, dropping almost unconsciously into parallel and rhythmic utterances through habit and temperament, but bestowed as great care on the strophical arrangement and the rhythm as modern poets give to meter. Not only is "strophic criticism" (p. clxix) an important method of recovering the original text, but naturally the theory of Israel's history current in the critical school to which the author belongs is regarded as determinative of the exegesis or the bearing of a passage. For example, a certain act is "not a violation of the law of the central sanctuary at Jerusalem (Deut. xii. 4-7), for that law had not yet been promulgated" (p. 91); and again, "for up to this time emphasis had not been placed in heart worship" (p. 133); and again, "for the sin-offering was unknown prior to Ezekiel" (p. 257). It is a cause of surprise that with the wealth of citation in which the author indulges, yet on these subjects the defense of the genuineness by such writers as Green (cited pp. 322, 406), Vos, Robertson has been overlooked. In this respect the book is not judicial.

The yield from the vast literature laid under contribution for light on matters philological, geographical, historical, exegetical, textual, has been admirably classified. The investigations of the ages have been placed before the reader in compact and orderly form. But it is here that the few formal defects of the work appear. 1. The material has not been fully digested; opinions being classified, but frequently left without discussion. Here again the work is not judicial. One often looks in vain for results to be reached or for progress to be made toward result. 2. In the effort after complete citation, absurd suggestions, sometimes dating from ages long before the rise of scientific philology and exegesis, are painstakingly classified along with explanations that are really worthy of consideration. 3. The book is overloaded with irrelevant material. On geographical names and on matters of archæology comprehensive articles, extending to a page or a page and a half in length, are introduced, to the distraction of the reader, instead of confining the remarks to matters pertinent to the references of the prophet. These articles belong to the Bible dictionary, not to the commentary. This feature is notably apparent in connection with the opening chapters of Amos, where geographical names abound. The volume might have been cut down by the omission of irrelevant matter, perhaps one-quarter, without sacrifice of anything pertinent to its problems and with a gain of space for the adequate discussion of the material.

We cannot close without mentioning the great value of the footnotes as an index to the literature on all points under consideration.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE TEXT OF THE BOOK OF HOSEA. By WILLIAM RAINEY HARPER, Professor of Semitic Languages and Literatures in the University of Chicago. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1905. Pp. 51. Price, \$1.00 net.

This brochure is a necessary companion to the author's commentary on *Amos and Hosea*. It offers a Hebrew text and an English translation which embody the results of the textual criticism of the prophecy of Hosea. Its more novel feature is its reliance upon rhythm and strophic structure for the recovery of the original form of this prophecy. Unquestionably uniformity of movement and flow of words are criteria which have their place in the establishment of the primitive text of a piece of Hebrew literature so poetic and elegant as is the prophecy of Hosea, for the Hebrew poet was not wont to offend against rhythm. Still his

ear and his feeling for music were perhaps not exactly ours; and he doubtless understood and employed the effect upon hearer and reader of interruptions to the even and regular flow of utterance. Rhythmic criticism must be cautious, and neither mechanical nor based on individual sensitiveness for form and measure. In the present instance the work has been done with thoroughness, patience, ingenuity and care, and with constant reference to the suggestions of others. It is a finished product of rhythmic, strophic criticism. The form of the prophetic word has undoubtedly been improved in symmetry and rhythm, when judged by the norm of modern Western taste.

To secure this result the author has frequently rearranged the text. For example, the whole of chapter ii (English i. 10–ii. 23) is torn from its present connection; verses 4–7, 10–15, 19 (Hebrew enumeration) are formed into a section and placed after chapter iii; and the remaining verses are constructed into another section, and the material of this paragraph is further arranged by making verses 1–3 follow verses 20–25. Less wholesale changes are made elsewhere, but equal freedom is taken with the text: thus in chapter iv the last clause of verse 14 is inserted at the end of verse 4, and verse 11 is introduced between the two halves of verse 12; in chapter vii the last clause of verse 12 is placed between verses 10 and 11; in chapter viii the two members of verse 5 are transposed; in chapter ix, verses 3 and 4 are transposed, verse 16 is put between verses 11 and 12, and the last clause of verse 12 is removed and attached to verse 15; in chapter x, verse 7 is put into the midst of verse 8; in chapter xii, verses 10, 14, 11 (English enumeration) follow each other in this order; and in chapter xiv the last clause of verse 3 (English) is made the first clause. Naturally this free treatment of the prophet's words enables the editor to secure a topical arrangement and a progressive presentation of thought which are logical and symmetrical. But at the same time one is led to ask how the prophet's good text, even amidst the vicissitudes of transmission ever became so strangely confused.

The Hebrew type is clear and sharp, and the printed page is pleasing to the eye. A few typographical errors have crept into the Hebrew text; see i. 3, v. 7b, vi. 9a, 11a. At vii. 15, viii. 12, ix. 6 the numeral is lacking by the Hebrew text. The errors are few for a book of Semitic text composed in America.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

THE SPIRIT OF GOD IN BIBLICAL LITERATURE. A Study in the History of Religion. By IRVING F. WOOD, Ph.D., Professor of Biblical Literature and Comparative Religion in Smith College, Northampton, Mass., with an Introduction by FRANK C. PORTER, Ph.D., D.D., Professor of Biblical Theology in Yale University. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1904. 8vo; pp xiv, 280.

We are thankful to the author of this volume for having given us in it a continuous and comprehensive discussion of the Biblical doctrine of the Spirit of God. Apart from the articles in the Bible dictionaries, no attempt has been made in recent times, so far as we are aware, to deal with the subject in its whole extent after a purely inductive fashion. The book gives even more than the title promises, for it includes a much-needed discussion of the development of the doctrine in the period between the two Canons, both in its Palestinian and Alexandrian form. The work of all future students in this field has been made easier by the pioneer work the author has done. There is more here than a mere collection and classification of exegetical facts. Dr. Wood endeavors to trace the historical nexus between the facts, and does so with a considerable degree of independence of judgment and penetration. He is well acquainted with the extensive modern literature on the subject and makes a circumspect use of it. In view of these undeniable merits we all the more regret that the author's work is vitiated by what we

must consider fundamentally wrong principles. He follows the chronological redistribution of the Old Testament writings based on the current critical hypothesis. All his historical constructions stand or fall with this. If ever the hypothesis in question should lose its present vogue, the work would have to be all done over again. But what is even more serious, in our opinion, is the purely phenomenalist spirit in which the author proceeds from beginning to end. The title, it will be observed, introduces the work as "A Study in the History of Religion." This means that the Biblical facts are placed on a line with all extra-Biblical groups of facts in the history of religion. The element of an objective special revelation is left out of account entirely. While this might be permissible, if a purely apologetic valuation of the Biblical phenomena in comparison with those of other religions were intended, the matter becomes entirely different where, as is the case here, an explanation of the at least proximate origin of the phenomena is attempted. Where Dr. Wood alludes to the causality back of the facts he does so in terms like the following: "The origins of the idea of the Spirit lie in the common ground of early religious concepts. The growth of it may be explained by laws which we find working in all early religions. . . . If there is ever a providence in the history of human thought, surely here is a place where it may be seen" (p. 37). This powerful conviction (viz., that his message came from Jehovah), with its accompaniment of a strong emotion, was not resolved by the prophet into elements of patriotism, reflection, logic and religious feeling, but taken entire, just as he experienced it, for a divine gift" (p. 44). "The growth of high religious ideas has always been due to personal religious insight, whether one calls that insight genius or inspiration. . . . It would be possible to divide, not religions indeed, for they are always complexes of the lower and the higher, but religious conceptions into lower and higher according as they were the gradual developments of religious thoughts influenced by environment or the sudden transformation of old ideas in the mind of some religious genius. Such a division would be the modern correlate of the old distinction between natural and supernatural religion. The former might be called racial religious concepts; the latter personal religious concepts. The new ideas of the Spirit were the Pauline, the old those which we may, for want of a better name, call primitive Christian" (pp. 151, 152). "All the manifestations have alike a psychological basis. Even such phenomena as visions and the speaking with tongues are in reality as much the augmentation of natural powers as are wisdom and boldness of utterance" (p. 172). "As the story of Cornelius lies at present in the narrative the impression is conveyed that the message of the Spirit to Peter contained information supernaturally supplied: Three men wait thee, go with them, nothing doubting, for I have sent them. We certainly cannot say with any assurance, however, that this would be the interpretation of the facts, if we had them as they occurred" (p. 184). It is obvious that under such conditions revelation can be nothing more than the invisible reverse side, the background of divine immanence to the psychological processes. It breaks at no point through the web of phenomena. In other words, all revelation is reduced to the category of natural revelation, as the quotation given above from pp. 151, 152, itself intimates. Now we submit that for everybody who truly believes in an objective revelation and to whom this revelation is a supernatural reality projected into the phenomenal world, a discussion based on premises like the above must from the outset fall under the judgment not merely of being inadequate, but of necessity false and distorted.

The book is divided into two parts, one dealing with the Spirit of God in Hebrew Thought, the other with the Spirit of God in New Testament Thought. The subdivisions of Part I discuss the writings before the Exile, the Origin of the Conception, the Canonical writings after the Exile, the Palestinian-Jewish writings, the Alexandrian-Jewish writings. Those of Part II are devoted to the Synoptical Gospels, the Primitive Christian Conception, the Pauline writings, the Johannean

writings, successively. In each chapter a careful classification of the various aspects of the usage is given, and the aspects present in or absent from each period are pointed out by means of a continuous comparison. The course of development found may be briefly outlined as follows: The earliest phenomena to which in recorded history the idea of the Spirit is applied are those of ecstatic prophecy. From this it extended to warlike prowess already in the same early period. The later prophets in their reaction against the older and cruder forms of prophecy used the conception of the Spirit less and less, till in the Deuteronomic period it disappears entirely as a designation of the source of prophecy. A third stage was entered upon where the idea was transferred from the subjective to the objective side, and the Spirit became = God active in the human life, which usage then in the exilic period received a cosmical as well as a large historical application, the latter both in the retrospective and in the prospective Messianic sense. In the postexilic period the use of the idea on its charismatic side, as of an experimental reality, disappears owing to the Deistic tendency of Judaism, although as a traditional idea relating to the past it remained. Alexandrian Judaism added no new element, but repristinated under the influence of Greek mantic conceptions the notion peculiar to the crude stage of early Hebrew prophecy, applying this notion to all Old Testament prophecy. In the New Testament the influences of the Spirit, since long associated with the Messiah, are felt to have become a present reality. While this allowed of wide expansion, at first only strongly emotional experiences were attributed to the Spirit. The operation of the Spirit remains confined to man as in the earliest Hebrew stage. To the cosmic sphere it is not again extended during the entire New Testament period. The author, in noting this, expresses the belief that Christian theology has followed the New Testament in this limitation (a strange statement) and the hope that it will never do otherwise, because the Spirit of God belongs of right only to the action of God in human hearts, such being its New Testament meaning and its only correct use. Finally, in Paul the idea of the Spirit reaches its highest and final stage of development, inasmuch as he makes it cover the entire ethical and religious life and conceives of the Spirit as an abiding possession of the believer. To this the Johannine type of thought has added nothing new. In point of fact, it has not fully reached or reproduced the rich Pauline content of the idea. For, although the Spirit here likewise is an abiding gift, and the conception of occasional charismatic operations, which still stands side by side with the new meaning in Paul, has, on the whole, dropped out, nevertheless, with the exception of chap. iii. 3-8, the Spirit is not represented in John as the origin of the Christian life; there being substituted for this the direct mystical relation to Christ and God, and the work of the Spirit is rather prophetic than ethical, a work of instructing in and witness-bearing to the truth for the development of the kingdom of the Messiah.

It is impossible for us to review every single link in this construction. We confine ourselves to touching upon a few of the most important points. Objection might be raised to the comparative isolation in which the author keeps his subject, confining himself strictly to the Spirit of God, and avoiding the investigation of the allied subject of the Spirit-nature of the divine as such. He calls attention to the fact that the Spirit is seldom used for God *ab intra*. But the fact remains that God is called Spirit, and that in what Dr. Wood considers the earliest accessible period. Of course it is quite possible to maintain that the several representations of God's being Spirit, of His having Spirit, and of His sending Spirit are entirely separate and distinct in their roots, but in that case it would not have been superfluous to state this explicitly, so as to prevent confusion of thought. In our view, Isa. xxxi. 3 (a passage not referred to by Dr. Wood) shows how close the "static" and the "dynamic" usage of the Spirit may occasionally lie together. Another point on which the investigation might to advantage have been pushed farther concerns the relations between the Spirit of God and the notion of wind.

The author cursorily refers in a footnote to Wendt's use of this as the starting-point of the development, but prefers himself to recur upon the idea of "breath," leaving the other view and its possible relations to his own theory undiscussed.

To the Spirit as the basis of physical life in man Dr. Wood finds for the præilic period only one reference, viz., Gen. vi. 3, although on account of the uncertainty of interpretation he is compelled to place a mark of interrogation even here. As to the Spirit acting upon external nature outside of man, he draws the somewhat artificial distinction that in the præilic period this action, while terminating upon external nature, appears always in connection with man, whereas in the exilic and postexilic periods the Spirit is represented as operating upon nature altogether apart from man. We touch here upon a more or less doubtful element in the author's argumentation. Though not oblivious of the distinction between non-occurrence of a certain usage in a group of writings and ignorance of the period represented by these writings with the usage in question, he yet, in point of fact, sometimes builds his conclusions on the identification of these two. In the New Testament the absence of explicit references to the cosmical functions of the Spirit is interpreted as indicating that these functions were no longer believed in, in deference to the Deistic trend of later Judaism. To us this seems extremely improbable, seeing that the cosmic significance of the Spirit's work was so plainly taught in the Old Testament.

In discussing the origin of the conception, the author adopts the view that it arose from the conjunction of the two factors of a waning polydemonism which began to subordinate the other divine beings to the one supreme God, and of a "divine psychology" which represented the impact of God upon man as produced by "the breath of God." The question arises whether, if the former had been an influential factor in the production of the idea, the personal distinction between God and the Spirit ought not to have been much more plainly apparent than it actually is at the first. In the author's own opinion the personality of the Spirit is an idea not reached by even the most advanced New Testament teaching. The Spirit, he says, was personal indeed, but only because God, who is the Spirit in a certain aspect, is personal. This fails to do justice to Rom. viii. 27, where the personality of the Spirit is implied in a relation which contradistinguishes Him from God.

We are glad to note that the author does not follow in the wake of the modern tendency to deny to the Old Testament entirely the idea of an operation of the Spirit in the specifically ethical and religious sphere. He recognizes distinct preformations in the prophetic literature and the Psalms of the later Pauline development.

In the chapter on the Synoptic Gospels the importance of the Spirit for the consciousness of Jesus is minimized. This not merely in the sense that the Pauline idea of the Spirit as the author and bearer of the entire religious life is declared to be absent from our Lord's teaching. Where the Johannine discourses are not admitted in evidence, and moreover a distinction is drawn between the synoptical coloring of Jesus' words and their original intent (*e.g.*, Matt. vii. 11, preferred to Luke xi. 13), no other conclusion could be expected. But Dr. Wood goes farther than this. He believes that Jesus had a positive motive for not reaffirming or further developing the Old Testament beginnings of the Pauline doctrine, viz., the desire "to have his disciples brought into direct and immediate connection with God Himself. Even so thin a veil as the idea of the Holy Spirit might tend to obscure the relation" (p. 136). If this be correct, we must wonder that the Spirit is mentioned by our Lord at all, even in a charismatic aspect, for the religious and charismatic cannot be kept sharply separated. In point of fact, the author reduces also the charismatic Spirit as consciously possessed by Jesus to far narrower proportions than are usually allowed for it. In the saying of Matt. xii. 28, about the casting out of demons by the Spirit of God, the Lucan

reading "by the finger of God" is preferred. Unfortunately, the reference to the Spirit remains in the immediately following statements about the sin committed, the word spoken against the Spirit. Inasmuch as these latter statements are continuous with the former utterance, it follows that Jesus, even if He said "the finger of God," must have conceived of this as working in the concrete through the Spirit of God. Dr. Wood endeavors to escape from this by making the Spirit in the second utterance refer not to the Spirit of miracles in particular, but to the Spirit as the principle of Jesus' Messianic work in general. We cannot consider this a plausible exegesis. The contrast between the sin against Jesus and the sin against the Holy Spirit compels us to take the Spirit here a definite extraordinarily palpable manifestation of the supernatural in Jesus' work. But even if the exegesis were allowed, at any rate the casting out of demons and the miracles would retain their place as parts of the Messianic work and in so far as operations of the Spirit. Considering how large a part the miracles played in our Lord's activity, it will be hard to maintain that the Spirit did not, at least as the charismatic Spirit, have a prominent place in His consciousness. This is confirmed by Luke iv. 18, where in the enumeration of the effects of the Spirit-anointing the miracles are certainly included.

The place of the Spirit in the baptismal formula, Matt. xxviii. 19, as well as in the accounts of the temptation of Jesus and of the nativity, is considered as in all probability due to the influence of early Christian tradition, not to the teaching of Jesus Himself. We note that on the last-mentioned point, the account of the nativity, the author does not follow in the wake of those modern writers who find in the story a reflex of the pagan notion of a physical begetting of children on the part of the gods, but rather an attempt to avoid and protest against such offensive physical conceptions largely current among the Syrian peoples, by means of that conception of the Spirit which the Hebrew religion had developed.

In connection with this whole subject, the place of the Spirit in the synoptical teaching of Jesus, attention may be called to the following remarks of Kattenbusch (*Das Apostolische Symbol*, II, 673): "I consider it nevertheless probable that the reference to the Pneuma or the promise of the same did not play so small a rôle in the teaching of Jesus as might be inferred from the Synoptists. . . . The whole Messianic conception was so indissolubly linked with that of the Spirit, that the idea of the Spirit inevitably would become one of the prominent ideas in the consciousness of Jesus. But this idea in its popular form lay open to the same objection as the Messianic idea. Jesus could neither without more accept it nor without more reject it. . . . By the whole manner of his activity, by everything He taught concerning God, He endeavored to explain, and in the end actually taught, that the Spirit was something more, and at bottom something different from what the people believed."

The great problem in the New Testament development of the doctrine of the Spirit concerns the genesis of the Pauline doctrine of the Spirit as the author and permanent bearer of the entire ethical and religious life. The author criticises the various theories that have been offered in solution of the problem and concludes that the most plausible view is as follows: Paul reached his doctrine as a result of the combination of the two principles that the Spirit witnesses for and advances the Messianic kingdom, and that the most impressive witness, the most effectual force for the propagation of this kingdom lie in the religious and ethical life of the believer. We do not intend to deny that this was actually a determinative factor in the shaping of the Apostle's thought. But as an explanation of the complicated Pauline doctrine of the Pneuma, in its religious and ethical significance as a whole, we think it wholly inadequate and misleading. The proof for this lies in the observation that Paul's doctrine of the *σάπξ* is equally comprehensive in its ethical and religious reference as that of the Pneuma. Unless, therefore, we assume that the notion of the *σάπξ*, ethically and religiously applied, was

in the apostle's teaching an afterthought, subsequently developed by way of antithesis out of the already matured ethical and religious conception of the Spirit, it is reasonable to believe that in their very origin these two ideas were interdependent. The antithesis *σάρξ* — *πνεῦμα* must in itself have had something to do in Paul's mind with that expansion of the Spirit-idea which is so characteristic of his teaching. Two further elements, it seems to us, will have to be taken into account in every attempted solution. On the one hand, the Pauline identification between the Spirit and the glorified Christ would naturally tend toward making the operation of the Spirit coëxtensive with the whole life of the believer, inasmuch as for Paul the personal Christ possessed such an all-pervading influence over the religious and ethical life. On the other hand, the Pauline conception of the eschatological state as having in principle begun would lead to the same result, because the Pneuma is the specific element of the heavenly state, and the Christian, being in the heavenly state, could not but be in the Pneuma in the most comprehensive and permanent sense. It is a pity, we think, that the author has not put the question more in detail as to what significance the Spirit has with Paul for the eschatological state, both for the resurrection-life and for the resurrection-event, and what is the connection between this and the peculiar functions the Apostle ascribes to the Spirit in the creation and development of the life of the believer on earth.

In conclusion we would ask, whether it is quite true that Paul "never places the Spirit in any connection with the glimpses he had of the cosmic relations in the purposes of God"? (p. 212). Rom. viii. 21-23, in a context pervaded by the idea of the Spirit as the principle of liberty, might point to a different conclusion.

In the bibliography at the close a place ought to have been given to Giesebrecht, *Die Berufsbegabung der Alttestamentlichen Propheten*, pp. 123-159. Of typographical mistakes we note Deut. iv. 22 (for 32) on page 53, and *ἀγιον* for *ἀγιον*, *παντός* for *πάντες* on p. 63.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

A HARMONY OF THE GOSPELS FOR HISTORICAL STUDY. By WILLIAM ARNOLD STEVENS and ERNEST DEWITT BURTON. Third edition. Revised. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904. Pp. x, 283. \$1.

This Harmony, which has now reached its third edition, is already well known to students of the Gospels. It appeared first in 1893; it was reprinted in 1895 and in 1901 slightly revised. The present edition has been more thoroughly revised and enlarged. The plan of the work has not been changed, but this edition has been enriched by a more consistent application of the principles on which the Harmony is based and by new material. A third margin has been added to the page, showing the renderings adopted in the text of the American Revised Version of 1901. The following is the Table of Contents: Principal Divisions of the Harmony; Analytical Outline of the Four Gospels; Index to the Analytical Outline and Harmony; Text of the Harmony; Appendices: I. Principles and Methods of Construction; II. Sayings of Christ assigned by the Evangelists to More than One Occasion; III. Old Testament Quotations in the Gospels; IV. Method of Study; V. Principal Divisions of the Life of Christ, with Calendar Dates; VI. Leading Events of Jewish History.

Princeton.

W. P. ARMSTRONG.

A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE GOSPELS. By ERNEST DEWITT BURTON, Professor of New Testament Interpretation in the University of Chicago. The University of Chicago Press, 1904. Pp. viii, 144. \$1.

Dr. Burton's little book treats the four Gospels in five chapters, one being devoted to the Synoptic problem. The four chapters on the several Gospels ap-

peared originally in the *Biblical World* for 1898, 1899 and 1900, and were subsequently reprinted in a pamphlet entitled *The Purpose and Plan of the Four Gospels*. The point of view from which the subject is discussed is stated in the Preface: "To us to-day the highest value of the gospels is in the testimony they bring us concerning the deeds, words, and character of the Lord Jesus. . . . In the endeavor thus to discover the proper point of view from which to study each gospel, it is the gospel itself that is our most valuable source of information. All that tradition transmits to us concerning the identity of the author and his aim in writing is sure to be seized upon with eagerness, all the greater because of the meagerness of such testimony, and is rightly scrutinized with the most diligent attention that it may be made to yield all the information that it can supply. Yet at its best tradition tells us but little, and that little only the record of ancient opinion. The internal evidence of the gospels themselves—not the few assertions which they contain concerning authorship and the like, but the constant reflection on every page of the point of view and aim of the evangelist—comes to us at first hand, and, if we are able to interpret it correctly, yields us evidence that cannot be impeached."

"It is to this internal evidence that special attention is directed in the following pages. Of the subjects here treated, that which is most necessary and useful for the interpretation of the several gospels is a knowledge of the purpose, point of view and plan of the gospel. As subsidiary to the search for them, the evidence afforded in the gospels themselves concerning the writer and the reader for whom he wrote is examined. The brief quotations of ancient traditions respecting the authorship of the books fill in the present treatment the place of least importance, serving only to suggest the relation of the external evidence to that internal evidence which is here the almost exclusive subject of study. The full presentation, scrutiny, and weighing of the external testimony lie quite beyond the scope of this book, the specific purpose of which is to throw upon the gospels the light concerning their origin and purpose which emanates from the gospels themselves."

Internal indications point to a Palestinian Jew as the author of our first Gospel. He shows himself familiar with the geography of Palestine, with Jewish history, customs and classes of the people and with Jewish ideas; he is familiar also with the Old Testament and believes in it as a book containing divinely given prophecies. The external evidence agrees with the internal, but is more specific, naming in the title Matthew. The Papian tradition (Euseb., H.E. iii, 39) also names Matthew, but associates him with a Hebrew gospel. The readers for whom the book was primarily intended appear from the internal evidence to have been chiefly Jewish Christian. The author's purpose, moreover, may be seen in the structure of his book. The historical material, while arranged chronologically in broad outline, is employed for argumentative purposes. "The first main division, though including only material pertaining to the ancestry, birth and infancy of Jesus, yet makes an evidential use of every event which it relates, pointing out how in each of the narrated facts Old Testament prophecy was fulfilled in Jesus. The Galilean ministry is scarcely less evidently constructed on a plan which is more logical than chronological, the whole constituting an exposition of the nature of the kingdom of heaven, the way in which it must be received and the way in which the Jews did actually receive it; foreshadowing their rejection of the Messiah and their consequent downfall. The Passion week, though the material is, with a few significant exceptions, apparently arranged on a chronological plan, is yet so treated as to present the evidence for the fact that Christ and his kingdom were explicitly and clearly presented to the Jews for their acceptance, with warning of the consequences to them of rejection, and that in the face of such presentation and such warning they definitely rejected Christ and the kingdom." By observing where the emphasis is placed in the narrative of Matthew, we may discover certain characteristics not common to all the

Synoptic Gospels which reveal as the motive of its argument "the purpose to prove that Jesus is the true Messiah of the Jews; that he announced and founded the kingdom of God, expounding its true nature, and setting forth its relation to the Old Testament religion; that he came, first of all, to the Jewish nation; that when they showed signs of a disposition not to receive his message, he warned them that the consequences of such rejection would be that the kingdom would be taken from them; that, in fact, they did, in the face of all this warning and instruction, reject Jesus and put him to death; and that consequently the kingdom ceased to be in any distinctive sense Jewish, and in place of the old national dispensation there was created by Jesus himself the true Jewish Messiah, a kingdom of all nations; thus, universal Christianity, freed from all national restrictions or peculiarly Jewish institutions, becomes the true successor of the Old Testament religion; the true Jew must be a follower of Jesus, and, in consequence, leave Judaism behind."

The Gospels of Mark and Luke are treated after a similar method. In chapter iv the Synoptic problem is briefly reviewed. Chapter v treats of the Gospel according to John. Section ii is entitled "Indications of Editorial Work in the Gospel," in which the recent discussions of this subject are noticed and a scheme of the arrangement suggested. There are but few typographical errors. On page 69, line 14, read Part II for Part I.

Princeton.

W. P. ARMSTRONG.

THE TEACHING OF JESUS CONCERNING GOD THE FATHER. By ARCHIBALD THOMAS ROBERTSON, D.D. New York: American Tract Society, 150 Nassau Street. Price, 75 cents.

Dr. Robertson's book ought to be in the hands of every disciple of Christ who is willing to listen to the Master's teaching concerning God the Father. It is a safe book, for the author is in full harmony with the position of orthodox teachers. A few excerpts will prove this. "What one thinks about God determines his theology, his philosophy, his ethical views, his conduct." "The theologies of all time are two—one with God as the centre, the other with man as the centre." "The infinite God cannot be grasped by the human mind either by inquiry or by revelation. It is impossible for God fully to manifest Himself to men, but this fact does not mean that God cannot at all reveal Himself to some men." These excerpts prove that the writer is Calvinistic in his presentation of the truth. We bear with him when he closes his book with the statement, "Christocentric theology is the kind that should enlist the mind and the heart of the teacher of men, and even this theology should not come between Christ and the sinful heart." This saying is a little dark and out of harmony with the general character of his book, which is theocentric and not christocentric.

He is also optimistic with regard to the attitude of men of culture toward God and Christ. Says he: "The blatant infidel has a coterie of followers here and there among the openly wicked, but not among the real men of culture." "The spiritual interpretation of the universe holds the field once more. The doctrine of the immanence of God is more clearly perceived in our day than ever, but needs to be reinforced by the parallel truth of the transcendence of God. In a word, the modern mind is open to faith in God." "The historic Christ fills the horizon of modern scholarship, and that scholarship is reacting to the admission that He is the eternal Christ, the Son of God." I wish I could see things in such a rosy light.

As a Biblical critic he is refreshingly conservative. "The testimony of the Gospel of John is here appealed to and will be used constantly on a par with that of the Synoptic Gospels." He does not give his proofs for this statement, but then his book is written for the common reader. We might question the prudence

of such a statement in such a book, but the position taken is a good one. How much we would lose, if the teaching of Jesus concerning God the Father as recorded in the gospel according to St. John had to be rejected as spurious.

The writer has also a great deal to say about the theory of evolution. "If the evolutionary view of the world's origin be correct, it does not follow that originally men did not have adequate knowledge of God." "He, *i.e.*, God, is superhuman and all-powerful, is Lord of nature and not the slave of His own laws. He can thunder at Sinai and He can speak at Horeb in the still small voice." "It is sometimes said that evolution brings Christ under inevitable law and makes it impossible for Him to differ in nature from other men, however far He excels them in character. But even on scientific grounds Jesus is the grand exception in the race, unless we deny the records that we have about His career." This statement is naïvely childlike.

One also finds strange sayings in this little book. "It is possible in a general way to speak of the Old Testament dispensation as that of God the Father, the dispensation of the gospels as that of Jesus the Son of God and the Son of man, and the apostolic dispensation as that of the Holy Spirit." It is true he modifies this statement, but what has it to do with his subject?

Besides all this we find discussions about the relation between divine sovereignty and human free agency and other theological questions. His idea that hyper-Calvinism is as unscriptural as extreme Arminianism is very strange. May I draw from this statement the inference that both Calvinism and Arminianism pure and simple are Scriptural?

But what has all this to do with the author's subject, "The teaching of Jesus concerning God the Father?" He says fine things about Christ's teaching concerning God the Father, but he burdens it with much extraneous matter, matter important enough in itself, but irrelevant with regard to the subject. Subjects of a biblico-theological nature ought to be treated exegetically. It was the author's intention to give his readers an exegetical view of the subject. In his Preface he says, "The bulk of the book is the result of direct exegesis of the words of Jesus. We come reverently with Philip to Jesus and say: 'Lord, show us the Father, and it sufficeth us.'" His book is interesting and full of information, and the author is aglow with love for the Master, whose glory he brings out in a conspicuous manner, but an exegetical study of the words of Jesus concerning the Father it is not. The book gives more than it promises, and much of it is very good indeed, but considered from a literary standpoint, it is a mistake to forget the *multum* over the *multa*.

Holland, Mich.

N. M. STEFFENS.

III.—HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

JOHN KNOX, THE HERO OF THE SCOTTISH REFORMATION. By HENRY COWAN, D.D., Professor of Church History, University of Aberdeen; Author of *The Influence of the Scottish Church in Christendom*, etc. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905. Crown 8vo; pp. xxxiii, 404. Price, \$1.35 net.

JOHN KNOX: HIS IDEAS AND IDEALS. By the Rev. JAMES STALKER, D.D., Professor of Church History, United Free College, Aberdeen. London: Hodder & Stoughton; New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1904. Crown 8vo; pp. viii, 250. Price, \$1 net.

JOHN KNOX. A Biography. By D. MACMILLAN, M.A. With an Appreciation by the Very Rev. Principal STORRY, D.D., LL.D. And with Special Illus-

- trations by THOMAS SMELLIE, F.S.A. (Scot.). London: Andrew Melrose, 1905. Crown 8vo. Price, 3s. 6d.
- JOHN KNOX: THE HERO OF THE SCOTTISH REFORMATION. A Biographical Sketch. By EDWARD MILLER, M.A. With Illustrations. London: Andrew Melrose, 1905. Price, 1s.
- JOHN KNOX. By A. TAYLOR INNES. Special Edition for the Fourth Centenary of Knox's Birth, with a new Preface and two Illustrations. Edinburgh and London: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 1905. Post 8vo. Price, 1s.
- THE LIFE OF JOHN KNOX. With Biographical Notes of the Principal Reformers and Sketches of the Progress of Literature in Scotland during a great part of the Sixteenth Century. By Rev. THOMAS McCRIE, D.D., Author of *Life of Andrew Melville*, etc. Edinburgh, London, Dublin and New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons. Cloth, 1s. net; leather, 2s. net.
- JOHN KNOX. By the late R. W. BARBOUR, M.A. Reprinted from *Evangelical Succession Lectures*. Edinburgh: Macniven & Wallace. Price, 6d.
- JOHN KNOX AND HIS TIMES. By P. HUME BROWN, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Scottish Ancient History in the University of Edinburgh. With sixteen Illustrations. Edinburgh and London: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 1904. Small 4to, pp. 24. Paper cover, 1½d.
- JOHN KNOX AND HIS TIMES. By P. HUME BROWN, M.A., LL.D., etc. Same as above, new edition in booklet form. Crown 8vo; pp. 80. Price, 9d. net.
- JOHN KNOX: THE HERO OF THE SCOTTISH REFORMATION. By the Rev. ALEXANDER ANDREW, D.D. Illustrated. Stirling: The Drummond Tract Depot. Price, 1½d.
- JOHN KNOX AND JOHN KNOX'S HOUSE. By CHARLES JOHN GUTHRIE, K.C., F.S.A. (Scot.), Editor of the Popular Edition of John Knox's *History of the Reformation in Scotland*. Sixth thousand. With ninety Illustrations. Edinburgh and London: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 1905. Crown 8vo; pp. xiv, 340. Price, paper, 1s.; cloth, 2s.
- KNOX'S HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION OF RELIGION WITHIN THE REALM OF SCOTLAND. Transcribed into modern spelling by C. J. GUTHRIE. With forty-three Illustrations. Cheap edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 2s. 6d. net. London: A. & C. Black, 1905.
- KNOX'S HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION OF RELIGION IN SCOTLAND. With Knox's "Confession" and the "Book of Discipline." A Twentieth Century Edition. Edited and Revised by CUTHBERT LENNOX. With frontispiece Portrait Royal 8vo. London: Andrew Melrose, 1905. Price, 4s. 6d.
- THE INFLUENCE OF KNOX. *Separatum* from *The Scottish Historical Review* for January, 1905. Pp. 131-135. By D. HAY FLEMING, LL.D.

The titles here brought together represent the popular literature which the celebration of the present year as the four-hundredth anniversary of John Knox's birth is producing. Along with this large mass of separate publications a very voluminous periodical literature covering nearly every phase of Knox's career and significance is also appearing: of this especial mention should be made of the series of articles which has been publishing ever since September, 1904, in the (monthly) *Missionary Record of the United Free Church of Scotland* (T. Nelson & Sons: Edinburgh and London), and which in its entirety affords a popular account of the life and achievement of Knox of exceptional attractiveness. Possibly never since the death of Knox has attention been so strongly and widely directed to his personality and services to Scotland and to Christendom: and there is prospect even that the celebration of his quater-centennial may result in a fuller

and better comprehension of the details of his life and the precise character and value of his achievements. In the nature of the case the great body of what will be published on such an occasion has for its object the quickening of the popular apprehension of what Knox was and did. But with the promise of comprehensive lives of Knox, on the one hand, from so competent a scholar and so unwearied an investigator as Dr. Hay Fleming, and, on the other, from such a free-lance as Mr. Andrew Lang, we may feel sure that this commemoration of Knox's birth will not pass without some solid contribution to our better knowledge of the man and his work. For the present (May, 1905), however, it is not these more serious studies (which we still await) that we are concerned with, but the more popular publications we have enumerated.*

It must be confessed that Knox had to wait long for an adequate biography. No historian of Scotland, to be sure, no less than of the religious life of Scotland, could pursue his task without drawing a portrait and estimating the significance of a personality which played so great a part in the formation of Scottish nationality no less than in the creation of that religious character which has given to Scotland so great a place in the history of Protestantism. Nevertheless it was not until the publication in 1812 of Dr. Thomas McCrie's *Life of John Knox* that a worthy biography of Scotland's great Reformer was given the world; and not until the publication in 1895 of Prof. Hume Brown's *John Knox*, that any serious effort was made to place a worthy rival by the side of Dr. McCrie's epoch-making book—although in the meanwhile the monumental edition of Knox's *Works* edited by David Laing had been given the public (six volumes, 1846–64). No doubt some monographs of importance were published during this interval, chief of which should doubtless be ranked Dr. Lorimer's *John Knox and the Church of England* (1875): and as the nineteenth century advanced a large number of meritorious popular lives appeared,—Miss Warren's, G. Barnett Smith's, Mrs. Terhune's, Dr. W. M. Taylor's (1884), Mrs. Florence A. McCunn's (1895), Mr. A. Taylor Innes' (1896). But though it thus seemed evident that Knox was coming to his own among his own people—of which no mean indication was given further in such literary essays as those famous ones of Thomas Carlyle's on *Knox as a Hero* and R. L. Stevenson's on *John Knox and His Relations to Women*—in wider circles he has remained without adequate memorials up to to-day. Even in literate Germany he seems to be yet without express biographies, with the exception of the abridged translation of McCrie published by G. J. Planck in 1817 and the excellent work of Fr. Brandes published in 1862 (8vo, pp. 504, Elberfeld; vol. 10 of the well-known *Leben und ausgewählte Schriften der Väter und Begründer der reformirten Kirche*). Elsewhere on the continent we have had to wait apparently until the publication in 1902 of Étienne Huraut's *John Knox et ses relations avec*

* Since this notice was sent to the printer three additional books on Knox have come to us, and may be mentioned in this note for the sake of completeness. They include Mr. Lang's promised volume, a goodly octavo, dedicated to Mr. Maurice Hewlett (whom we all thank for keeping his hands off of Knox in his novel), and seeking to validate his disparaging view of Knox; but they do not include Dr. Hay Fleming's anticipated life, which we learn will not be ready until next year. The three books are the following: (1) *John Knox and the Reformation*. By Andrew Lang. With Illustrations. London, New York and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1905. 8vo; pp. xiv, 281. (2) *John Knox: A Criticism and Appreciation*. By John Glasse, M.A., D.D., Minister of Old Greyfriars, Edinburgh. Edinburgh and London: Blackwoods; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1905. 12mo; pp. viii, 194. \$1.25. (3) *John Knox: Appreciations by United Original Seceders*. Addresses delivered at the Meeting of Synod held in Edinburgh on the 18th of May, 1905. Published by Request of Synod. Edinburgh and London: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 1905. Small 4to; pp. viii, 64. This volume, after a prefatory note by the Rev. George Anderson of Glasgow, contains an Opening Address by the Rev. Thomas Mathew, Moderator of the Synod, and three special addresses—"The Dawn of the Reformation," by the Rev. John Sturrock, of Edinburgh; "The Life and Work of Knox," by D. Hay Fleming, LL.D.; and "The Legacy of John Knox," by the Rev. Alexander Smellie, M.A., of Carlisle. It is a very attractive presentation of the man, his work and the debt of Scotland to him.

les églises reformées du Continent for any important contribution to the knowledge of a man who played a part in the great upheaval of the sixteenth century second in picturesqueness to none, second in permanent effect to very few. If the interest now focussed upon him among the peoples who have profited most directly by his labors shall be communicated to the wider world, and shall lead not merely to a more intimate acquaintance with the man, but also to a wider influence of his character and teaching in the world, it would be a great gain.

The works at present before us, as has already been intimated, are all popular in character and testify chiefly to the interest that is taken in the commemoration of Knox's quater-centenary. Some of them are reprints of books which have been already for a number of years before the public, but are now issued in cheaper, and in some instances more attractive, forms to meet the popular demand. It is a wonderful thing to see such a book as McCrie's *Life of John Knox* circulated at a shilling a copy. The new issues of Mr. Taylor Innes' interesting biography and of Mr. Sheriff Guthrie's edition of Knox's great *History of the Reformation*, as well as of his little book on *John Knox's House*, with its remarkable collection of pictures (increased in the edition before us to no less than ninety), belong in the same class: as does also the reprint of Mr. Barbour's penetrating essay. Some of the new books, again—as, for example, Prof. Hume Brown's and Dr. Alexander Andrew's—are intended distinctively for the young people. Mr. Cuthbert Lennox's modernization of Knox's masterpiece—his *History of the Reformation of Religion in Scotland*—is a painstaking piece of work, but we think will scarcely supplant in popular favor Sheriff Guthrie's. Like it, it omits the fifth book, which was not written by Knox's own hand; but unlike it, it retains the account of Wishart's trial which is drawn from Foxe's *Acts and Monuments*. Like it, it not only modernizes the spelling and to some extent the diction, but takes certain liberties with the letters and documents which Knox inserted into his narrative. Possibly little has been lost by the omissions of either editor which the general reader need grieve over: but naturally the student will continue to resort to the unabridged and unaltered text as it is communicated to us in Laing's fine volumes.

Among the books on our list the chief importance must accordingly be assigned to the three new biographies of Knox which stand at its head. They are all good biographies. For a plain, simple, full narrative of the whole life of the Reformer nobody could do better than go to Mr. Macmillan. But he has certainly sought very little the graces of historical composition and has not always attained desirable accuracy, especially in his quotations. At the opposite extreme from Mr. Macmillan's stands Dr. Stalker's pleasant volume. Here the very form of historical narrative has been sacrificed to artistic construction: a topical schematization has been adopted which treats in turn of "John Knox," "His Ideas" and "His Ideals"; and the material is marshaled in a manner which is as attractive as it is instructive. It is far and away the most readable of the sketches of Knox accessible to us; and we shall not say it is the least informing, though it does not essay to give a complete account of its subject. As a biography of Knox, however, the palm among the three books before us must be given, we think, to Prof. Cowan's. In it we have a formal biography, covering the whole ground, and seeking to set the story in its framework of general history. There seems to have been adequate investigation: there is a simple and clear narrative style; good proportion has been preserved; and in the main the judgments expressed seem well balanced. In our own reading of the book, we have found the arrangement confusing by which the whole of Knox's continental work has been described before his doings in Scotland during his "first return," 1555-1556: but that may have been an accident, which need not repeat itself in other perusals or with other perusers.

Among the advantages likely to be reaped from the renewed scrutiny of the

details of Knox's life consequent on the present commemoration of his birth, seems to be the recovery of at least a closer knowledge of the date of his birth. In a letter printed in *The Scotsman* of May 27, 1904,—while the Scottish Church-courts were considering the propriety of arranging for the commemoration of this year,—Dr. D. Hay Fleming briefly presented reasons for doubting whether the date of Knox's birth has not heretofore been set some ten years too early. Even thus briefly put, the reasons appeared so good that the suggestion has rapidly taken root. An interesting correspondence published in *The Athenæum* at the end of the year showed Mr. Andrew Lang and Dr. Henry Cowan ready to yield to them: and now Dr. Cowan has adopted the new date—1513 to 1515—in his book, and, as has been announced, the same is to be done and the question fully argued in the forthcoming biography by Dr. Hay Fleming. Neither Mr. Macmillan nor Dr. Stalker has seen his way to a similar course; but neither has been able to speak with perfect confidence of the old date as the true one. And, in fact, the gains which accrue from the later date for understanding the early life of Knox are great enough and obvious enough to make the reader of his biographies hope that Dr. Hay Fleming will be able to put it on solid ground in his forthcoming book.

All of our present biographers write of the great Reformer sympathetically and with hearty admiration alike of his character and his achievements. After the almost truculent assaults that have been made upon him of late by such writers as Mr. Andrew Lang in his *History of Scotland* (and nearly everywhere else) and Mr. W. L. Mathieson in his *Politics and Religion*, this is refreshing enough. But admiration even here has not been permitted to go the length of abolishing criticism. The object of this criticism is primarily what is called Knox's "intolerance," which is somewhat sharply scored by both Prof. Cowan and Prof. Stalker, for example, though neither, naturally, fails to say what can be said in his defense on the ground of the general sentiment of the age in which he lived and the entanglement at the time of religious and civil life. A certain extremity of temper and opinion which is supposed to have exhibited itself especially in, say, his *Monstrous Regiment of Women*, and generally in his Puritan conception of what is lawful in worship and conduct, also comes in for somewhat pointed criticism. Prof. Cowan and Prof. Story both even permit themselves still to speak of Knox as a "grim" man: the infelicity of which epithet as applied to a man of Knox's known tenderness of heart and depth, richness and wideness of sympathy is pleasantly exposed in a telling little article on *John Knox's Humanity*, printed by Sheriff Guthrie in the May number of *The Missionary Record of the United Free Church*. "The beginning, middle and end of the whole belief in Knox's general harshness of disposition," Mr. Guthrie there argues, is summed up ultimately in this alone—that he made Mary weep! And unfortunately it was necessary either that Mary should weep tears of rage or Scotland tears of blood. Luther, Calvin, Knox—and all men who like Luther, Calvin, Knox have been called by God to throw themselves athwart the currents of a corrupt age and the cruel courses of designing men—have uniformly been branded by the world whose evil they have successfully curbed as narrow men, full of hardness and regardless of the natural feelings which belong to humanity. It is time that those who owe their all to these heroes of faith, yes, and of love, should give themselves more sympathetically to the vindication of the beauty of their personal characters, as well as of the essential purity of their motives. He who has become intimately acquainted with Calvin, for example, will know what a libel it is to represent him as a "sour" fanatic; and he who has entered into a sympathetic knowledge of Knox will know that to speak of him as a "grim" boor is to bear a witness against him than which nothing could be falsier: and he owes it to these great children of our common Father to bear swift testimony to their true characters. Calvin and Knox were both men of open and wide minds and of notably tender hearts, who yet had a "grim" work to do—like our Saviour's

own when He drove the traders out of the temple with scourging cords: and they must not be permitted, any more than He in similar case, to be branded as unlovely in character, mien or deportment (they who attracted love from their companions with the inevitable surety with which the magnet does good metal!) because those on whose guilty shoulders their scourges fell take this revenge upon their undefended memories.

Another matter in which the sympathy of our modern biographers of Knox is apt to be incomplete cuts even more nearly to the centre of things. We mean the theology of the Reformer; and that is to say, the platform upon which he based and wrought his reform. And strangely enough this failure of sympathy is apt to be most apparent at the very central point of this platform—the architectonic principle which gave form to the whole. There is no concealing it: Prof. Cowan, for example, looks upon John Knox's Calvinism as something to be apologized for and upon his doctrine of predestination (and that is to say, his sense of dependence on God) as extreme; and even Prof. Stalker, though speaking more guardedly and genially and in the main with excellent balance, yet obviously feels that Knox's doctrine needs something of the nature of condonation rather than hearty and appreciative praise. Even with Dr. Stalker "Calvinism" may be "the purer expression of the religious sentiment at its warmest," but undoubtedly "such a system" as Arminianism "has its own share of truth"—a remark which we take leave to say exhibits just a perfect misapprehension of the whole matter. As if Calvinism and Arminianism were two species of one genus, instead of (as they are) sound and unsound specimens of the same species! How would it do to say that a sound horse is, on the whole, the best animal, but a deformed or spavined one presents, nevertheless, some advantages? Certainly these "advantages" are not apparent in the points in which a deformed or spavined horse he differs from a sound one! If even Dr. Stalker's note quavers a little here, Prof. Cowan's jangles. Prof. Cowan does not scruple to speak openly of the "one-sided recognition of the absolute sovereignty of God, which is the chief basis of Calvinism" as Knox embraced it; of the "obscurization of God's fatherly relation to all mankind" inherent in the system; or of an equal right enjoyed by us "to build upon God's desire for universal human salvation, the assurance that under an omnipotent government all will actually be saved" as "to build upon the divine fore-knowledge an eternal purpose of reprobation." Enough has been already said, however, not merely to manifest Prof. Cowan's lack of sympathy with the essence of Knox's faith; but also, we fear, to suggest his unpreparedness to deal in detail with the history of doctrine. When a writer permits himself to repeat such current misstatements as that Calvin himself spoke of "reprobation" as a *decretum horribile* (what Calvin really so designated—of course not in the sense which the English word "horrible" conveys, but in that of "awe-inspiring"—was not the decree of reprobation, but the decree by which all men were implicated in Adam's sin), or that the theology of the Confession of 1560 is more "moderate" or "flexible" than that of the Westminster Confession, and gives in reality less place to predestination (because forsooth the *word* does not occur in it, and the section headed "Of Election" treats of anything rather than of that "eternal and immutable decree of God, from quihilk all our salvation springs and depends" and by which the elect are differentiated from "the reprobate," which is the underlying basis of the whole doctrine of this Confession)—the reader is at once advised that in the sphere of doctrinal history at least this writer's "taste exact for faultless fact" does not quite "amount to a disease." Of course Prof. Cowan belongs to that remarkable body of Kirk of Scotland men of our day who regret the substitution of the Westminster Confession for the Confession of 1560, and who would fain return to the older Confession "as the possible starting-point from which a less rigid standard of doctrine might be formulated for the present time" (p. 379); a point of view which does not seem to us to evince either good

historical judgment or high doctrinal acumen. We are glad to see that Prof Stalker, having looked at the documents with his own eyes, cannot fall in with this strange attitude (p. 202), but passes much the same judgment upon the relative value of the two documents which the late Dr. A. F. Mitchell did (*Scottish Reformation*, pp. 118 sq.) in a comprehensive and penetrating discussion which it would be well if those who fancy they would get relief in their half-hearted Calvinism by reverting to this pre-Arminian formulary would take the trouble to read.

We have no intention, of course, of entering here into a discussion of such matters as these. They concern rather the currents of thought running up and down in present-day Scotland than the life and services of the great Reformer, to whom and to whose faith Scotland in large part owes all she is. Indeed, we deprecate the tendency, from which neither of the authors we have just been quoting is entirely free, to drag into an account of Knox's life and teaching allusions to the party strifes by which present-day Scotland is torn (*e.g.*, with reference to the present matter, Cowan, p. 379; Stalker, p. 163). Our object in referring at all to such things is, first, to illustrate the remark we have made that even our present biographers are not in perfect sympathy with Knox in the deeper foundations of his teaching, and therefore are prone to write from a point of view of underlying criticism more or less explicit; and, then, to give point to the expression in closing of two sentiments on our own part—a sentiment of sorrow and a sentiment of hope. We deeply deplore the evidences which are thick about us of a very widespread departure in the Scottish Churches of our day from the purity of that religious system in the strength of which alone could Knox have had the power to liberate Scotland from the incubus of the Roman dominion. Men seem concerned nowadays more with impatiently freeing themselves from the shackles which, in their view, are imposed on their freedom by this high doctrine, than with proclaiming with full-hearted conviction the glory of the Lord God Almighty, in which proclamation alone Knox found his strength. Our prayer and hope is that as we are at this time giving attention as perhaps never before to the character and achievement of Knox, we may learn also afresh to estimate aright the source of his strength and may be led to seek for ourselves in the same source the same might to destroy the strongholds of the Evil One. If the quarter-centenary of John Knox should bring us back to Knox's God and Knox's attitude of loving dependence on this God,—to Knox's burning zeal for the glory of God and His glorious evangel,—to a revival of Knox's spirit, because a revival of Knox's faith—we shall have reason to rejoice that he has been caused to live again among us, not merely as a memory, but as a vital and vitalizing force.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

IV.—SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

GRUNDRISS DER EVANGELISCHEN DOGMATIK. Von Dr. OTTO KIRN, Professor d. Theologie in Leipzig. Leipzig: A. Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung Nachf. (Georg Böhme), 1905. S. 126.

This book, as the title indicates, is a brief outline of Dogmatics. It is, in fact, a syllabus of Prof. Kirn's lectures which he has prepared for publication. In part first he takes up the subject of Prolegomena, discussing very briefly such questions as the place of Dogmatics in theological encyclopedia, the problem and method of Dogmatics, the nature of religion and of the Christian religion, revelation and the doctrine of the Scripture. Then in the second part the dogmatic system is set forth. This is made to centre round the idea of the kingdom of God, and we

have four main divisions: 1. The presuppositions of the realization of the kingdom, viz., the doctrines of God, of man, and of sin. 2. The realization of the kingdom—(a) Its historical founding through the work of Christ. Under this head the author discusses the Person and Work of Christ. (b) "The individual appropriation of salvation in justifying faith." This is a discussion of the application of redemption and *ordo salutis*. (c) The "continuous mediation" of salvation through the Church's means of grace. 3. The Christian hope of completed salvation. This division includes an outline of eschatology. 4. The completion of Christian knowledge in faith in the triune God, *i.e.*, the doctrine of the Trinity.

Precisely what Prof. Kirn has purposed to do in this outline he himself tells us in the Preface. He there says that, being persuaded that the teaching of the Reformers—especially Luther—is in accord with the true sense of the Gospel of Jesus and His apostles, he has attempted to free it from a use of the Scripture which he terms unhistorical and strange to us of a modern age. This, however, he will do without injuring at all the "religious and ethical" content of the Gospel. He says also that he has attempted to "attach" his exposition of the Gospel to a conception of Biblical revelation in harmony with the Biblical science of to-day. To such an extent, however, has the author been influenced by the subjective tendency of modern theology since Schleiermacher to regard theology as the science of Christian faith (*christliche Glaubenslehre*), that he has departed considerably from Lutheran orthodoxy, and shows the influence of Schleiermacher as well as of the Ritschlian movement in theology. Accordingly he tells us that the task of Dogmatics is to seek for the "religious kernel" of dogma. But Dogmatics is not a mere description of "pious Christian states of mind." It aims rather at the interpretation of the Divine revelation as it is appropriated by faith. Accordingly Prof. Kirn says that Dogmatics "describes the Christian ethico-religious life as it becomes the inner possession of man through the receptivity of faith, upon the basis of the Divine revelation of salvation." Having thus attempted to do justice to the historical element of revelation, Prof. Kirn, of course, concludes that the method which bases theological knowledge upon Christian experience must be supplemented by that of the "historical and religious comprehension of revelation." By this the author does not mean the "method of the history of religion" (*religionsgeschichtliche Methode*), advocated by theologians like Tröltzsch. Prof. Kirn's method is more nearly akin to that of the more evangelical theologians who may in general be classed in the Ritschlian school. Accordingly Dogmatics seeks to understand in their historic light the facts upon which Christian faith is founded. But the object of the dogmatic proposition is not the objective revelation, but its meaning for the religious life. Accordingly Prof. Kirn tells us that the doctrine of orthodox Dogmatics as to the inspiration and external authority of the Scripture must be abandoned. The Scripture, however, is the chief source of Christian truth, since it records special revelation which consists in "events and experiences" which produce the Christian life. Hence we are not surprised to find Prof. Kirn saying that the Scripture is a source of knowledge because and in so far as it is a means of grace.

This conception of the nature and method of Dogmatics and of the sources of theological knowledge determines the author's whole system, as well as its several parts. It is therefore, in our estimation, a fundamental weakness of this book that it sets aside the doctrine of plenary inspiration upon such inadequate grounds as it does. Thus in criticising the doctrine of inspiration, Prof. Kirn states what is known as the mechanical or dictation theory, and then attacks it as setting aside the individuality of the Scripture writers, which, of course, the doctrine of plenary inspiration, when adequately stated, does not do at all. Prof. Kirn even goes so far as to hold that the use of sources by the writers of Scripture is inconsistent with the doctrine of the inspiration of the Scripture books. In fact he seems to have confused to a large extent the historical and

dogmatic questions in regard to the Scripture (pp. 22, 23). His idea of inspiration is that the writers of Scripture were especially under the influence of God's revealing acts; and the authority of Scripture consists in the fact that it mediates to us the Divine revelation.

The rejection of the Scripture as an external authority often—one might almost say usually—has as one of its causes at least, an unwillingness to accept the pure supernaturalism of the Scripture teaching and those Scriptural doctrines which are metaphysical, *i.e.*, which involve elements that transcend religious experience. Consequently when we come to the several doctrines we are not surprised to find that Prof. Kirn holds to what he calls an "economical" view of the Trinity, *i.e.*, one which simply gives expression to our apprehension of salvation in history and experience, as having its source in the Father, as accomplished by the Son, and imparted by the Spirit. This is to be distinguished from what the author calls the "immanent" view, *viz.*, that the historical manifestation of the Son and the Spirit in the work of redemption is grounded in God's essential nature. Prof. Kirn tells us that in this way we can gain no knowledge of the Divine nature. All that the doctrine of the Trinity means is that "for religious reflection upon God's eternal being and His relation to the world and its history, there is the necessity both to distinguish and to postulate as one, the God who stands above history, the God who reveals Himself in history, and the God who declares Himself in the inner life of His personal creatures, especially in the consciousness of believers" (p. 123). Precisely what is his view of the Son and the Holy Spirit is made more plain in the chapters on Christology and on the application of redemption respectively. We are told that Christ is a man in whom the Divine life was "absolutely immanent" (p. 91). It would seem, then, that the Son is only a term for God in so far as He reveals Himself in the man Jesus. The Holy Spirit is said to be the transforming influence which streams from Christ to believers (p. 105). This seems to be a purely modal Trinity, although in the very brief historical section on the Trinity (p. 121) Prof. Kirn does not attach himself to historical Sabellianism.

This "economical" view of the Trinity also explains why Prof. Kirn, like Schleiermacher in the *Glaubenslehre*, puts it at the very end of his system, since it can only be understood from the experience and knowledge of redemption. This, however, reveals an inconsistency in the author's arrangement of his system. For according to his view it is only in the same way that we can know anything about God, and yet the doctrine of God comes first in his system; as it does, for example, in that of Kaftan, who holds, broadly speaking, a somewhat similar view of the nature and sources of religious knowledge (*vid.* Kaftan's *Dogmatik*). Kaftan has also maintained that the doctrine of the Trinity must be treated as part of the doctrine of God, and not last, as in the *Glaubenslehre* (*vid.* Kaftan's later book, *Zur Dogmatik*, published first as a series of articles in the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*). In fact Lobstein, who contends that theology must be Christocentric, explains this by saying that *whatever order* is followed, Christ is the *principium cognoscendi* from which we learn concerning God and man, although Lobstein himself recommends a "regressive method," working back to the doctrine of God (*vid.* Lobstein, *Introduction to Protestant Dogmatics*).

In Prof. Kirn's treatment of God's relation to the world in the doctrines of preservation and government, we find the same tendency to reject the so-called metaphysical elements of Christian doctrine. In regard to the doctrine of preservation, he maintains that we have no metaphysical "knowledge" of the way in which the world depends upon God for its continued existence. At the same time Prof. Kirn is not entirely consistent in avoiding all metaphysical statements, for on the same page he criticises the view that creation is a preservation without beginning, as doing away with the absolute dependence of the world upon God; he criticises also the view that preservation is a continuous creation, as destroying

the relative independence of the world. These are sound criticisms, although they imply a considerable amount of metaphysics. It is also in accordance with this same tendency that, in discussing the Divine government of the world, the author sets aside the doctrine of "concurus," and says that the certitude of the Christian that God is governing the world for man's salvation is independent of any knowledge of its mode (p. 56). The dislike of the supernatural is seen in his definition of a miracle as "a heightening of the care of God seen also in nature and history" (p. 58).

When we pass to Christology the same influences are at work. Thus Prof. Kirn says that the unity in Christ's person, which the Chalcedonian formula failed to reach, is not between two natures in one person, but between "the infinite life of God" and the historical person of Jesus. God is absolutely "immanent" in Jesus. Jesus is, therefore, according to His historical manifestation (*Erscheinung*) a man, but according to His nature (*Wesen*) "the bearer of the fullness of the Divine life." This somewhat obscure language means apparently that Jesus was simply a man indwelt by the Divine Spirit to an extraordinary degree. In fact, Prof. Kirn tells us that the preëxistence of Christ is simply in God's eternal will and purpose of salvation, *i.e.*, a merely ideal preëxistence (pp. 91, 92).

But while we thus find in the above doctrines a minimizing of the metaphysical and of the supernatural in Christianity, in other doctrines the author, no doubt inconsistently, takes a higher position. In his doctrine of God, for example, he maintains the idea of God as absolute, rejecting Ritschl's attempt to set it aside as inconsistent with the Christian conception of God. So also Ritschl's limitation of God's omnipotence and omnipresence to His care for His creatures is rejected, and these attributes are made to have a relation to the world.

In his doctrine of sin Prof. Kirn shows the semi-Pelagianizing tendencies of some of the modern rationalistic theories; while in his doctrine of the atonement he rejects the satisfaction theory as well all those theories which conceive of Christ's work as having no reference at all to God. God can uphold the safety and dignity of His moral government by making men feel in their conscience the hatefulness of sin. This is done by Christ, whose death Prof. Kirn calls an expiation not a punishment. We cannot stop to criticise his idea of expiation, but must pass on to say a word about the remainder of the book.

In the remainder of the book the author adheres much more closely to evangelical Lutheranism. Indeed in his whole doctrine of the application of redemption and *ordo salutis*, as well as in the whole section on the means of grace, his position is very nearly that of the Lutheran theology, except for his conception of the Holy Spirit already noticed. In the section on eschatology he not only denies chiliasm, but even finds a place for the supernatural, and speaks most cautiously on the question of future probation. This is, to us at least, the most satisfactory part of the book.

Thus it will be seen that the book is not entirely self-consistent. It really occupies a mediating position between the tendency which may, broadly speaking, be called Ritschlian and the theology of evangelical Lutheranism. It is to be commended for its clearness and conciseness. It is not an easy task to include so much in so small a compass, and at the same time to be clear and easily comprehensible in one's statements. Prof. Kirn has accomplished this in no small degree.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

QUESTIONS OF FAITH. A Series of Lectures on the Creed. By JAMES DENNEY, D.D., MARCUS DODS, D.D., JOHN LAIDLAW, D.D., T. M. LINDSAY, D.D., H. R. MACINTOSH, Ph.D., JAMES ORR, D.D., P. CARNEGIE SIMPSON, M.A. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1904. Price, \$1.50.

"These lectures were given in Renfield Church, Glasgow, on Sunday evenings.

They are meant to be primarily apologetic in character, though also, as befitted the day and place, frankly religious."

This antithetical relationship of "apologetic" and "religious" is naïve enough. That there is an irreligious "apologetic" and a "religious" which is not true apologetic is, unfortunately, not without foundation in fact. However, these lectures are "apologetic" without being irreligious. The opening lecture is the least satisfactory of them all.

Dr. Orr's treatment of "What is God" is a mixture of "religion and apologetic" which is not very satisfactory. There is the old-fashioned contrast of the "dim lamp of reason" and the "light of revelation" which true Christian apologetic has outgrown. It is not reason which is dim, but unreason. If a reasonable view of the universe does not come to see God, then God is certainly unknowable. Paul does not so speak. Through His works God's eternal power and divinity are clearly manifest. He has not left Himself without witness. The heavens and the earth declare God's glory. The revelation which nature and history make of God is not to be despised, even though the full knowledge of God is to be had only in "the begotten Son." It is not the Bible as a whole which is "God's own revelation of His character," but it is Jesus Christ. "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son He hath declared Him."

The second lecture, "Is Christ the Son of God?" by Dr. MacIntosh, is admirable. It is true we must object to the statement that "the arguments of religion are addressed, not primarily to the reason, but to the emotion and the will." This statement, which suggests the non-reasonableness of religious truths, is of the kind which has turned many a man away from religion who sees no "reason" in handing over the most important part of his life to that which is, admittedly, non-rational if not irrational. It is a fact that an argument may be convincing "but not compelling"; it is true that "the heart has reasons of its own which the intellect knows nothing of," as Pascal says. But a true apologetic must insist that true reasonableness is the satisfaction of the *whole* consciousness of man. Man cannot reason with his head apart from his heart. A man cannot think without blood in his brain; he cannot reason without emotion. The heart *may* bias the head, yet the head cannot say, "I have no need of thee." Dr. MacIntosh gives a most lucid and forcible argument for the belief that Jesus is truly the Son of God. It would be hard to find a better argument in equal compass (forty-two pages), or, indeed, in much larger form.

The lecture by Dr. Laidlaw, "What do we mean by the Holy Spirit?" is packed full of thoughts, yet so carefully are these expressed that there seems no crowding, no confusing. It must be read for itself.

As would be expected, Dr. Lindsay's lecture on the "Catholic Church" is of great value. The Church is "the communion of saints." It is a unity. It has authority. This authority is democratic; it pertains to the body of Christians, not to supposed rulers. It is sacerdotal; all its members have the right to approach God at all times and in every place. There is one mediator only. It is a fellowship. Fellowship with God has been thought of as absolutely independent of outward organization. Again, it has been thought of as absolutely dependent on organization. These two antagonistic conceptions existed side by side till the Reformation. The Church owes its existence to the Word of God. Dr. Lindsay does not, but he probably would, consent to define the Church as the visible response to the Word of God. He says, "The Church is made visible by the proclamation of the Word and by the manifestation of Faith."

Dr. Denney's lecture is on "Can Sin be Forgiven?" Sin is positive. "When we sin, we put our being into it, and our will." "We spend force pushing something aside which resists us as we push." "Can sin be forgiven?" Nature cannot forgive sin. Only a personal God can. He can. The supreme example of the forgiveness of sin is in the case of "the prodigal son." The love of the father was

"a pardoning love." "How do we know that God is love?" The answer is, "We know it in Christ." Atonement, expiation "are the fruit of reflection on forgiveness rather than the way to experience forgiveness." "A doctrine of atonement is a doctrine of the cost of forgiveness to God." Forgiveness costs God. He sees "sin, feels it, mourns it, tastes the agony of it" in Jesus Christ. "Keep your face toward Christ and His passion."

The subject Mr. Simpson treats is, "Is there Life after Death?" It is, from the argumentative point of view, the most difficult of all. He presents his argument with clearness and force and even beauty. In brief, "man *may* be immortal," "man *ought to be* immortal," and on the basis of the Gospel, "man *is* immortal." This argument he ably sustains. We miss any allusion to the difference between immortality and eternal life.

This review of these lectures, though hasty, is not what it is meant to be if it fail to suggest that in them we have not merely "*multum in parvo*," but a practical treatise on subjects which thinking men are eager to have preachers present from the pulpit, and yet the imperfect handling of which is most harmful.

Auburn, N. Y.

ALLEN MACY DULLES.

V.—PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

THE EVANGELISTIC NOTE. By W. J. DAWSON, Author of *The Reproach of Christ*, *The Life of Christ*, *The Threshold of Manhood*, etc. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1905. 8vo; pp. 282. \$1.25 net.

This volume has an opening essay on the topic which gives name to the book and the remaining chapters are sermons or addresses delivered, for the most part, during the author's "mission" in Plymouth Church, Brooklyn. Dr. Dawson's return to this country and his visits to various cities at the present time (April, 1905) give special interest to the appearance of this volume. It is always a difficult task to judge a preacher from impressions gained only by reading his sermons. It is not our good fortune to have heard Dr. Dawson. We are asked to write a critique of this volume, not of its author; happily so, for we have only this book on which to base any view or review. From his own incidentally biographical note, we are able to learn that Dr. Dawson was the pastor of a large, wealthy, prosperous and influential church in London. In taking stock of his work, during his vacation days in 1902, he decided that, although it might pass with the world as successful, nevertheless it was in a very distinct and painful sense a failure. And he was not able to locate the cause of this. Not long after, while attending an evangelistic conference at Brighton, he was deeply impressed by an address delivered by the Rev. Dr. R. F. Horton, and at the same conference, in attending an evangelistic service conducted by Gypsy Smith, a well-known English evangelist, he was suddenly enabled to see what it was that was missing in his own work. Immediately he entered upon a new era in his ministry. He went home and very soon introduced Gypsy Smith with his methods of reaching people. He was greatly surprised at the reception accorded these innovations by his own congregation and at the response from those on the outside. His church was quickly transformed from an old centre of conventional respectability to a great evangelistic agency, with a wonderful power upon all classes of the surrounding population. Always a man of culture, rather averse to the usual tactics of the evangelist, he suddenly finds himself thrust forward as a great evangelist; he comes to Brooklyn, where he holds a great mission in Plymouth Church; he goes to Des Moines to be present at the National Council of Congregationalism; and wherever he goes the telling of his "story" stirs up deep interest and great enthusiasm. And now again he is on this side of the Atlantic, preaching his gospel with *The Evangelistic Note*. One need not read this volume very

carefully to perceive that in Dr. Dawson's work "The New Evangelism" is paired with "The New Theology." He is willing to admit that "the liberal theology has often been associated rather with social than spiritual zeal" (p. 26); but he also argues that when to its deep knowledge it "adds the burning faith begotten of vital spiritual experience, it will become the greatest power for evangelism that the world has ever known" (p. 28). This is certainly an extravagant claim for an evangelist to make concerning a certain *school* of Christian theology. If the daily papers reported Dr. Dawson correctly, he recently said in Boston: "The less theology the better for me." Is the good man consistent with himself? We were interested in hearing a friend, of distinctly liberal theological views, after having heard Dr. Dawson, thank God that the day has now come when, in the fusing fervor of evangelistic activities, there is no longer any liberal theology or conservative theology, no new or old—it is all one. But Dr. Dawson is not so naïve in this essay. Given the "vital spiritual experience"—does it not occur to Dr. Dawson that it is a tremendously significant fact that up to date, as he intimates, this "vital spiritual experience" has not been much in evidence?—the liberal theology far excels the conservative in evangelistic work.

Now this is not our affair, this introducing of comparisons—it is Dr. Dawson's. Whether or not they are odious, coming from a soul-winning evangelist, they challenge a careful reading of these sermons, with his words in mind. However, we are bound to remark that a distinction is to be observed between the spirit and the substance of a man's preaching. No one can doubt the earnestness, sincerity, piety, power of the preacher of these sermons. But these are subjective and can be judged only by the listener. They may be *only* psychological, or they may be genuinely spiritual. A man may be deeply in earnest, transparently honest, profoundly devout in preaching downright error, and he may be conspicuously successful in arresting and impressing and helping men along the line of an unselfish social service, even though what he preaches may be only a half gospel or no gospel at all.

We believe that it is neither unkind nor unjust to say that, judged by this volume, Dr. Dawson is no such preacher as the world would call great. His style is elegant, his thought is strong, his exegesis is scant and not always above criticism, his homiletical methods are sometimes bold and hazardous and sometimes captivately ingenious, and his spirit is warm, sympathetic and winsome. But his themes and discourses betray the limitations inseparable from his point of view. In his sermon on the "Social Significance of Love" we are again treated to the old, old saw, "Christianity is not dogma, it is conduct" (p. 65), in which the latter member of the remark is just as far from the truth as is the idea disclaimed in the former. In his sermon on "The Courage to Forget," repentance is wholly overlooked, forgiveness of sin is presented not as an act of grace only, but as an act of justice, and the chief argument is that "we deserve a new chance, because we are capable of a new chance." If we turn to the sermon on "Saving Faith" we may find what we have failed to find elsewhere; but this is what we find: "Christ suggests but one question as cardinal: do you grant or do you not grant the spiritual nature of man?" (p. 260); "The thing that does condemn a man is disbelief in his own soul. The thing that saves a man is belief in his own soul. How far that belief may go, or what it may include, will vary; but the abiding and invariable factor of belief is this belief in man as a creature with a soul" (p. 261).

Now it may be an ungracious task to speak one's mind upon such sermons as these. It is this: Dr. Dawson's liberal theology restricts his range of vision so that he misses some of the very essential elements of evangelical Christianity. We are not pleading for theology, *qua* theology; but, Dr. Dawson in Boston to the contrary notwithstanding, his sermons are full of theology, of a sort. There are some important omissions in these sermons. The New Testament says, "Believe

on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved"; Dr. Dawson says, "Believe in thine own soul and thou shalt be saved." This is but "a change of emphasis," perhaps, but it is a tremendous and a portentous change. Where in these sermons is the great truth, in any form, of the Atonement, of Repentance for Sin, of Faith in Jesus Christ, of Guilt before God, set forth? We are reminded that questions concerning the Scriptures are neither here nor there to the evangelist: "I am wisely indifferent whether Bacon or Shakespeare wrote 'Hamlet' so long as I have 'Hamlet'" (p. 26); the inference must be that with a Coleridge-like indifference to the four Gospels, we are to be content if we only have THE GOSPEL.

We wonder whether Dr. Dawson is in a position to set forth the whole Gospel of Jesus Christ. We dislike and resent his comparison of the new theology with the old. It is at the best, as we are frequently admonished, unworthy the catholic spirit of the true evangelist. Liberalism even in the mouth of a loving evangelist can be so dogmatic as to be unseemly. The evangelistic trophies of the past have not been won by the propagators of the liberal theology. It has not been the preacher who draws his text from a mangled or mutilated Bible who has reached and saved most men from sin. Destructive Criticism and attenuated Dogmatics are too new in the role of Evangelism to vaunt themselves so boastfully. This volume is not reassuring. We have not so learned Christ. We question the wisdom of welcoming the new theology under the guise of a new evangelism. The evangelistic note is false if it ring not true to the evangelical note. The best theology for the preacher and for the hearer, saint or sinner, is the old truth, heralded through the centuries and in these last times proclaimed by Spurgeon and Moody and the rest. We cannot question that Dr. Dawson preaches truth and reaches men; neither can we question that if he would preach more of the truth, he would either reach more men or would reach men more effectively. We do not say that these sermons preach a false Gospel; we do say that we fear that they preach a partial gospel; and, indeed, is not a partial gospel in so far a false gospel? It has been said to the writer by one who grants that such criticisms on this volume are just and fair, that Dr. Dawson does preach the parts that are here so conspicuously and so sadly missing. We have only the sermons here printed from which to judge; but, even so, in such a volume as this, it is significant that they do not appear. If these sermons, presumed to strike *The Evangelistic Note*, do not fairly present Dr. Dawson's point of view and the subjects and substance and spirit of his preaching, then, on that account, the volume is open to serious criticism. It is a question whether an evangelist is wise in taking sides in theological controversies as such; it does not seem to be a question with Dr. Dawson, however. We believe the liberal theology is no more preachable than the new; and is it as catholic, as comprehensive, as Biblical? Nevertheless, if Christ is preached, "we therein do rejoice, yea, and will rejoice" (Philippians i. 18).

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

THE FACE BEYOND THE DOOR. By COULSON KERNAHAN. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1904. Pp. 110. 40 cents net.

The writer of this dainty little volume says of himself that he is neither a scholar nor a theologian; rather he prefers to characterize himself as a man of "imaginative temperament." The book fully confirms this estimate of himself. It gives us the reveries of a dreamy doubter who had once believed. An angel is represented as coming to him and having conversation with him, answering his questions, especially concerning the immortality of the soul. The book is written in fine English, the style is somewhat quaint, the tone thoughtful and reverent, and the doctrinal elements of the angel's teaching, while here and there slipping a cog, are, in the main, true to the revelations of Holy Scripture.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

LEAVES FOR QUIET HOURS. By GEORGE MATHESON, F.R.S.E., LL.D. (formerly Minister of the Parish of St. Bernards, Edinburgh), Author of *The Representative Men of the Bible*, *Studies of the Portrait of Christ*, *Moments on the Mount*, etc. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1904. 8vo, pp. vi, 288.

No one who is familiar with the author's former books needs to be told that this is a volume to be welcomed and prized by all thoughtful and intelligent Christian people. Few men have the homiletic insight, coupled with the faculty for poetic expression, which Dr. Matheson possesses. He handles a text with the deft but reverent hand of a real genius. Most of these papers are exquisite in both conception and expression. They are all very short, each presenting first "a thought" and then a feeling or a prayer. In only one or two instances should we say that the theme, excellent in itself, is not quite germane to the text from which it is taken. We shall have to think again before agreeing with the author when he says that there was no prayer in Eden. In richness of thought and diction these meditations are unique; sometimes the writer seems to have great difficulty in keeping back the torrent of alliterations which comes surging down upon his pen. For example this, in an apostrophe to his soul, in the paper on "The Education of Bereavement": "Thou hast soared by thy sorrow; thou hast loved by thy loss: thou hast widened by thy weeping; thou hast grown by thy grief; thou hast broadened in being broken; thou hast enlarged thy sympathy by emptying out thy treasures; the storm that shook thy nest taught thee to fly" (p. 149).

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

RELIGION AND THE HIGHER LIFE. Talks to Students. By WILLIAM RAINEY HARPER, President of the University of Chicago. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1904. 8vo, pp. ix, 184. \$1.00 net.

This volume contains an even dozen addresses to students upon a variety of subjects in which student hearers might be presumed to be interested. They are somewhat informal, being practical rather than didactic, and suited more to impress character than to inform the mind. For this design they are well adapted, and there are in them so many wholesome truths and so many helpful bits of advice that they are well worthy of being preserved in this permanent form.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

HOME IDEALS. By WAYLAND HOYT, D.D., LL.D. Philadelphia: Griffith and Rowland Press, 1904. 12mo; pp. 115.

In this beautiful little book Dr. Hoyt offers a series of six charming talks, in sermon form, on such topics of universal interest as courtship and marriage, and the respective duties of husband and wife, and brother and sister in the home circle. The last discourse, on "Large Life in Small Place," is a homiletical gem, as helpful, too, as it is beautiful. The style has the well-known characteristics of the author's devotional publications. The many literary allusions and citations will no doubt give many a reader the inspiration for a better acquaintance with Browning and Tennyson, with Carlyle and Ruskin. We are especially pleased with the deeply religious spirit that pervades the treatment of these important themes. The book has a freshness and fragrance and inspiring vigor that make one think of a breeze from the meadows on a sultry summer day. We can only express the hope that many lovers, and husbands and wives, and brothers and sisters will find in these attractive paragraphs a word of wise counsel and good cheer.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

THE LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN. By Rev. G. CAMPBELL MORGAN, D.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1904. 12mo; pp. 114.

The "Life of the Christian" is here treated under the following six heads: Its Nature, Its Substance, Its Expression, Its Consciousness, Its Testing, Its Value. To say that this book is thoroughly worthy of the man who to-day is so widely regarded as the greatest popular expounder of the Word of God is high but well-deserved praise. Often child-like in his simplicity, even when speaking on the profoundest themes of the Gospel; absolutely fearless in handling the problems of experimental religion; overmastered by the desire to give his words a practical bearing upon the reader's daily conduct; in the best sense apologetic in aim, yet never condescending to apologize for his God-given message, but delighting most of all to let the sacred oracles interpret themselves; abounding in apt, even if sometimes homely illustrations; with a genius for making the commonplace things of life full of new interest and meaning; with a vision of faith that often startles by the amplitude of its sweep and the energy of its hold upon some gracious promise of Scripture or some unseen but eternal reality of the spiritual realm; and with a directness of speech that immediately grips the reader and then never fails to carry him along by the sheer inertia of the author's thought and the fervor of his convictions—the celebrated preacher here gives us a series of truly wonderful discourses. It is a cause for gratitude and joy that such works as this are having so large a vogue. We may not, from some points of view, regard Dr. Morgan's sermons as models, but the fact remains that he knows well how to speak to this age the message it needs most of all to hear: it is the old, old story, told with simplicity, candor, beauty, and the power that is born of the conviction that the message is true and therefore supremely worth telling.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

HUMANITY AND GOD. By SAMUEL CHADWICK. New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company. 8vo; pp. 356.

A volume of sermons characterized by vivacity of style and deep evangelical thought. These discourses are much more theological than are most volumes of popular sermons now appearing. There is in them much strong food for solid thought and devout reflection. They are neither didactic nor dogmatic, and yet they set forth some of the great doctrines of the Christian faith in such a rational light as to give them their true bearings upon all our knowing and all our doing. Their style is monotonously epigrammatical. The sententious declarative, page after page, is hardly best suited for discursive reading or for the best poise in setting forth the many-sided truths of the Gospel. Yet, all in all, the faults to be mentioned are incidental and few, while the merits of the volume are many and great.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

ELIMS OF LIFE AND OTHER SERMONS. By the Rev. J. D. JONES. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company. 12mo; pp. 256. \$1.00 net.

It is always difficult to appreciate a sermon one has only read. Probably these sermons appeared to the preacher and his friends as above the ordinary. They will likely seem to the reader just like thousands of sermons which are preached every Sunday—no better, no worse. This is not to condemn them. Most of us need to have our everyday privileges and duties put before us quite often. These discourses present sometimes very one-sided views, notably the one on "The Unaccountable Man," but generally these views are corrected by other passages or sermons. As modes of thought and expression, they express what is current in theology.

Princeton.

W. B. SHEDDAN.

VI.—GENERAL LITERATURE.

A YANKEE ON THE YANGTZE: Being a Narrative of a Journey from Shanghai through the Central Kingdom to Burma. By WILLIAM EDGAR GEIL, Author of *The Isle that is Called Patmos, Ocean and Isle, Laodicea; or, the Story of a Marble Foot*. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1904. 8vo; pp. xv, 312. \$1.50 net.

Books on China are becoming almost as numerous as readers on China, and here we have another bidding for popular acceptance and favor. It is not a scientifically descriptive treatise; it is innocent of Chinese history in any formal sense, either ancient or modern; it is not a narrative of the more than century old work of Protestant missions in the Middle Kingdom. Neither is it exactly a mere reprint of the author's journal during his trip westward across China, though it is a nearer approach to this than anything else. It is personal in that it traces the author's personal experiences on a ninety-nine days' journey westward from the Yellow Sea to Burma.

The book is written with a brilliant dash; it seems almost like a reporter's account of some last night's thrilling adventure. The author is not wholly ignorant of American slang, and, although he never shows irreverence, either in spirit or speech, yet his book could certainly not with fairness be criticised as being either stilted or stiff. It does not abound in abstract generalizations or in many very informing observations. Mr. Geil seems to be one of those who see very clearly, but who do not see very far. Such a book may be the very kind that is suited to reach Western readers and to teach them more concerning China than would Williams' *Middle Kingdom* or some learned essay gleaned from the encyclopædias. The book has a hundred unusually fine photographic illustrations, but surely it ought to have had at least one map.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

A TALE OF THE KLOSTER. A Romance of the German Mystics of the Cocalico. By BROTHER JABEZ. Illustrations by FRANK McKERNAN. Philadelphia: Griffith and Rowland Press, 1904. 8vo; pp. 336.

The *Tale* has a double interest and charm: there is a romantic element which makes one delight in the story for its own sake, and there is a sufficient amount of historic background to flavor the reader's enjoyment of the plot with the consciousness that he is making a substantial contribution to his knowledge of the time and place in which the characters lived and moved and had their being. And it is certainly a most engaging picture we here have of the industrial, the educational, and especially the religious life of those noble-hearted Pennsylvania Germans of the colonial days. The story halts somewhat here and there, but the interest is sustained by the delightfully weird account of the cloistral life of those semi-monastic communities, bringing with them, as they did, into the very heart of the New World wilderness their ancestral superstitions, their pietistic vagaries, and their mediæval asceticism. The author has judiciously refrained from making extensive use of their dialect, that nondescript Americanized German of theirs, but the occasional insertion of a characteristic word or idiom will no doubt prove a gustable addition to the realism of the narrative for many a reader hailing from the Lancaster section of Pennsylvania.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.





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